David E. Lewis's book on political appointments and bureaucratic performance

Public Policy Processes and Analytical Approaches

Critical Book Review- David E. Lewis, the Politics of Presidential Appointments:

Lewis, David. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control Public Policy Processes and Analytical Approaches

Critical Book Review:

The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance (2008)

PAPA 6214 Public Policy Processes and Analytical Approaches - Professor Patrick Roberts

Stacey Shindelar

David E. Lewis' book on political appointment in the United States has been considered to be one of the most important writings in the field of public policies of the last years. This is largely due to the fact that the book in itself represents a comprehensive view and analysis on the way in which appointments are achieved at the high level of local and federal administrations. The main issue of the book revolves around the way in which competences are taken into account when political appointment is achieved and the results such a strategy brings

This critical review focuses on several key questions, including discussion of the main arguments of the book, assumptions made about the role of public policies, strengths and weaknesses of the book, and positive contributions to the specialized literature as well as the general reader of the book.

Assumptions Regarding Public Policy

There are a number of assumptions regarding public policy that are made by Lewis. One assumption that is made is that the American government can be directly compared to the governments of European countries such as France or Britain. While in general, there are several similarities between European democracies and American government, there are several ways this does not hold up. For example, the division of government into local, state, and federal levels is not reflected in most of these other governments, and increased levels of government do influence the number of individuals (either civil servants or political employees) required for government to function efficiently. A second assumption is that presidential changes bring change in the political employees. Indeed, this is a major element to be taken into account and it has its premises and considerations. More precisely, changing the major players from the Supreme Court in a country where the Supreme Court plays a crucial role is justifiable. The powers of the Court in the United States are vital and it is only natural that the new president changes the old relevant actors in this area. However, it cannot be ruled out the quality of performance when change occurs. Better said, change does not necessarily bring about a decrease in performance.

Another possible assumption would be that political appointments are by definition a negative aspect of the administration. The author fails to mention it in particular, but it is obvious from the information provided, especially in the first part of his book that political appointments are viewed as a negative practice in the United States. Surely, there are several examples such as the FEMA which would indicate that political appointments sometimes harm the office of appointment, but at the same time, there are situations in which political appointments produce performance and thus hold office for the entire mandate of the president and even longer. This is to point out that such a premises which denies a reasonable doubt on the relation between political appointment and performance could subjectively influence the results of the analysis because it does not take into account all parts and aspects of the issue under discussion. In the case of Lewis's book, the research is well documented and enables a much wider perspective than that initially offered by its starting premises.

Perhaps the most important assumption made by Lewis is that the structure of political appointment is by nature limited. Lewis noted that professional bureaucrats (i.e. civil servants), under Weber's view, develop specific skills, networks, and relationships that allow them to become effective in their role within the bureaucracy, and yet are still limited to an advisory role by the structure of the political environment, which requires that elected officials be put in charge. (in this case, political appointees, who are subject to removal on change of political regime or at the whim of their appointer, can be seen as an extension of the elected regime, although they themselves are not elected). Thus, the professional bureaucrat, who has the knowledge to run the organization, is forced to convince the politician, who does or does not know, what the right course of action is, which is contrary to the goals of an efficient, professional public service. Lewis's choice of FEMA's handling of the Hurricane Katrina disaster clearly indicates that the assumption being made is that the effectiveness of government is compromised by the use of political appointments. However, this is not necessarily indicative of all agency conditions, and Lewis does not challenge his views regarding the efficiency of the appointed official by considering any counterexamples that have (or may have) provided substantially improved efficiency.

Strengths and Weaknesses

This book has a number of strengths and weaknesses that can be taken into account. The strengths of the book revolve around the depth of the analysis, which includes both qualitative and quantitative examinations of the political appointment system as a whole, as well as individual agencies, and the historical and administrative science views of political appointment. This historical influence does have a positive influence on the argument due to the placement and context of the current state of political appointments. For example, discussion of the development of extensive political appointment structures during the New Deal, and the growth of the program through the intervening years, presents a historical context and background as well as a pattern of cause and effect that can be examined in detail. The discussion also focuses on recent events including the Clinton administration's use of political appointment and of course the Hurricane Katrina disaster. The use of copious examples does provide strong support for Lewis's argument, although given the empirical claim that he has laid, it is difficult to fully accept these examples as a consistent factor in the book's effectiveness. However, despite's Lewis substantive empirical analysis, and detailed statistical analysis of outcomes or model building, some of these strengths are not fully realized. In general, there are more negative aspects of the book than positive aspects.

The possible negative aspect of this issue is the targeted public. Indeed the reader is not the typical reader but one which is well aware of the theoretical elements invoked throughout the book. However, the book in itself does not represent a source for a general opinion on the matter but rather a manual type of document. This in turn could become inconvenient given the fact that the argumentation is very difficult to ascertain without a proper knowledge of each event or term used. Therefore, the high level of argumentation can make the book harder to read and follow, without any argument to be lost.

A second negative aspect is the discussion of politicization. The assumption of politicization is that the percentage of individuals appointed on a political basis will lead to a specific reduction in the performance level of the organization. However, the percentage of political appointees is not necessarily the best way to judge the politicization of the agency. In each of two cases studied, the CIA and the Office of Special Council, the influence of politicization was felt not simply due to the number of political appointments made, but in the rapid growth in these appointments in a short period of time, and surrounded by political wrangling regarding the nature and goals of the agencies (Lewis, 2008). That is, while politicization is presented by Lewis is a primary cause; it is in fact an effect of the surrounding conditions. Furthermore, it should be noted that the relationship between percentage of employees appointed and performance is likely to be highly dependent on the number of employees within the agency. In this sense, for example, should one agency be comprised of one hundred employees and ten of them are appointed on political criteria, the percentage is ten percent. However, that same percentage of ten percent is more important for an agency which employs fewer people and appoints on political ground fewer individuals. In this case, it does not mean that the latter agency is less politicized. Additional elements to define politicization should be taken into account such as level of appointment, degree of experience, and implications for the wider community of agencies. Politicization is, in general, considered a negative aspect of the executive branch. However, that term should be better described and defined.

Finally, Lewis assumes that the reason for lack of organizational performance is the use of political performance, and he explores few other potential reasons for this lack of performance. In fact, the appointment of an unqualified individual in a position of authority is likely to lead to negative performance implications. However, there are several other reasons for limited performance, such as lack of resources, negative organizational culture, and external politicization of the agency. Thus, the positioning of the use of political appointees as the main element in loss of organizational performance is both reductive and somewhat unfair.

Is the Case Made?

Lewis's work does not fully make its case in regard to the direct statistical relationship between the number of political appointees and the effectiveness of the organization. In one sense, this is not his fault, other than having made a claim that could not be tested empirically. The issue of organizational effectiveness is surprisingly complex in regard to its measurement, and it could be very difficult to appropriately measure organizational effectiveness in order to allow this type of analysis to emerge. However, Lewis did make the claim for a direct negative relationship between the number of political appointees and the effectiveness of the organization. Given that he does not examine this issue in quantitative detail, and provides only negative examples from which conclusions could be drawn, it does not provide substantial proof or evidence for the direct relationship posed. It is quite likely to be certain that there is a relationship between political appointees and organizational performance, but it does not seem likely to be as straightforward as Lewis would like us to believe. Instead, it is likely to be mediated by the size and criticality of the organization, organizational culture and existing norms, strength of the civil service bureaucracy supporting it, and actual skill of the political appointee as well as the outward pressure from political norms. As noted above, Lewis's work does not seem to take into account any possibility that a political appointee may be appointed not only based on political ties, but on actual evidence of competence. Although Weber's ideas regarding bureaucracy and the development of a professional civil service are classical, they do not necessarily bear up to modern scrutiny in all cases. As such the reliance on this structure is not necessarily the most convincing of arguments.

Contributions of the work

Lewis's work provides substantial contributions, despite its shortcomings. One of these contributions is the detailed statistical collection. Although the analysis of this information was rudimentary, it does demonstrate that it is possible to collect this data, making it possible to improve the research outcomes. Furthermore, this provides a reflection of the views of political appointees at the federal administration level, as well as from the realm of public opinion. This clearly demonstrates that, at least in the public mind, the role of political appointees is routinely to lessen the efficiency of the government. Through the use of the FEMA agency and its handling of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, this book provides valuable insight into how political appointment can (and has) go substantially wrong. Thus, this clearly indicates the role that political appointment can play in loss of organizational efficiency, even though Lewis's argument does not follow through with demonstrating that it necessarily causes this loss of organizational efficiency.

Finally, this analysis introduces new questions regarding politicization. Although politicization is seen as crucial in management of regional or federal agencies, Lewis's analysis does provide some questions regarding the role of politics and politicization in the limitation of performance. In particular, there is a dilemma found -- is politicization itself, as characterized by the increase in the number of political appointees to an agency, responsible for a fall in performance, or is it the political activity surrounding the agency itself that causes this change? This area would provide an interesting avenue for new research that could be considered in detail.

Concordance With Other Theories

The most similar theory of political bureaucracy that can be seen reflected in Lewis's work is that of Weber, who promoted the role of the professional civil service free from political appointment based on just such a series of observations. The author dates the origins of these ideas to Woodrow Wilson, who established a professional civil service in order to avoid political influence in administration, and their demise to Roosevelt, who reintroduced the use of political appointees as a means of gaining political and economic power. However, this is not consistent with Weber's discussion in many ways. While Weber saw the role of the elected official in the organization, Lewis discusses the role of the political appointee. While this may seem a minor distinction, in fact it is not. While an elected official may or may not hold knowledge of the position elected to, the political appointee is much more likely to have specialist knowledge that can be applies to the organization. While this is not always true, it is true often enough to consider that political appointees may act as positive change agents, rather than simply negative ones.

Conclusion

Although Lewis' argument is not fully convincing, it is solid and well documented, and the use of historical and statistical information provides ample background on the role of political appointment in American life. The issue of politicization and interference of politics into management of governmental agencies is indeed an important issue for analysis, and Lewis provides a provocative analysis. Lewis's argument that the political appointment of management in the public administration has a negative impact on the performance of the administration has not been fully supported, as he has not yet examined positive examples, empirical research, or other areas that could improve the robustness of the understanding. Lewis used official administrative resources, historical accounts, and qualitative analysis, as well as in-depth observation in order to make his argument. While these analyses do not provide a clear understanding of all issues related to this cause, they do provide some understanding of this issue, and open the door of opportunity for discovery of a more advanced understanding in this area. He not only points out the prerogative of the presidential power to appoint on a political basis when they are installed at the White House, but also gives a thorough account of the reasons for which such actions are taken, especially from the point-of-view of the control the President must exercise on the various agencies which deal with actions at the federal level. Thus, he does extend some legitimacy to the role of political appointment in the development of government, particularly within the executive branch.

At the same time however, he fails to take any other factor into account in order to address the issue of limited performance in terms of public administration. He also fails to take into account any issues that do not fit into the predefined mould, such as effective political appointee management, variations based on organizational size or culture, or other elements that may change the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization that are not related to leadership. Overall, the book offers both answers to important questions and potential sources for new questions related to the federal administrative segment and its relation to the political sphere of appointments. However, it does not provide a specific answer to the question of whether there is a direct relationship of the number of political appointees and the effectiveness of the organization. Thus, although the book is a positive piece of wiring in many respects, it fails in one of its basic tasks.

Reference

Lewis, David E. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.