Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant

¶ … Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant argues that all human thought and behavior must be subjected to the dictates of the Categorical Imperative, an ethical paradigm for grounding universal action that he believes sufficient to cover all possible exigencies of human decision-making. Due to its grounding in the rational and material world, however, I believe (with Kierkegaard) that the Categorical Imperative is insufficient to cover the categories of religious and natural faith, and I will argue in this paper that Kant's position must be challenged as a guide for ethics for its exclusion of faith as a guide to action. Such a challenge is critical because, as Kiekegaard argues, when we judge actions only by their results we do not allow for the possibility of a type of original action on the part of great men which has resulted in many of the great advances of humankind.

Kant formulates his Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork as an attempt to structure all human behavior, which he see as ultimately based on subjective experience and knowledge, on something objective and universal. He believes that only in doing so can ethics derive a ground for action that is based on more than mere claims of authority or displays of power. If humans feel and experience the world in particular ways, and we want to make sure that all human behavior and action is judged by some ethical standard which is valid and universally applicable, his argument goes, we must find a rule that takes into account the very nature of this condition. In contrast to practical reason, which is the decision-making stuff of everyday existence, and pure reasoning, which signifies the capacity to know, Kant wants to develop a system for pure practical reasoning, or a guide for action that accounts for the subjectivity of experiencing the world through our bodies in everyday interactions, but does so with the universality of something objective and pure.

Kant's solution is to treat humans as ends in themselves. If everyone is an end in himself or herself, he believes, then we cannot simply impose our will or understanding on people by force or intimidation or majority rule or manipulation because in doing so we will not be utilizing a guide for action that we can justify through appeals to reason. Although parents and children interact in daily squabbles around the world in ways that include someone exclaiming "Because I said so!" we know that such interactions are not ultimately justifiable according to the dictates of reasoning. How do we like it when someone is imposing on us? We know that when we were children and our parents used the appeal to authority to end the conversation we understood it to be a power play rather than a logically infallible appeal. Similarly when a governmental authority demands that we take some action which seems questionable, we demand rights to appeal in the hope that a reasoned decision can be reached and agreed upon. In others words, we want to be treated as an end ourselves, and Kant believes that we must treat all men and women as ends in themselves.

Once we do that, our path become clear. We must act in ways that seem not only right to us in the moment but right in an objective sense. Further, we must act in ways that seem right while treating all persons as ends in themselves. Further, we must act in ways that we would want anyone to act while having the same kinds of considerations. Thus we can state the Categorical Imperative:

"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

By grounding his ethics in this kind of thinking, Kant believes that he has developed a system for ethical thought and behavior that is universally applicable and objectively valid. It is pure, practical reasoning. And it answers all challenges.

But does it? Has Kant really formed the perfect foil for use in judging ethical behavior? Specifically, the criticism to be offered here is that Kant wants us to accept a claim that in order to overcome the limitations of practical experience of the world -- the only type of experience that is ultimately available to us -- we must judge actions by whether we would want them always and universally applied. We should judge actions by their results. But how are we to know such actions and such results? Do we not also experience the reasoning that we must experience in order to arrive at such calculations through practical means? And if so, how should judge this processing. Ultimately, if we follow this line of reasoning back in an endless loop, we will reach some point at which Kant says to us, "Because I said so!" And this, as we have seen is not to be allowed.

The point can be better seen through a consideration of Kierkegaard's treatment of faith. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard argues that an individual such as Abraham can come upon some event such a calling by God that he finds to be entirely valid and compelling. He finds that he must act upon such a calling. But what if such an event cannot be justified by appeal to universalized law? Kierkegaard argues that the individual must take a leap of faith and act anyway. The problem of faith when it runs into a requirement to judge actions by their results, according to Kiekegaard, is that faith refuses to back down.

A truly ethical behavior, according to Kierkegaard, cannot account for the possibility of faith, because faith operates in a different realm than ethics. While ethics signifies a tallying of reasons and outcomes, it does not account for the place faith resides. So what is that realm? Kierkegaard suggests that faith operates in the realm of greatness. He claims that all persons have within them an innate knowledge of what it means to be great. They are drawn to such greatness through an openness to passion. Kierkegaard writes that "Every movement of infinity comes about by passion, and no reflection can bring a movement about. This is the continual leap in existence which explains the movement."

If all we ever do in the field of human thought and behavior is weigh the supposed results of our intended actions and tally them against what we think the universe can bear, we will miss the point of much of human existence and most of its greatness. Kierkegaard claims we fall prey when doing so to an "infinite resignation," in which we constantly consider doing something great, something we feel a strong calling to do, but we turn away because we are not able to justify the action by an appeal to universal validity and objectivity. Faith operates in the realm we feel ourselves drawn to, that place inside us that feels fear and trembling at the brush with greatness, but is drawn nonetheless. The feeling for this reader is that this intense connection to Is Kierkegaard's argument, therefore, superior to Kant's? The feeling here is that it is. In Kant's formulation, he argues that we should treat people as ends in themselves. However, he then sets about developing a formula which kills the ultimately expression of individuality by an appeal to universality. Kierkegaard, on the other hand claims that when a person acts on faith it is a teleological suspension of ethics in which the individual becomes higher than the universal. In many ways, then, Kierkegaard realizes a true appreciation for the individual as an end in himself, whereas Kant simply offers the bait of individuality in order to get the hook of universality in.