Cloud Lit Rev Insider Threats

Cloud Lit Rev

Insider Threats in Cloud Computing

The diversity of threats that loud networks face and the complexities involved in effectively countering these threats in a manner that allows companies to truly take advantage of such technologies without enormous security and control expenditures have made these networks and their security issues the subject of abundant research and literature in recent years. Numerous perspectives have been brought to bear on these problems and the means by which they can be addressed, from directly practical examinations of a technical nature to larger-scale theoretical understandings of the practicalities of cloud computing in the real world to a consideration of certain ethical considerations that exist amongst all of these practicalities. While the issue of cost feasibility as a direct measurement of risks and solutions presented by insider threats inherent to cloud computing networks has not been specifically addressed in the research, current literature does provide a comprehensive foundation upon which to build such an investigation.

Addressing insider threats to cloud computing networks is itself problematic, as there are many modes of external attack or unauthorized access that could be utilized by insiders perhaps more easily than by wholly external forces (Qaisar & Khawaja, 2012). Whether or not these would truly be considered insider threats is a matter of semantics, but the fact is an insider would be in a better position to launch a number of attacks, including a "man in the middle" attack (intercepting communication between two parties that was meant to be private and encrypted) and "network sniffing" (gaining unauthorized access to a network via password hacking or retrieval) (Qaisar & Khawaja, 2012). These risks are not even specific to a cloud network as they exist for traditional networks as well, though greater vulnerabilities exit in cloud networks due to the remote access that is an inherent part of even authorized use of such networks (Qaisar & Khawaja, 2012; Reddy & Reddy, 2011). This limits the degree to which current security measures can be implemented against potential attacks on a cloud network, both internally and externally, and can make it extraordinarily more difficult to track where attacks are or might be coming from (Reddy & Reddy, 2011). Every element of a cloud computing network that makes it more vulnerable to external attacks also makes it more vulnerable to internal attacks, and makes it easier for internal attackers to hide their tracks and to gain broader access (Reddy & Reddy, 2011).

The many problems that are specific to cloud computing and to insider threats only adds to the complexity and the difficulty of dealing with these security problems in a manner that is effective and efficient for medium- to large-scale enterprises. Perhaps most importantly, the very architecture of a cloud computing network removes the actual hardware and software control from the organization that needs to maintain network security as a direct means of protecting its interests; this "abstracted infrastructure" typically means that even the type of hardware and software being used to protect their data is unknown to the organizations and individuals that utilize cloud computing networks (Durkee, 2010). This level of ignorance can make it much more difficult to develop and implement effective security measures on the user end of the network, and also creates an inherent dependence on an outside organization to maintain strict security protocols in its own processes and with its own personnel -- insider threats are not faced solely within the business organization, but also within the cloud computing service provider's organization (Durkee, 2010; Reddy & Reddy, 2011). Combine this with the fact that all substantially sized cloud computing service providers have different contractual obligations and perhaps different methodologies for every client organization whose data and processes they handle, and the threat of accidental security breaches or lapses, accidental data loss or process interruption, and a host of other malicious and accidental security threats emerge as a problem in cloud computing and the nature of insider threats in such networks (Reddy & Reddy, 2011).

Of course, the business and technology communities have not simply thrown their hands up in despair over the new security threats that have arise in cloud computing, and specifically in regards to insider threats in cloud computing networks. There have been a variety of technical innovations, including new encryption methods, various methods of partitioning data and operations to limit insider access, and of course human resources monitoring and control from hiring through employment must also be considered an important elements of security when it comes to mitigating insider risks to cloud computing networks (Qaisar & Khawaja, 2012; Reddy & Reddy, 2011; Durkee, 2010). By implementing some fairly basic security protocols and trusting cloud computing service providers to utilize available resources to ensure proper encryption and access control on their end, companies can greatly minimize their exposure to insider risks (Durkee, 2010). This trust is in and of itself a risk, however, and the lack of direct control presents an unavoidable risk in cloud computing.

A recent case that is both highly unique and highly extreme in many of its details highlights many of the specific problems that are encountered with cloud computing networks and their inherent dependence on off-site and external systems, equipment, and personnel. Last year's flooding in Thailand forced many companies to move to cloud computing options for their data storage and communication needs as well as for many ongoing operations, as on-site data centers and other hardware become inoperable due to rising water levels and power interruptions/other infrastructure problems (Sambandaraska, 2012). The immediacy and the totality of the switch that became necessary for these Thai companies, migrating their networking dependencies from in-house traditional systems to cloud systems provided by off-shore companies, not to mention the forced nature of this transition as cloud computing presented the only option to these companies other than shutting down and potentially losing all of their data, brought several key problems quite quickly and pressingly to light (Sambandaraska, 2012). Controlling the amount of data flowing through the network is necessary to eliminate or at least limit accidental data loss, service interruption, and other technical problems that constitute insider threats; ensuring that proper understanding and adherence to protocol is utilized within the business organization by both management and personnel when such changes are made; and a host of other issues are still being confronted by these businesses (Sambandaraska, 2012). Ongoing attention to Thailand could prove very fruitful in understanding and addressing similar problems elsewhere.