Military Intervention and Peacekeeping Islamabad,

Military Intervention and Peacekeeping

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, April 19, 2009 -- A potentially troubling era dawned Sunday in Pakistan's Swat Valley, where a top Islamist militant leader, emboldened by a peace agreement with the federal government, laid out an ambitious plan to bring a "complete Islamic system" to the surrounding northwest region and the entire country (Constable).

Speaking to thousands of followers in an address aired live from SWAT on national news channels, cleric Sufi Mohammed bluntly defied the constitution and federal judiciary, saying he would not allow any appeals to state courts under the system of sharia, or Islamic law, that will prevail there as a result of the peace accord signed by the president Tuesday.

Richard C. Holbrooke, the U.S. special envoy to the region, said in an interview broadcast Sunday on CNN that the decision by insurgents to keep fighting in spite of the peace deal should be a "wake-up call to everybody in Pakistan that you can't deal with these people by giving away territory as they creep closer and closer to the populated centers of the Punjab and Islamabad" (Constable)

The evidence suggests that the extremist forces have drawn the opposite lesson from their victory in Swat and are gearing up to carry their armed crusade for a punitive, "hatred-of-women" form of Islam into new areas. There have been numerous reports of Taliban fighters entering districts south and west of Swat, where they have brandished weapons, bombed and occupied buildings, arrested aid workers, and killed female activists (Constable).

In the northwestern town of Mardan, insurgents attacked girls' schools, forced CD shops to close, ordered barbers not to shave beards and bombed the office of a nonprofit aid agency, killing a female worker. Taliban commanders accused the agency of "propagating obscenity." Taliban fighters occupied the Buner district for several days, closed a religious shrine and burned DVDs in the streets. They then toured the region in a convoy of trucks, even entering a secured army area while displaying heavy weapons (Constable).

"The inescapable reality is that another domino has toppled and the Taliban are a step closer to Islamabad," the Pakistan-based News International newspaper warned last week.

Inside "The Tank" -- The Joint Chiefs Secure Pentagon Briefing Room

"Gentlemen, given yesterday's article from the Washington Post, Pakistan is wobbling on the edge of a deep precipice, and we have to face a reality: the United States and the multi-national coalition will not remain passive as a Pakistan with WMD's falls into the deep void. As you know our intervention plans for Pakistan are modeled on the initiative by Coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm as well as the American forces in Iraq to arm and support Sunni militias in Anbar province in the campaign against the Al Qaeda in Iraq. The current GO date is set for November, 2010.

The Department of Homeland Security has worked up the following background and strategic brief that will serve as planning information we will all need to make the intervention successful, including options -- both military and other."

Greatest Risk to the U.S.

Terrorism is currently the preeminent threat to U.S. And Coalition national security. Pakistan is currently the frontline in the battle against terrorism, as its tribal areas have become a safe haven for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistani efforts in the war on terrorism have suffered due to a lack of resolve and military capabilities, as well as a general distrust of the United States. To combat and diminish the threat posed by al Qaeda and the Taliban, the Coalition must pursue a strategy of constructive engagement and unconditioned inducements (Minor).

The consequences of a possible intervention into Pakistan are extremely unpredictable. The alleged al-Qaeda militants are embedded in complex tribal networks in a remote mountainous area. Military action could inflict severe casualties and damage to these traditional communities and inflame anti-American sentiment across Muslim Pakistan. It might accelerate the disintegration of the U.S.-backed Pakistani government which currently possesses nuclear weapons. The Pakistani military have steadfastly opposed direct American intervention for many years (Hayden).

However, plans have been drawn up by the U.S. military's Special Operations Command for deploying Special Forces troops in Pakistan's frontier regions for the purpose of training indigenous militias to combat forces aligned with the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Van Auken).

Citing unnamed military officials, the newspaper reports that the proposal would "expand the presence of military trainers in Pakistan, directly finance a separate tribal paramilitary force that until now has proved largely ineffective and pay militias that agreed to fight Al Qaeda and foreign extremists" (Van Auken).

The prevailing and primary interest of the U.S. is the national security and protection of its citizens. Former U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte identified the religious fundamentalist group al Qaeda as the single greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its interests. The July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate revealed that al Qaeda's central leadership "in the past two years has been able to regenerate the core operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks in the Homeland." In addition to regenerating its core capabilities, al Qaeda is working "more efficiently as a beacon for other terrorist organizations around the world" (Minor).

Next Al Qaeda Attack From Pakistan

Mike McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, stated that a future al Qaeda attack on the U.S. "most likely would be planned and come out of the [al Qaeda] leadership in Pakistan" Dr. Rohan Gunaratna described the Afghanistan/Pakistan border as a "terrorist Disneyland."

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan contains numerous terrorist training camps, many of which are associated with al Qaeda. Dr. Gunaratna indicated that the 30-40 terrorist groups training in Afghanistan prior to the attacks on 9/11 have subsequently moved to the FATA. The survival of the Taliban in the FATA has been "singularly responsible for the continuing regeneration of al Qaeda as an organization because it has permitted the leadership and the operatives of this terrorist group…to safely 'dissolve' into a larger environment either that is hospitable to them directly or that protects them by disguising their presence amidst a larger pool of Taliban adherents." Pakistan therefore represents the front line and a vital component in the U.S. war on terrorism (Minor).

Options

Among the many options suggested are, as already mentioned, sending in U.S. Special

Forces first to secure and then protect that country's nuclear weapons. Sending in a more substantial force would follow. This would help secure Pakistan's "core" before "retaking" regions controlled by Islamic fundamentalists. (Hartung).

While the Pentagon admits to only about 50 U.S. troops currently stationed in Pakistan as "advisors" to the Pakistani armed forces, that number would swell substantially under the proposed escalation. The Times cites a briefing prepared by the Special Operations Command that claims the beefed-up U.S. forces would not be engaged in "conventional combat" in Pakistan. It quotes unnamed military officials as acknowledging, however, that they "might be involved in strikes against senior militant leaders, under specific conditions" (Van Auken).

In other words, American Special Forces units would be used to carry out targeted assassinations and attacks on strongholds of Islamist forces.

In addition to the plan to recruit and train new paramilitary militias in the frontier region, Washington has developed a $350 million program to train and equip the existing 85,000-member Frontier Corps, a uniformed force recruited from among tribes in the Pakistan border region (Van Auken).

Key Objectives

The U.S. has several key objectives in Pakistan for the short-, medium-, and long-term. In the short-term, the U.S. must continue to work with Pakistan to combat terrorism and reduce the power of both al Qaeda and the Taliban. If the U.S. is successful in diminishing the threats posed by al Qaeda and the Taliban, the mid-term objectives of ensuring the stability and self-determination of Afghanistan and Pakistan will be more easily realized. With the achievement of stable and self-determined Afghanistan and Pakistan, the long-term U.S. objectives can more readily be obtained. The long-term goal of the U.S. is to have partners in the region who seek to marginalize al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, as well as to maintain and promote stability in the region (Minor).

Current Concerns

The most likely possible dangers are these: a complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which the minority sympathetic to the Taliban and al-Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism (Kagan and O'Hanlon).

All possible military initiatives to avoid those possibilities are daunting. With 160 million people, Pakistan is more than five times the size of Iraq. It would take a long time to move large numbers of American forces halfway across the world. And unless we had precise information about the location of all of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and materials, we could not rely on bombing or using Special Forces to destroy them.

The task of stabilizing a collapsed Pakistan may well be beyond the means of the United States and its allies. Rule-of-thumb estimates suggest that a force of more than a million troops would be required for a country of this size. Thus, if we have any hope of success, we would have to act before a complete government collapse, and we would need the cooperation of moderate Pakistani forces (Kagan and O'Hanlon).

Despite significant U.S. aid provisions and a large Pakistani military presence in the tribal regions, Pakistan has not been successful in thwarting the resurgence of al Qaeda -- as well as the 30-40 terrorist groups following in its footsteps -- and the Taliban. There are many barriers to U.S. success, including the potential lack of resolve and capabilities on the part of the Pakistani government and military, as well as the prevailing anti-American sentiment in the region. Due to these aforementioned barriers, as well as the rugged geographic nature of the region, the support of the Pakistani military and public is crucial in routing out the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Pakistan's military, which has conducted numerous engagements in the tribal regions, has limited counterinsurgency capabilities because it previously focused its attention on preparing for conventional war against India. As a result, they are "overly reliant on imprecise mass firepower" that causes significant civilian casualties (Minor).

The continued and large-scale Pakistani army presence in the tribal areas furthers the alienation and resentment of the indigenous population, the support of which is essential to Pakistan's military, which has conducted numerous engagements in the tribal regions, has limited counterinsurgency capabilities because it previously focused its attention on preparing for conventional war against India. As a result, they are "overly reliant on imprecise mass firepower" that causes significant civilian casualties. The continued and large-scale Pakistani army presence in the tribal areas furthers the alienation and resentment of the indigenous population, the support of which is essential to successfully routing the Taliban and al Qaeda. Frontier Corps, Pakistan's paramilitary organization in the FATA, has closer ties with the local inhabitants. However, it is also ill equipped to handle the resurgence of the Taliban and al Qaeda because it is "riddled with sympathizers, inadequately motivated, suspicious of Islamabad's and Washington's intentions, and poorly trained and equipped for counterterrorism operations" (Minor).

Pakistan's military, which has conducted numerous engagements in the tribal regions, has limited counterinsurgency capabilities because it previously focused its attention on preparing for conventional war against India. As a result, they are "overly reliant on imprecise mass firepower" that causes significant civilian casualties.

The continued and large-scale Pakistani army presence in the tribal areas furthers the alienation and resentment of the indigenous population, the support of which is essential to successfully routing the Taliban and al Qaeda. Frontier Corps, Pakistan's paramilitary organization in the FATA, has closer ties with the local inhabitants. However, it is also ill equipped to handle the resurgence of the Taliban and al Qaeda because it is "riddled with sympathizers, inadequately motivated, suspicious of Islamabad's and Washington's intentions, and poorly trained and equipped for counterterrorism operations" (Minor).

Strategic Considerations and Analysis

In selecting an effective strategy, the U.S. must consider the interests, objectives, and current concerns of the U.S. In regards to the battle on terrorism in Pakistan. The U.S. must consider the signals that strategies could send to both the Pakistani public and military. In addition, the U.S. must consider the weaknesses in resolve and capabilities currently present in the Pakistani military (Minor).

The following will evaluate the relative merits and deficiencies of U.S. strategic options in Pakistan.

Multi-lateral Military Action

Multi-lateral military action has significant benefits. Specifically, the U.S. military has more adept counterterrorism and counterinsurgency forces than the Pakistani military. A large scale invasion could serve to root out the Taliban and al Qaeda cells. The U.S. could also use drones to target specific al Qaeda or Taliban targets, resulting in less collateral damage than is currently caused by Pakistani military forces. Such intervention would demonstrate a strong Coalition resolve in the fight against terrorism that is currently lacking among many members of the Pakistani military. Operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban could deny the terrorists a safe haven in Pakistan and improve the security situation in Afghanistan (Minor).

However, Coalition action is not a viable option because of the significant disapproval on the part of the Pakistani public and military. Multi-lateral action would likely be perceived as a breach of sovereignty by both the public and the military, as Pakistanis are already very sensitive to signs that the U.S. plays a large role in Pakistan's political and military environment. In previous U.S. drone attacks, the Pakistani public has also expressed strong disapproval of the resultant loss of innocent lives. Additionally, increased U.S. military engagement could enhance suspicions within the Pakistani military concerning U.S. goals in the region. As noted above, the cooperation of the Pakistani public and military is essential in combating terrorism in the region (Minor).

Without Pakistani support, the Coalition would find it exceedingly difficult to navigate the tribal regions and gain enough intelligence to sufficiently cripple the Taliban and al Qaeda forces. An invasion of overwhelming force could result in the collapse of an already weak

Pakistani government. This would run in direct opposition to U.S. interests, as this would likely encourage the further growth of al Qaeda and the Taliban. In addition, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal could be put at risk of falling into the wrong hands.

Lastly, an invasion of overwhelming force is currently not possible. Given current U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. could not commit sufficient troops to Afghanistan. The monetary costs of such an action would also be prohibitively high. Further, the U.S. would lack domestic public support for increased military engagement in the region (Minor).

Coercion

Coercion has the defined benefit of demonstrating U.S. resolve in the war on terrorism. Properly implemented, coercion allows the U.S. To be proactive and avoid appearing to appease Pakistan. With a credible threat, the U.S. could apply pressure to Pakistan and compel it to adopt a stronger response to the resurgence of al Qaeda and the Taliban in the tribal regions.

The U.S., however, does not possess a credible threat. As discussed above, the U.S. does not currently have the military capacity to engage in a large-scale invasion of Pakistan. Targeted strikes using drones also do not represent a credible threat. Carried out in a limited fashion, these strikes would be insufficient to eradicate al Qaeda and the Taliban due to the sheer size and rugged geographic nature of the region. Carried out in a larger fashion, these strikes would likely engender a backlash not only from moderate Muslims, but also from the international community. In addition, without the assistance of the Pakistanis the U.S. likely does not have sufficient actionable intelligence to carry out substantial targeted strikes (Minor).

The U.S. also does not possess a credible economic threat either. The Pakistani government has repeatedly stated that it will consider sanctions or conditioned aid to be a signal that the U.S. is only using Pakistan for its short-term interests in Afghanistan. Economic coercive efforts could result in an adversarial relationship between the U.S. And Pakistan. Pakistan could turn to China for economic assistance, as it has been enhancing its relations with China in recent years. As Pakistan is the frontline of the terrorist threat and Pakistani support is critical to winning this war, the U.S. cannot risk alienating the Pakistani government. Pakistan is well aware of this.

Other Feasible Alternatives

One possible plan would be a Special Forces operation with the limited goal of preventing Pakistan's nuclear materials and warheads from getting into the wrong hands. Given the degree to which Pakistani nationalists cherish these assets, it is unlikely the United States would get permission to destroy them. Somehow, American forces would have to team with Pakistanis to secure critical sites and possibly to move the material to a safer place.

A second, broader option would involve supporting the core of the Pakistani armed forces as they sought to hold the country together in the face of an ineffective government, seceding border regions and Al Qaeda and Taliban assassination attempts against the leadership. And the Pakistani armed forces are nothing to sneeze at.

The Pakistan Army has a total standing strength of 520,000, about the size of the Army of the United States, with a reserve element of 500,000. The 180,000 strong National Guard would be useful in guarding vulnerable points. It consists of the Mujahid Force of 60,000, organized in battalions, some with light air defense capability, the Janbaz Force of 100,000, whose members are intended to serve close to their homes (Minor).

This would amass a sizable combat force -- not only from the United States, but ideally also other Western powers and moderate Muslim nations. But is it enough?

Even if we were not so committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western powers would need months to get the troops there. Fortunately, given the longstanding effectiveness of Pakistan's security forces, any process of state decline probably would be gradual, giving us the time to act.

So, if we got a large number of troops into the country, what would they do? The most likely directive would be to help Pakistan's military and security forces hold the country's center -- primarily the region around the capital, Islamabad, and the populous areas like Punjab Province to its south.

We would also have to be wary of bloody warfare within the Pakistani security forces. Pro-American moderates could well win a fight against extremist sympathizers on their own.

But they might need help if splinter forces or radical Islamists took control of parts of the country containing crucial nuclear materials. The task of retaking any such regions and reclaiming custody of any nuclear weapons would be a priority for our troops (Kagan and O'Hanlon).

If a holding operation in the nation's center was successful, we would probably then seek to establish order in the parts of Pakistan where extremists operate. Beyond propping up the state, this would benefit American efforts in Afghanistan by depriving terrorists of the sanctuaries they have long enjoyed in Pakistan's tribal and frontier regions (Kagan and O'Hanlon).