Operation Ajax
The war was triggered by the Anglo-Iranian crisis of 1951 to 1953. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was largely viewed as a colonial influence bent on controlling the host government and enjoying benefits from the hierarchies that resulted from a society that was divided. However, in 1951, led by campaigns championed by Prime Minister then, Mohammad Mossadeq, Iran managed to nationalize its oil resources. Slightly over two years down the line after the nationalization of its oil, the Iranian Premier was deposed (De Seve, 2020).

When the foreign powers failed to destabilize and abdicate, the British tried to dislocate the premier one more time. Following mass protests and a three-day uprising and bloodshed – the Siyer-Tir on July 21, Mohammad Mossadeq, was granted powers to appoint the chiefs of staff and the minister for war. The British noticed a chance to depose the premier from the differences between the Shah and the government. 18 Nevertheless, Mohammad Mossadeq was already suspicious of the British, thus closed their embassy in October of 1952. All the British agents plus the M16 employees under diplomatic cover had no option but to leave. After sensing that the coupe de tat could not succeed as planned, the British changed tact and resorted to using the CIA (De Seve, 2020).

Accountability of Preparations, Equipment, Logistics, and Contingency

The then British Prime Minister, along with his American counterpart President Eisenhower signed the final coup plans on July 1 and 11th, respectively. 21. The coup conspirators chose General Fazlollah Zahedi, who was the 1st interior Minister to replace Mohammad Mossadeq. Although the British could not practically carry out the coup on their own, they had a major hand in its execution by the USA. Their contribution included chosen Iranian experts who formed a secret network within the Iranian Forces, a civilian network that had existed for a long time, and constant meetings of influence with several influential Iranian politicians (Levin, 2018).

The USA contribution was more concrete and open. They provided the compound of their embassy in Tehran, its secret service operatives, and its diplomats. Kermit Roosevelt, President Theodore's grandson, who was the Chief of CIA for the Middle Eastern region, was made the field commander and coup director. The primary planner of the coup would be Dr. R.N Wilber, who worked with the secret service and had the experience of traveling across the Middle East disguised in various ways. Others were Loy Henderson and Richard Cottam, a CIA agent and the U.S Ambassador to Iran, respectively. The CIA had groomed four operatives locally, i.e., Colonel Farzanegan, who had lived in Washington but new many field officers in Iran, an agent provocateur named Ehsam Lankarani, a daring revolutionist named Tudeh, and the "Boscoe Brothers." The latter had important links with the Iranian press. They also had strong links with gang groups and mobs (Levin, 2018).

Several months before the coup, the propaganda against Mohammed Mossadeq increased. Weapons were supplied secretly tot eh groups and tribes that were in favor of the Shah. However, as the plans intensified, Mohammad Reza Shah started demonstrating that he would stand on the way of the coup. He was indecisive and hesitant at first but was eventually persuaded after spirited efforts to accept the scheme. It is not clear whether the Shah agreed with the royal powers and signed the decree to dismiss Mohammad Mossadeq from the premier position, and replaced him with General Zahedi. Using a personal interaction analysis with Dr. D. Wilber in 1969, according to Abraham, Wilber forged the royal signature. Thus, the coup had no legitimate cover. The M16 and the CIA worked together to secure the resolve of the Shah and kept reassuring him that the coup would be sustainable and that it was backed by two strong foreign powers (Levin, 2018).

Plan Execution and Recovery Measures

The coup plan had the backing of several critical royalists in Tehran. As explained by Abraham, the plan was amazingly simple. One of the nights, Colonel Nehmatollah Nasiri, the imperial Guards Commander, was to use an armored car, six army personnel, and two trucks of soldiers. They would, in a single swoop arrest, the Army Chief of Staff and the key ministers. Colonel Nehmatollah Nasiri would then proceed to Mohammed Mossadeq's home and give him the decree to dismiss him. If he declined to obey the royal decree, Colonel Nasiri would arrest him also. In the meantime, another coup contingent of the Imperial Guars would disconnect the communication channels to the Bazaar and take charge of the central communications hub, and the Chiefs of State headquarters. Zahedi was to lead a convoy to the national radio broadcaster and read the royal decree appointing him to the premiership, from there (Roosevelt, 1979).

To make sure that the coup received popular support from the public, the Boscoe Brothers and other gangs were to collect a group of civilians and go to the radio stations to loot the residences of the officers and cabinet secretaries who supported Mohammed Mossadeq. When the coup was carried out late night on August 15, it was projected to go through with little or no resistance at all. However, it was quickly...…in 1953(Levin, 2018).

Recommendations

The U.S. and Britain blatantly ignored international law and pursued a hidden change of regime, and set the stage for a portent adversary in the Middle East. However, the originally perceived enemy was not Iran. The shocks are still evident. Britain accused Iran of going against the legal rights of the company and pushed for the boycott of oil from Iran. The campaign resulted in the financial crisis in Iran. Britain attempted to lure America into participating in a coup, but Truman had earlier rebuffed the idea. However, when Eisenhower took charge of the American nation, he was determined to thwart any communist advances by the Soviet Union. He, therefore, ordered the CIA to pursue the secret overthrowing of a foreign government. The aim was to prevent USSR from finding space in the oil-rich state (Luce, 2017).

The coup that was orchestrated by the U.S. and Britain introduced a two-decade period of dictatorship presided over by the Shah. The Shah heavily depended on western powers for economic and military support. The forces that eventually deposed the Shah in 1979 were informed by anti-American sentiments. The incident introduced Islamic rule in Iran and spread militancy with Islamic innuendos. The new regime declared unrelenting enmity with the U.S. The overthrowing of the government that was headed by the premier Mohammed Mossadeq changed how the world, particularly the poor and oppressed nations, viewed the U.S., permanently. Many Iranians think and feel that the coup was an unfortunate event that led to a degeneration of the country to depths it has since never recovered from. This feeling could be informed by the fact that Mossadeq's installation to leadership was the beginning of the realization of the future that was denied by the coup.

The thinking patterns exhibited by the coup engineers do not fundamentally differ from the view that the so-called war on terror justifies throwing the Geneva Convention to the wind, including ignoring what the populace of a country thinks. President Khatami's allies, with reformist minds, believe that this is yet another opportunity for the country to choose between dictatorship and democracy. They are worried that external interference and internal wrangles could thwart the chances of returning to a democratically led country. Thus, any external pressure piled on Iran only helps to breed more hardliners against what would inadvertently be christened a foreign agenda. It is rather appealing to think that influencing change in the region means dmocratization. However, if it is premised on end justifying the means, then, the Operation Ajax specter will continue dogging the region and its people forever (Merica& Hanna, 2013).…