Miranda warnings and their legal foundations

Fifth Amendment Miranda Issues

The Miranda Doctrine:

Under the landmark 1966 Miranda v. Arizona (348 U.S. 346) decisions, evidence procured by police authorities during interrogations of criminal suspects may not be admissible at trial unless the suspect was first advised of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights against self-incrimination (Dershowitz, 2002; Friedman, 2005; Schmalleger, 2008). At a minimum, Miranda requires police to advise subjects under arrest that they have the right to remain silent, to refuse to answer questions without legal representation, and that competent legal counsel will be provided to them at no charge if they cannot afford an attorney to represent them (Dershowitz, 2002; Friedman, 2005; Schmalleger, 2008).

Under the Miranda doctrine, admissions, confessions, and other evidence procured in violation of the Miranda ruling must be excluded from introduction at trial. The exclusionary rule also applies to secondary evidence derived from any Miranda violations under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine (Dershowitz, 2002; Schmalleger, 2008). Since Miranda, the Supreme Court has recognized several important exceptions to that doctrine, such as where sufficient evidence exists to establish that the same evidence obtained improperly would have inevitably been discovered through permissible means; where suspects provide spontaneous statements not in response to direct police questioning; and where police question subjects of investigative detention short of arrest (Schmalleger, 2008; Zalman, 2008)..

Custodial vs. Non-Custodial Interrogation:

In 1968, two years after Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a related decision in Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1) that firmly distinguished the concept of arrest and mere investigative detention (Schmalleger, 2008). Terry primarily concerned the issue of defining "search and seizure" in connection with the police practice of "frisking" subjects without probable cause to conduct a search in the context of Fourth Amendment constitutional protections. That decision also (in effect) allowed police to question subjects being temporarily detained but not arrested without providing Miranda rights and for evidence elicited thereby to avoid exclusion at trial (Schmalleger, 2008).

Subsequent Supreme Court decisions addressed the issue of reasonable investigative detention and unreasonable (unconstitutional) investigative detention, distinguishing them largely on the basis of the amount of time to which a person can reasonably be detained and questioned for investigative purposes without probable cause to arrest them or otherwise interfere with the person's right to leave (Dershowitz, 2002). Likewise, the Supreme Court has also limited the scope of what can be considered "investigative detention short of arrest," most recently in 2003, in Knapp v. Texas (123 S. Ct. 1843), and determined that the totality of circumstances rather than explicit statements such as "you are under arrest" are sufficient to trigger the requirement for Miranda warnings (Zalman, 2008).

In this case, the police interrogation of Fred does not violate the well-settled Miranda doctrine, mainly because (1) Fred was not under arrest; (2) he was not brought to the police station against his free will; (3) he was repeatedly reminded that he was at liberty to leave at any time; (4) he volunteered to be interviewed in the first place; and (5) he freely provided the information and ultimately confessed to the crime voluntarily. Fred's attorney may try to argue that once police advised Fred that they considered him a suspect and were searching his home, the circumstances of the interview changed enough to become a custodial interrogation.

In that regard, if a reasonable person would have believed at that point that he was no longer free to terminate the questioning and leave the police station at will, Miranda requirements would have been triggered whether or not Fred was formally under arrest (Dershowitz, 2002; Zalman, 2008). The fact that Fred was eventually allowed to leave is less important in that determination than Fred's state of mind and reasonable belief about whether or not he was still free to leave once the police informed him that he was actually a suspect in Wilma's murder (Dershowitz, 2002; Zalman, 2008).

Search and Seizure and Unlawful Arrest Issues:

The fact pattern does not make clear whether or not the police actually conducted a search of Fred's home or were merely "bluffing" to induce cooperation from Fred. Assuming that no such unwarranted search was actually being conducted, there was no impermissible search and seizure of Fred's home. Provided Fred still (reasonably) believed that he was free to terminate the interview and leave when he volunteered the confession, that evidence should not be excluded under Miranda (and related) doctrine and principles.

However, the police did seize Fred's vehicle, which was an impermissible violation of Fourth Amendment search and seizure law. At that point, police had no probable cause to believe a crime was being committed that would have brought the search of his vehicle under the motor vehicle exception to unwarranted search and seizure rules (Schmalleger, 2008; Zalman, 2008). Therefore, a search of Fred's home and of his vehicle would have required a search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause to a judge or magistrate of the court with local jurisdiction (Zalman, 2008). Finally, it is clear that police arrested Fred unlawfully, because they did so without first obtaining an arrest warrant in violation of his Fourth Amendment constitutional rights against arrest without a warrant issued upon probable cause (Dershowitz, 2002).

Two-Tiered Questioning Issues: