The EU as intergovernmental and supranational organization

¶ … EU primarily an intergovernmental or a supranational organization? Which of the various institutions of governance in the EU are more supranational? Which are more intergovernmental? Be sure to cite Wood and Yesilida, Emerging European Union. Who is Jose Manuel Barroso? Would you expect him to be more of a supranationalist or intergovernmentalist? Explain.

There is a wide debate concerning the European Union, its future role, and the nature of its construction. More precisely, it can be said that since its creation in the 1950s the European Community and since 1993 the European Union has been seen as a complex, innovative, yet confusing institution. It is neither an organization in the traditional view, nor is it a national state. Therefore, the tensions that exist between defining the EU as an intergovernmental or supranational institution frame the ongoing discussions.

It is rather hard to determine whether the EU is one or another. Given the magnitude of the debates, it can be said that it is more important the discussion itself rather than an eventual outcome. This is largely due to the fact that the various opinions on the matter are enriching for the political debates that determine in the end the future of the European Union in the ever changing international context. In order to have a proper image on the debate itself, it is important to have in mind the actual European institutions and their place in the framework of the European Union. Therefore, the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council, as well as the Court will be presented and analyzed in the context of the EU's structure.

The European Union is a rather interesting creation of the post World War II era.

There are various theories which try to explain the process of integration in order to assess the degree in which this undergoing is an intergovernmental process or a supranational one. One of the most comprehensive in this sense is the theory concerning the European Union is the "territorial integration" theory which underlines the fact that the European Union is the result of a phenomenon which in a space delimited by geographical coordinates is total in what concerns the elements of the economic, social, technical and political life (Marchal, 1965, 10). Moreover, it is considered that the integration process represents the progressive merger of national economies at all levels, from an economic point-of-view in the first instance, followed by a social and in the end by a political integration (Marchal, 1965, 10). However, in this entire process, it is the institutions of the European Union which bear the responsibility of the success, while the member states must first and foremost comply with the regulations. What is interesting to notice though is the fact that the member states have agreed on this ratio by giving up part of its national sovereignty to the supranational institutions. Nonetheless, the fact that there are still areas in which member states chose to follow only a strong collaboration process, rather than an integration mechanism is relevant for the fact that the European Union has both a supranational nature, developed according to the theory presented by Andre Marchal, and an intergovernmental aspect as well.

The European Union represented a possible solution for preventing a future world confrontation between European countries. In this sense, "the EU is perhaps the most important agent of change in contemporary government and policy-making in western Europe. Jacques Delors, then the President of the European Commission, claimed in 1988 that about 80 per cent of socio-economic legislation in the EU member states was framed by treaty commitments, policy rules, and legislation agreed through the institutions of the EU. Whether or not the percentage is precisely accurate does not matter. What matters is the acknowledgement that EU agreements pervade the policy-making activities of individual west European countries, both the member states and their neighbors" (Wallace and Wallace, 2000, 4) Therefore, it can be pointed out the fact that due to the structure it proposed in the early 1950s the main elements of the war industry were placed under common control, an issue which prevented any negative developments of the economic structures of the countries involved.

In the beginning, the issue of common control of the coal and steel industry between the traditional rivals on the European continent, Germany and France, appeared to be inconsistent with the realities of the era. More precisely, Europe had suffered twice as a result of the conquering desires and pressures from states such as Germany or the Russian empire and later Soviet Union. Therefore, it was considered at the time of the end of the Second World War that the only means possible for avoiding in the future such tragedies for Europe would be exercising in common the control of the raw materials used for the war industry. Therefore, the Coal and Steel Community was the first authority to enable the cooperation process between France and Germany. Immediately after the establishment of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, it was underlined that the institution "has been directing a pioneer venture in multinational economic integration under the treaty by which France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries combined their regulation of two major industries through the establishment of "a common market, common objectives, and common institutions" (Merry, 1955, 1). Therefore, at the time, the institution with the highest degree of supranational impact was the Authority. This in turned was later renamed the Commission.

It can be said that in the beginning the High Authority was representative for the European project because it offered a symbol of the peace attempts made by the six states comprising the ECSC. However, it can be considered as being the element of the supranational structure that would be the European Union decades later. In this sense, "the High Authority, in its executive and administrative functions, has had the assistance of the Consultative Committee, its own permanent staff, and a host of advisory commissions" (Merry, 1955, 2). The actual structure of the institution bears little relevance nowadays; however, at that time, the fact that its members represented the state at a higher level was evidence of an evolution process, in terms of political as well as economic action.

The European Parliament is yet another institution which can be accounted for as being a supranational element. However, in the beginning, there was limited proof of the fact that the EP would be transformed in an element of the future European Union. This is largely due to the fact that its members were representatives of the member states; therefore there were no particular elections made for the supranational forum. Members of the national parliaments were sent to represent their countries at an international level. However, the inclusion of the elections for the European Parliament on the European Community's agenda in 1979 acknowledged the necessity of the European peoples to be represented at the supranational level by individuals directly elected by them.

There are two distinctive institutions entitled the Council. On the one hand, there is the legislative body which shares this power with the Parliament; on the other hand, there is the European Council which represents the meeting of the heads of states and government of the member states. The distinction is important because their existence can determine the debate on the intergovernmental vs. supranational either way. More precisely, the existence of the European Council is a proof of the coordinated efforts of the heads of state and governments made at the European level. However, at these reunions, the states are represented at a national level; therefore the institution in itself is the evidence of the intergovernmental approach. In regard to the Council, its members are also the representatives of the national governments. However, there is a sense of stability in the structure due to the nature of the COREPER or the Council of the Permanent Representatives. More precisely, the ministers on different affairs hold regular meetings to consult and carry on the legislative process at the European level. However, there is a permanent mission of each country which represents it at the meetings adjacent to the monthly encounters at the ministerial level. Therefore, from this perspective, it can be said that the activity of the Council, as well as the permanent missions of the nation states at the Council give it a high degree of supra-nationality.

Finally, the Court of the European Union is an important element of the structure of the EU. "The Court of Justice is composed of 27 Judges and eight Advocates General. The Judges and Advocates General are appointed by common accord by the governments of the Member States for a renewable term of six years. They are chosen from among lawyers whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment, in their respective countries, to the highest judicial offices, or who are of recognized competence" (the European Union, 2008).

The composition of the European Court of Justice may appear similar to that of the International Court of Justice, an instrument of the United Nation, an intergovernmental organization. However, the scope and the activity of the European Court differentiate it from any other mechanism of applying the justice inside the European Union. There is the issue of the activity of the Court. This mechanism was designed to enable both the European Union and the member states to have a viable and legitimate environment to discuss and resolve their differences. More precisely, the European Court of Justice has a mandate to apply and insure the respect of the Communitarian law. In this sense, it is clear that the simple existence of a special system of law that regulates the relations inside the EU is an element of supra nationality. The European law comprises the particular treaties of the EU as well as the case law of the European Court of Justice. However, the activity of the Court is essential for pointing out its role inside the Union. It is an element of uniformity of the procedures and rules all the member countries must abide by and follow in order to benefit from the positive effects of the European integration. Therefore, it can be said that from the point-of-view of the communitarian law the Court of justice is a federalist concept.

Another important element related to the Court of Justice is its practical composition. In this sense, although the judges are designated by the member states and are of different nationalities, the status of member of the European Court of Justice forces them to have an impartial role in the ongoing processes at the European level. Therefore, the entire structure of the European Court is designed to protect and defend the rights and interests of the European Union in its relation to the states.

The discussion over the extent to which some institutions are more supranational and others are more intergovernmental cannot be dealt with in a decisive manner. This is largely due to the fact that there must be made a distinction between the composition of these institutions and their actual scope and activities. The entire structure of the European Union is a complex mechanism in which the supranational elements are mixed with intergovernmental ones; therefore, it cannot be said which one is more or less intergovernmental.

Concerning the European Commission, in essence it is a supranational structure. It has commissioners that represent the interests of the European Union in the face of the member states. In this sense, "the European Commission was envisaged by the early federalists as the EU's sole executive and the motor of European integration, acting for the greater good where national governments feared to tread, wary of sacrificing their own powers and interests. In theory, it has the sole right of legislative initiative and is still the EU executive" (Ash, 2005). Therefore, it can be said that the precise reason for the creation of the Commission was to embody in its actions the communitarian goals of the European Union. Nonetheless, the situation of the commissioners is rather debatable because they are appointed by the member states, rather than elected by a European structure. More precisely, the fact that each state has the right and obligation to appoint a representative for the Commission is a relevant fact for the way in which the EU combines the issue of intergovernmental with its supranational valence. In theory, this method of considering the composition of the Commission would suggest an equal and fair distribution of power. However, there have been cases in which an important country of the EU received a certain portfolio inside the Commission and it triggered suspicions over the potential influence the political factor had in determining the position of the respective Commissioner and the respective country. Therefore, it can be said that even the delimitations of the functions of the Commissioners is an issue which most often is discussed at the intergovernmental level.

Moreover, there is also the matter of the democratic deficit inside the European Union, a topic which is often associated with the composition of the Commission, an institution which is designed to express the power of the European Union. In this sense, it is considered that for a mechanism which must take into account a fair distribution of power, the Commission lacks democracy. Thus, in relation to the Commission "there are concerns that as such it is insufficiently democratic. This situation has improved recently with the Parliament now approving each individual Commissioner and scrutinizing the Commission more closely, but some suggest a more radical democratization, with a directly elected President who might be able to choose his own commission. This would give a Europe-wide electorate the chance to determine its agenda. But a problem is the general population's lack of interest and knowledge (turnout in European elections is typically quite low.)" (Ash, 2005). Therefore, taking into account these concerns it is clear that the Commission was expected to be more people oriented.

One of the most important players in the European Union is the Head of the European Commission. He is widely regarded as the political symbol of the organization and the one representing the interests of the Union in its relation with the member states. Still, concerning the Head of the Commission there are opinions which view him as a symbol of the supranational structure of the EU. However, while some countries which support a more intergovernmental Europe view him as too European, others consider him too intergovernmental.

In regard to the role of the Head of the Commission this is evaluated according to the elements of the intergovernmental and supranational theory respectively. Thus, on the one hand, the proponents of the intergovernmental approach such as Britain underline the efficiency of the way in which the President of the Commission is currently elected. The procedure implies two steps. Thus, "the President of the Commission is appointed by the governments of the Member States, and then approved by the European Parliament. This dual legitimacy gives the President political authority, which he exercises in a variety of ways" (the European Commission, 2008). Therefore, his legitimacy comes from two sources. On the one hand, he is nominated and approved by the European Council which represents the will and the desire of the political forces in the European Member States. This offers him the political support of the structures of power involved in the process of the political integration. At the same time, the President is in this case the connection point between the Member States and the European Commission, the executive body of the Union. Therefore, from this perspective, it is important that the President receive the unanimous approval of the heads of state.