Logical Model for Counterterrorism in Africa

Boko-Haram In order to effectively neutralize the Boko Haram in Nigeria, I suggest a combination of strategies including the use of military force combined with education and economic empowerment programs. The Nigerian authorities need to incorporate partnerships and conduct a host of operations mentioned above within the Boko Haram strongholds. This model describes the aims and contribution of the various stakeholders. The implementation of such a model, collectively, will enable the authorities to undermine the strengths of Boko Haram on economic, psychological and military front (Siollun, 2015).

Although the military alone cannot stop the insurgency, it has a critical role to play in the equation. The military can be used to buy quiet time for the government to roll programs that will handicap the group's operations and legitimacy among its populations. The Nigerian military can be deployed to either suppress the insurgency or compel the fighters into a ceasefire. For such action to come to fruition, the intelligence services must up their game and upgrade their intelligence systems.

There is evidence that the insurgent group has succeeded to infiltrate the military forces that the military has done to penetrate its (Boko Haram's) ranks (Siollun, 2015). The government still has the capacity to push the group into a ceasefire; although it has dismissed such a condition as one that isn't on their cards. The government can employ the idea of Hudna -- a phrase that means cessation of war or calm in Islamic circles; and is, indeed recognized by several Islamic insurgents including Hamas in the Middle East.

A Hudna can stretch over a long time; and it can also be renewed. Since the government will not accede to Boko Haram's concept of theocracy as a form of governance in Nigeria, while Boko Haram has adamantly declined to accede to secular governance, a Hudna for the long-term may be an option that will help both sides to achieve their objectives without being ashamed of anything.

A Hudna could be part of the government's strategy; and could be proposed as a temporary ceasefire or even a long-term treaty (Siollun, 2015). The problem at the moment is that the insurgent group, Boko Haram, has not been made to consider a ceasefire as an option. It owns a huge stockpile of weaponry, an equally large mobile army, ammunition and has control over large expanses of territory in the north eastern part of Nigeria.

The onus is on the government to create bargaining chips to force Boko Haram to come to the negotiating table. One of the leverage options is to take Boko Haram members as prisoners as opposed to execution. Such prisoners can be used to push for the release of hundreds of children that have been kidnapped by the group.

Once the recruitment base of Boko Haram has been dried, it would make the Boko Haram prisoners all the more important to them as it would be hard to replace such members (Siollun, 2015). The government could also find Boko Haram splinter groups that are disgruntled and lure them to cooperate for intelligence purposes. Such groups might facilitate negotiation. The authorities should avoid pooling all Muslims with Boko Haram.

Even those perceived to be moderates on the borderline should be lured and convinced to work with government so as to acquire deeper understanding of the extremist mission of the insurgent Islamic groups (Samu, 2016). Economic empowerment is a strong tool at the government's disposal to counter insurgencies powered by doctrines. If there can be investment on tangible projects that quickly capture the imagination of the youth and involve them; including road construction, provision of water,.