How Democracy Leads to Tyranny

To answer the questions of why De Tocqueville and Mill think that democracy is a threat to the liberty of the individual and whether they are right, this paper will show that both De Tocqueville and Mill viewed democracy as a mechanism that could easily become tyrannical and thus overwhelm one's individual liberty. Considering that democracy in its various forms (direct, representative, constitutional) is capable of being corrupted (voters and/or representatives may be bribed, coerced, misinformed, misled, subjugated, harassed, mobbed, and so on), it is not difficult to see that both Tocqueville and Mill are correct in their arguments: democracy can be a threat to the liberty of the individual -- precisely because it is not necessarily predicated on truth, rightness, or goodness. Is there any system of government that does not represent a potential threat to the liberty of the individual when it is not predicated on truth, rightness or goodness? As Plato argues in The Republic, the ideal state is one that is led by a philosopher-king, who pursues truth and views the citizens as his own children, and who makes correct decisions for them in the same manner as a father makes for his family.[footnoteRef:1] For society to function there has to be some limit as to what is permitted and what is not permitted (in terms of rightness and wrongness). Mill's standpoint is that what is permitted should be based on what is deemed to make them happiest -- i.e., the greatest good for society (a pragmatic -- or utilitarian -- consideration). For Tocqueville, the question of what is permitted has a decidedly more moral character (which is rooted in his traditional sense of moral order as promoted by the Church). Ironically, personal liberty, in both cases, takes a back seat to moral or natural order and the common good. [1: Plato, The Republic, Book V. http://www.iep.utm.edu/republic/#SH1e]

The concept of liberty was enshrined in Western society along with fraternity and equality during the Enlightenment -- the French Revolution formally -- but practically speaking in the American Revolution. De Tocqueville, a French Catholic who travelled to America to investigate firsthand the grand democratic experiment, described some of the inherent conflicts of interest posed by liberty in a democratic society: as a Catholic, Tocqueville's perspective was fashioned by a sense of moral order and correctness (right and wrong according to both natural and supernatural law) -- and therein lay the difficulty. Liberty of the press, for instance, could be seen as a safeguard against tyranny and authoritarianism by giving voice to the opinion of just men and women -- but it could also give way to the base and/or false opinions of an individual suddenly becoming adopted by the whole, which would be bad in an altogether different way (there would be liberty but error would reign).[footnoteRef:2] With error reigning over the minds of men, liberty would not last long in turn, for the need for more and more control would quickly be evident (and control would likely not be applied in a correct or moral manner). [2: Alexander De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, chapter 11, para 3. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/815/815-h/815-h.htm#link2HCH0026]

Mill likewise held that one's personal actions are "right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."[footnoteRef:3] In order to elaborate on this definition of rightness, Mill had to define happiness -- which he did from an inherently Enlightenment perspective. For Mill, happiness is the absence of pain. In terms of governance, social pain comes by way of social tyranny, which is produced by the issuance of "wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which [society] ought not to meddle."[footnoteRef:4] Mill speaks of propriety with the same reverence as Tocqueville inherently holds for natural and moral law. He warned that individuals need to be protected "against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them."[footnoteRef:5] Finding the limit of "legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence" was a matter that society must consider "as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs."[footnoteRef:6] That limit, today, is less clear than it was in Mill's own time. [3: J. S. Mill, On Liberty, chapter 2, para 2. https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill2.htm] [4: J. S. Mill, On Liberty, introduction, para 5. http://www.bartleby.com/130/1.html] [5: J. S. Mill, On Liberty, introduction, para 5. http://www.bartleby.com/130/1.html] [6: J. S. Mill, On Liberty, introduction, para 5. http://www.bartleby.com/130/1.html]

The reason it is less clear is that the modern conception of democracy is less clear, just as the modern conception of goodness, rightness, correctness, truth, and virtue are less clear.[footnoteRef:7] Lickona argues that there is "no consensus" as to what character education even means or what it should consist of. Meanwhile, education curriculum is constructed by a group at a centralized level of power (individuals appointed by the President). Democracy has little to do with how various aspects of society are situated. As Kolodny notes, "an alternative form of rule, where social decisions would be made by an unchosen class, whether defined by birth, or virtue, or training, is not so much as seriously contemplated"[footnoteRef:8] -- and yet it is precisely what exists in today's so-called democractic societies. In fact, the inverse of what Mill and Tocqueville feared has come true: personal liberty (to a degree) is guaranteed (one may choose one's gender, one's sexual preferences, one's method of becoming an indentured servant) -- but one has very little choice as to who will govern (a two party system that so often resembles a one party system does not provide much choice, after all). Jones notes that this is the modern trade-off: personal liberty (typically sexual) for totalitarian control (political submission).[footnoteRef:9] By enshrining liberty in 1791, the West yielded up its liberty: in other words, liberty is not a foundation upon which one builds, but rather an outcome that is yielded from adherence to truth, rightness and order, as Plato indicated -- and what Mill and Tocqueville each in their own ways recognized as the common good (greatest happiness) or natural/moral law. [7: T. Lickona, "The Return of Character Education," Educational Leadership, vol. 51, no. 3 (1993), 6.] [8: Niko Kolodny, "Rule Over None I: What Justifies Democracy?" Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 42, no. 3 (2014), 195.] [9: E. M. Jones, Libido Dominandi (IN: St. Augustine Press, 2000), 8.]

Democracy brings the illusion of the permanence and authenticity of personal choice. That does not mean that personal choice is not possible in a democracy. It can be; it can also be lost. Democracy carries with it very specific responsibilities, as in any society. The responsibility consists of acting as Plato's philosopher-king -- and this is implicit in what Mill does: he writes his philosophy for the common man to read and expects that the educated man (aristocratic man) will read it, will enlighten himself, and will stay informed with regard to the best present course of action open to him and the rest of society. However, the common man at Mill's point in time could very well be confined to the aristocracy -- and the same holds for Tocqueville, as the aristocracy was primarily the educated class. Indeed, voting and being democratic was an exercise reserved for the aristocracy -- land owners (this is how America was founded). Thus, the "common man" as he is known today (the day laborer or middle class man usually does not own land -- his home, if he "owns" it is usually bought with a loan from a bank, which really "owns" the home until the mortgagee pays off the debt over 15 to 30+ years) has rights which were not available to him 200 years ago. He has assumed much and bought into the American Dream, which has spread all across the West (and much of the world) -- the idea that democracy (personal choice) can open up all possibilities to him. The reality so often proves the opposite. A "vote" is usually all the choice he has. The real decisions -- the big ones concerning trade, interest rates, going to war, etc. -- are made by individuals at a much higher level (the representatives) who typically represent interests of other entities (such as those who supported their campaign or who have allowed them to have their "career" in politics: a federal congressman is paid well above the middle class average, after all). Meanwhile, the middle class man is obliged to obey the laws, regulations, tax code, TSA orders at airports, and so on that the ruling establishment passes on his behalf. The little bit of liberty that he is allowed is specifically in the realm of the sensual: he can choose where to eat, what to smoke, whom to pursue for sexual intercourse. Even the realm of the intellectual is limited to him: he may not discuss certain matters (those that are politically incorrect) for fear of ruining his career and public name.

But America has always been like this -- even before the Revolution. Tocqueville describes it as such in chapter 2 of Democracy in America: "The chief care of the legislators, in this body of penal laws, was the maintenance of orderly conduct and good morals in the community: they constantly invaded the domain of conscience, and there was scarcely a sin which was not subject to magisterial censure."[footnoteRef:10] The community magistrates in the 17th century were not interested in personal liberty but in control. They were no more in line with the concept of the greatest happiness, truth, or rightness than today's ruling class but rather with the idea of conformity and control. They did not welcome open discussion on ideas or the nature of truth, religion, sexuality, war, nature, etc. They dictated terms and expected them to be observed -- or else the individual who failed to do so would be cast out. Hawthorne's Scarlett Letter depicts just such a scenario -- and it is representative of the American ethos, the Puritanism that shaped its character, and the reason why democracy in general was doomed to fail in the U.S. It was not based on the truth sought by Plato's philosopher-king but rather on control and the desire to subjugate others. Both Mill and Tocqueville surmised as much when confronted with the issue of democracy. They saw clearly that a democracy was no guarantee of personal liberty -- for the latter does not flow from the former but rather the inverse: democracy flows from liberty -- and liberty flows from adherence to truth. In modern society, where truth is essentially a casualty, as Lickona points out, what is left but the need for absolute control, or in short tyranny? [10: Alexander De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, chapter 2 -- part 2, para 8. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/815/815-h/815-h.htm#link2HCH0003]

In conclusion, Tocqueville and Mill are both correct in determining that democracy is a threat to liberty. First, democracy is vulnerable to corruption at every level (from the voter to the legislator to the executive to the judicial). Human nature is not above corruption and left to a legalistic system will always find ways to utilize legalese to its own ends as opposed to the ends for which it is supposed to function. Second, it acts as an illusion of choice in the long run, while the ruling class makes the decisions that impact the lower classes' lives. Democracy offers the "common man" the hope of having a say in how one's government goes about the business of overseeing the state -- but the reality is much more complex than the simple narrative of everyone having a vote and a say implies. The reality is that ruling classes in the West never intended to have equality among men and women -- even as this ideal was enshrined by the enlightened revolutionaries (and regicides) in Paris in 1791. It is no surprise that the Romantic Era followed directly thereupon: the ideals of the Enlightenment were tied to notions that were one part noble, one part fantasy, and one part horrific.

Bibliography

De Tocqueville, Alexander. Democracy in America. Gutenberg.

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/815/815-h/815-h.htm#link2HCH0003

Jones, E. Michael. Libido Dominandi. IN: St. Augustine Press, 2000.

Kolodny, Niko. "Rule Over None I: What Justifies Democracy?" Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 42, no. 3 (2014): 195-208.

Lickona, T. "The Return of Character Education," Educational Leadership, vol. 51, no. 3

(1993): 6-11.

Mill, J. S. On Liberty. Bartleby. http://www.bartleby.com/130/1.html

Plato. The Republic. IEP. http://www.iep.utm.edu/republic/#SH1e