Mao Zedong and Defense Philosophy

Active defense is a real defense and passive defense is a spurious defense by Mao Zedong Active defense Active defense can be simply explained as a defense launched with an objective of counter attacking the enemy. Passive defense Passive defense can be defined as defending for the sake of it. Analysis: Mao Zedong, in explaining active defense, referred it to as offensive defense, or defending through resolute engagements (Mao, 1965). In referring to passive defense Mao (1965) referred to it as pure defense or defensive defense.

Mao (1965) noted that passive defense is a spurious or an inauthentic type of defense. According to Mao Zedong the only real defense was active defense. Active defense according to Zedong was defending with the intention of launching a counter attack and taking on the offensive. The difference between active and passive defense is in the reaction (Mao, 1965). Mao contrasted passive defense with active defense. In his opinion prolonged defensive war was a temporary measure that was only necessitated by the adverse balance of the war forces.

This was never to be the foundational strategy used by the red army. It was never to be a strategy either (Mao, 1965). China has had an approach to war that considers the view by the west that their tactics are those of denial and anti-access (Cheng, 2011). China’s PLA (People’s Liberation Army) has been carefully observing the west in their approach to local wars in the high-tech modern conditions or what is now termed as local wars fought under the informationalized conditions.

The defense planning mechanisms used by PLA have been shaped by lessons learned from observation of how potential opponents like the U.S. have been executing their wars (Cheng, 2011). During the Mao Zedong era, PLA anticipated early wars, nuclear wars or major wars that would detail prolonged fighting on the Chinese. The expectation was that guerrilla tactics would be relied upon in these wars. Since the times of Deng Xiaoping, this anticipation has changed to more of limited and localized conflicts (Cheng, 2011).

The analyses by PLA of high-tech local wars and then informationalized local wars suggest of future wars that will be much shorter and may be last for only a single campaign (Cheng, 2011). The future war may not include occupation of the Chinese territory although the military, economic and political environments are likely to be attacked. These future wars will entail joint operations over the land, air, sea, outer space, and cyberspace. The war may even entail use of advanced technology especially in information systems (Cheng, 2011).

The analysis of the possible wars has driven PLA to come up with actionable lessons. The evolution of war has made it necessary for PLA to pay particular attention to active defense against long range missiles, stealth aircrafts, and helicopters. The PLA is also attentive on defending against possible electronic warfare, precision strike, surveillance and reconnaissance. According to Cheng (2011) the U.S. has an ability to dictate tactical and operational terms in any conflict through executing precision and coordinated strikes with their space assets. The U.S.

is also able to dictate strategic conflict terms through influencing opposition will support from third parties, and domestic opinion. China is eager and alert in their intention of creating a deep defense mechanism against the threat from the U.S. The defense extends beyond operational and tactical levels through the development of encrusted defenses but also to strategically deny U.S. of any capability to dictate strategic definition of any potential conflict (Cheng, 2011).

This approach by the PLA speaks to the viewpoint of Mao Zedong in his support of active offensive defense as opposed to passive defense (Mao, 1965). Holmes &Yoshihara (2005) consider that assumptions that China will remain on the defense may mean dire consequences for the U.S. military and policy strategy. The passive defense strategy that occasioned the building of the great wall has changed radically to a more measured and offensive minded strategy as demonstrated by Cheng (2011).

The old perception was that China could control their territory by simply surrounding it. Prolonged defensive resistance is only a temporary measure and not the PLA military strategy (Holmes &Yoshihara, 2005). This is true both for land and sea combat. Chinese military strategists have taken cue from Mao (1965) by exploiting active offshore defense strategies. Sea denial is an active offshore defense strategy that aims at establishing circumstances that discourage the adversary from starting operations within some nautical distance for long periods of time (Holmes &Yoshihara, 2005).

This sea denial strategy is one that is suitable for inferior military powers although the tactics and operations involved are offensive and aligned with the Mao (1965) philosophy. Mao (1965) is famously remembered for proposing offensive methods for attaining defensive ends. PLA has a plan to develop capabilities that will make it possible for them to.