How Media Coverage of Operation Desert Storm was Influenced by the U.S. Government

The Effects of Operation Desert Storm on Human Behaviors, Human Expression and Ethics
Introduction
In early 1991, the United States launched Operation Desert Storm in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait while the American public held its collective breath to see whether Hussein’s threat to wage “the mother of all battles,” including threats to use chemical weapons of mass destruction, would come to fruition. Although the Iraqi military was never able to live up to their leader’s claims, the political and social fallout from this successful prosecution of this regional war by the United States had long-term implications for American political and military leaders alike. This topic is important to analyze today because the Middle East remains a global hotspot with the very real potential to erupt in other conflicts with Western powers in general and the United States in particular. To determine the facts, the overarching purpose of this paper is to review the relevant literature to provide an analysis of the humanities that were involved in the lead-up and aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, a critical analysis of the situation and salient post-conflict recommendations. Finally, a summary of the results of the literature review and the key findings that emerged from the research are presented in the paper’s conclusion, followed by some personal reflections about my participation in Operational Desert Storm and its effect on the American consciousness.
Analysis of Humanities
On January 16, 1991, President George H. W. Bush launched the military intervention, Operation Desert Storm, in an effort to force occupying Iraqi troops out and restore Kuwait’s democratic institutions (Taylor, 2016). Like many other military engagements, Operation Desert Storm involved extensive planning operations and the coordination of hundreds of thousands of American and coalition troops which were massed along the Saudi-Iraqi border awaiting the word from military leaders to advance. When the deadline for withdrawal by January 15, 1991 that was set by the United Nations expired with no response from Iraqi’s political or military leadership, the U.S.-led coalition initiated an 5-week bombing campaign of Iraqi command and control centers an effort to dilute their war-fighting capabilities (Taylor, 2015).
Following the cessation of the bombing campaign and despite concerns that Saddam Hussein might unleash chemical weapons at the time, coalition forces initiated a ground invasion in February 1991 which was successful in quickly driving Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. Coalition forces then advanced into Iraq itself but settled for a cease fire within 100 hours which left Hussein in power, an outcome that was highly controversial then and now (Taylor, 2015).
Against the backdrop of other military conflicts prosecuted by the United States, the 300 or so casualties (see Appendix A) that resulted from this “100-hour war” were incredibly minimal, but the corresponding human behaviors that resulted from this war were not. As noted in the introduction, some of the behavioral responses to this conflict included an initial “rally ‘round the flag” reaction that swept the nation which is commonplace during times of perceived threats to national security. In fact, throughout its history, Americans have been taught from an early age that their country is the greatest nation in the world, and it is their patriotic duty to “rally ‘round the flag” in times of crisis, including most especially when the United States is at war. Consequently, the American’s public’s response to Operation Desert Storm was no exception, at least during the early phases of the conflict and immediately thereafter. In this regard, Lindsey and Smith (2003) report that, “The Iraq War validated a basic rule of American politics: the American public closes ranks in times of national crisis” (p. 21).
Indeed, the same reaction has been experienced to some extent in response to the ongoing global coronavirus pandemic when the American public rewarded President Trump with a modest “bump” in his popularity ratings. For example, one historian points out that, “[President] Bush, remembering the lessons of Vietnam, sought public support. Although there were scant opponents of the conflict, the vast majority of Americans and a narrow majority of the Congress supported the President's actions” (Operation Desert Storm, 2020, para. 3). The intensity of the burst of national patriotism and exultation in response to Operation Desert Storm, though, was relatively brief due in large part to the brevity of the conflict and the minimal casualties that were suffered as a result. Moreover, there were no dancing or public celebrations in the street or ticker tape parades, just an overwhelming sense of relief at the quick outcome with few American casualties as well as a growing appreciation for the war-fighting capability of the American military.
This positive reaction, however, was in sharp contrast to the American public’s views about becoming further embroiled in the Middle East prior to Operation Desert Storm. For instance, according to Lindsey and Smith (2003), “In the prolonged march to war, the public was divided and ambivalent about the wisdom of invading Iraq rather than relying on continued United Nations weapons inspections” (p. 21). Despite these negative views, however, the Bush administration’s public relations campaign in support of military intervention in Iraq was highly effective in positively influencing the American public’s views, especially after the successful outcome at minimal cost became apparent.
Further, the positive response to America’s intervention in Iraq extended beyond the Oval Office to include other democratic institutions. In this regard, Lindsey and Smith (2003) conclude that, “Most of those doubts evaporated once the bombs began falling [and] the surge of patriotism not only boosted public support for President Bush, but extended beyond the White House to raise optimism about the country's institutions and American society as a whole” (p. 22). In sum, the United States went to war with Iraq and came out on top, and this outcome was widely viewed by the American public as a job well done by those who were trained for the purpose.
Notwithstanding the successful outcome of the military intervention in Operation Desert Storm, though, there were some profound ethical questions that emerged prior to and following its conclusion that continue to be debated today (Khan, 2011). In some cases, in the years leading up to Operation Desert Storm, critics argued that America’s interventions in the Middle East, including Iraq, were being fueled by its interests in the region’s oil reserves as exemplified by the Doonesbury comic strip below.
Figure 1. Doonesbury comic strip illustrating American public’s views about U.S. intervention in the Middle East
Source: https://www.yachana.org/research/writings/draft/
Taken together, it is clear that whenever a country goes to war, there are serious ramifications that are involved, some of which such as the number of casualties are readily discernible. In other cases, however, the impact of waging war may be less obvious due to the manner in which the conflict is managed by the U.S. government and these issues are discussed further below.
Critical Analysis of Situation & Recommendations
The widespread elation in the United States over the minimal losses of American lives virtually ignored the other human costs that were caused by this military intervention. For example, according to Stilwell (2015), “More Americans died from HIV infection in 1991 than in Operation Desert Storm. An estimated 100,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed in the conflict, while the United States had only 383 fatalities in the region” (para. 4). These grim statistics, of course, were available to the American public if they were interested, but the record shows that public opinion was carefully manipulated in the days leading up to the intervention and in the months following its cessation. In this regard, one military analyst emphasizes that, “The [U.S.] public was manipulated as surreptitiously as is practiced by most authoritarian regimes. The U.S. Secretary of Defense and his instrument, the U.S. Army, in effect censored every media outlet, U.S. and foreign” (Clotzer, 2002, p. 34).
More troubling still, perhaps, from an ethical perspective was the fact that the censorship of the media’s coverage of Operational Desert Storm was specifically directed by the nation’s commander in chief. As Clotzer (2002) points out, “Control over news, was absolute. The directive came directly from former President George H. W. Bush. The President was horrified at the possibility that millions could view the war wounded and dead, Allied or Iraqi” (p. 34). In reality, though, there was some justification in support of this seemingly dystopian communication strategy that was based on the president’s empirical observations and experiences but the implications were chilling. For example, Clotzer adds that:
As a war veteran, [Bush] remembered the agony of the wounded. He also remembered the split television screen during the Panama invasion, when he was wisecracking with reporters on one half, while the other half of the screen showed arrival ceremonies of the American soldiers killed in Panama. As of then, news coverage of honor guard ceremonies was banned. President Bill Clinton continued the ban. (2002, p.35)
In other words, the president and like-minded political and military leaders believed that the harsh realities of actual war were too much for the American public’s sensitivities and they sought to avoid this negative response to the maximum extent possible in a democratic republic. This lack of transparency, though, has special relevant for contemporary issues such as the U.S. government’s sluggish response to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic as well as the precedents these actions represent for the future of the United States as a democratic republic.
In addition, the government’s actions during Operation Desert Storm also have significant implications for future military engagement that might place U.S. troops in harm’s way yet again. For example, according to Curtis (2015), “The phenomenal success of U.S. ‘shock and awe’ bombing persuaded American planners thereafter to expect more from air power than it since has proven capable of delivering, to our considerable frustration since 9/11” (p. 25). Likewise, Tilford (1993) argues that America’s one-sided victory in Operation Desert Storm persuaded American military leaders that technological solutions could replace soldiers on the battlefield partially or even entirely. In this regard Tilford (1993) points out that, “Many writers proclaimed not only the American military’s total recovery from the Vietnam war but also contended that Desert Storm heralded the advent of a military technological revolution” (p. 327).
Just as Allied military tacticians learned in World War II, however, the unique rigors of waging war effectively requires more than massive bombing campaigns but rather demands “boots on the ground” in order to ensure a successful outcome. Unfortunately, this lesson has not been learned in sufficient detail to preclude U.S. policymakers from believing that they could wage wars without suffering the enormous numbers of American casualties that characterized previous conflicts (Curtis, 2015). This view became more nuanced over the next few months as analysts questioned the rationale in support of waging a war with limited objectives that precluded the removal of the source of the problem that started it (Tilford, 1993).
While the decision to cease hostilities just 100 hours after Operation Desert Storm began was applauded by many Americans back home since it meant even fewer casualties, Saddam Hussein was still left in a position of power which required even more U.S. involvement thereafter. In other words, when it comes to war, half-measures can be even worse that total war in achieving a nation’s objectives irrespective of the initial human toll that is exacted. As noted above, though, the United States has been reluctant to wage total war by deploying tactical nuclear weapons on the modern battlefield for fear of igniting a global conflagration or suffering a permanent backlash from the international community. The net effect of this military doctrine has been to create a scenario in which new and increasingly dangerous actors arise that present the United States with novel threats that demand some type of response. As Curtis points out, “Beginning with World War I, the U.S. has been content to watch or abet the destruction or mauling of major powers across the globe, only to wonder why those who remained suddenly seemed so much more dangerous” (2015, p. 25).
Based on the foregoing, recommendations for future considerations and future areas of study would include determining when and if it is ever ethically appropriate to engage in military interventions in response to international events such as the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Although it is impossible to predict with any precision what types of events might unfold in the future that would require such a decision, it is reasonable to posit that U.S. policymakers will be confronted with similar circumstances in the future that will inevitably involve even more manipulation of the mainstream media to ensure the support of the American public. Therefore, developing contingency plans today that are based on historic realities and which recognize the need for transparency in media coverage represents a timely and valuable enterprise.
4. Conclusion
In January 1991, the U.S. launched Operation Desert Storm in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The stated mission of this military intervention was to free to people of Kuwait from the oppression of the Iraqi government and restore its democratic institutions. The research also showed, though, that many observers believed that the United States had other, ulterior motives in prosecuting this war, including most especially retaining access to the region’s massive oil reserves in the future.
The lopsided victory that was achieved by the United States during Operation Desert Storm was also characterized by the manipulation of public opinion by the U.S. government on the direct orders of the commander in chief. While the use of propaganda by the U.S. government to generate public support of military operations is certainly not new, the manipulation of the mainstream press during the lead-up to Operation Desert Storm and thereafter has some unsettling aspects that demand closer scrutiny today. This closer scrutiny is needed because the American public in general and members of the armed forces depend on the media for accurate, unbiased and timely news about events that affect their lives, and savvy soldiers fully understand that they are only receiving part of the picture from the limited coverage that is presented in Stars & Stripes.
The research was also consistent in showing that winning the hearts and minds of the American public is just as important as those of belligerents, perhaps even more so since the latter are staring down the mouth of a cannon barrel and have few viable alternatives except to comply while the former provide the economic means by which wars are waged through their tax contributions. To the extent that public opinion fails to support the U.S. government’s military actions will therefore likely be the extent to which such actions are jeopardized and their outcomes adversely affected. The United States could have won the wars in Korea and Vietnam by leaving the north of these countries radioactive wildernesses, but the nation has decided that these weapons are too dangerous to use ever again except perhaps in response to a first strike by another country. What is left in the wake of this line of decision making are mere humans covered only by thin layers of olive drab who rely on their political leaders to make informed decisions and honestly share their reasoning with them and their families and friends back home. The actions by the U.S. government with respect to Operation Desert Storm, however, failed to live up to these standards, a shortcoming that remains firmly in place today.
5. Personal Reflection
Upon reflection, I was and I am still proud of my military service in general and especially during Operation Desert Storm. Researching this project, though, opened my eyes to some of the criticisms that were directed at this intervention and how the U.S. government manipulated public opinion before and after the war was over. While I still do not feel like a pawn in the larger scheme of things, the research was consistent in showing that there are indeed two sides to every story -- and far more in some cases.
One of the most important lessons learned from completing this project was the need for effective time management. The adage that “you have to eat an elephant one bite at a time” is certainly applicable to the academic research process. My strong sense of self-efficacy, though, convinced me that completing this type of project could be accomplished in a single sitting, since this would help ensure the continuity of the thought process. Critical analyses, however, requires some thoughtful reflection that cannot be forced and I will endeavor to “eat the elephant” more slowly in the future.
Yet another lesson learned from completing this project was just how interesting the topic was to me since it represented one of my more memorable lived experiences. Of course, any topic does not necessarily have to hold personal relevance in order to be interesting, but developing a 360-degree perspective about Operation Desert Storm provided me with some compelling information that was especially relevant personally. This eye-opening experience has helped me better understand how and why the American media and White House are at such divisive odds at present, as well as the fundamental need for a free press as stressed by the Founders.
As a final thought, although war is not unique to the human species, we have become exceptionally good at it. Indeed, future generations of Americans may point to the latter half of the 20th and early 21st centuries as periods in history when the United States fought its wars with “one hand tied behind its back” because it refrained from employing all of the tactical weapons of mass destruction that were at its disposal, preferring rather to rely on “good ol’ boots on the ground” to achieve its military objectives. The decision to deploy American troops to a combat zone where their lives are in constant jeopardy must therefore be based the ethical grounds that define a just war instead of the economic interests of major oil concerns. Unfortunately, recent global events underscore the fact that prosecuting wars against other countries has a hidden ethical price tag that goes largely unnoticed until the body bags start piling up and concerning observers begin questioning the rationale that was used to justify such military actions. In the final analysis, being part of humanity means that there will always be “wars and rumors of war,” but the decision to participate requires more justification than oil reserves or perceived personal injustices against political leaders.
References
Curtis, J. (2015, November). Reflecting on strategic results of Operation Desert Storm. Army, 65(11), 24-27.
Khan, H. (2011, July 1). An unbiased estimate of present American competitiveness from deontological and teleological perspectives of utilitarianism. Competition Forum, 9(2), 348-352.
Klotzer, C. L. (2002, October). A lesson for Americans: Desert Storm operation reports were full of lies and distortions. St. Louis Journalism Review, 32(250), 34-39.
Lindsey, J. M. & Smith, C. (2003, Summer). Rally 'round the flag: Opinion in the United States before and after the Iraq War. Brookings Review, 21(3), 20-24.
Operation Desert Storm. (2020). U.S. History. Retrieved from https://www.ushistory.org/ us/60a.asp.
Stilwell, B. (2015, September 12). 21 facts about the first Gulf War. Military.com. Retrieved from https://www.military.com/undertheradar/2015/09/21-facts-about-the-first-gulf-war.
Taylor, A. (2016, January 14). Operation Desert Storm: 25 years since the first Gulf War. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/01/operation-desert-storm-25-years-since-the-first-gulf-war/424191/.
Tilford, K. H., Jr. (1993, Summer). Review: The meaning of victory in Operation Desert Storm: A review essay. Political Science Quarterly, 108(2), 327-331.
Appendix A
U.S. Military Casualties - Persian Gulf War Casualty Summary Desert Storm (as of April 10, 2020)
CASUALTY TYPE
TOTAL
ARMY
AIR FORCE
MARINES
NAVY

Killed in Action
143
96
20
22
5

Died of Wounds
4
2
0
2
0

Missing in Action - Declared Dead
0
0
0
0
0

Captured - Declared Dead
0
0
0
0
0

TOTAL HOSTILE DEATHS
147
98
20
24
5

Missing - Presumed Dead
3
02
0
1

Other Deaths
148
105
4
26
13

TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS
151
105
6
26
14

TOTAL IN-THEATER DEATHS
298
203
26
50
19



Source: Defense Casualty Analysis System (2020) at https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/ report_gulf_storm.xhtml