Logical Flaw With Robert J.

¶ … logical flaw with Robert J. Art's "primacy of the State" argument as put forth in "The Strategy of Selective Engagement" is the creation of further instability and resentment towards the United States that his recommended strategy would create -- does create, in fact, as certain current events have shown. Ignoring such things as "ethnic, religious, and cultural cleavages" only worsens them, leading to militarily undesirable fragmented threats to United States' security (Art, 301). Art's further assertion that the differences in national interests between other foreign countries can be recognized and exploited to the United States' advantage is oddly naive and cynically bereft of all ethicality at the same time.

The obvious example of this today is the United States involvement in the Middle East, specifically in Iraq. Though increased troop levels have managed to somewhat subdue the violence there, the United States military was never welcomed as a liberating force. Even other countries of the area that were not in favor of Saddam Hussein's sadistic regime did not applaud direct and unilateral American intervention there, nor did the international community. Increased American military in Pakistan actually appears to have boosted the number of Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in certain areas of the country (Rajghatta, 2008). These are just two simple examples of the increased threat brought on by increased resentment; the more complex ramifications of this strategy of supremacy might not surface for several years.

At the same time, American intervention in Kosovo was decisive and productive. Of course, this was also sanctioned by the international community, making Art's argument still misleading and ethically malformed.

Force Employment and Post-Hostilities Conflict Management

One of the more infamous single encounters American forces have had in the past decades is the Battle of Mogadishu, popularized (if such a term can be used) by the book and movie Blackhawk Down. This particular instance of military intervention also illustrates the complexities of conflict management after the employment of force. Though according to many on the ground there was no viable alternative to direct military confrontation, the results were less than favorable to further diplomatic solutions (WGBH, 2008). Within a short time after this conflict, the United States withdrew from Somalia; its diplomatic position there had become completely untenable due to the increased violence that was seen as a direct result of their presence.

On the other hand, the use of force was the only thing General Aidid and his militia had ever shown any signs of responding to. Though it ended in complete failure, the force that was employed in this situation was thought adequate to ensure effective conflict management through force. There are instances where this option is the only viable one, and this could very well have been one of those instances had force been applied perhaps more liberally.