Utilitarian Morality Utilitarianism and Moral

Utilitarian Morality

Utilitarianism and Moral Reason as Applied to the Case of Lying

Morality appears to us as a concrete term which is underscored by certain rational assumptions about the universe. And yet, our own experience tells us that that which one considers to be vice may, to another, be seen as virtue. The reverse may also apply. Thus, it is rather difficult to reconcile that which does in fact define our cause for moral behavior, though all figures of importance to the historical discourse on philosophy have ventured a framework. The 18th century in particular would witness a flurry of activity, with the latter generation of the Enlightenment Era providing a spirited exchange across decades of literature on that which inspires moral behavior. In our investigation here of the various possible lenses through which to understand morality, consideration of German theologian Immanuel Kant's 1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals provides basic understanding for the discussion of morality from the normative perspective. Such is to say that Kant's will be the most rigid, socially constrained and dangerous of understandings. This contrasts the idea of utilitarianism, which proposes that all situations demand a certain degree of pragmatism with respect to behavior. This throws into chaos the moral presuppositions of Kant, with such thinkers as Bentham and Mill coming to the fore of the discussion. In utilitarian philosophy, it is imperative that morality be channeled through an understanding of context and the nuances of society human interaction. By contrast to this view of morality, Kant provides deep ideological refusal for what he might argue is mere ethical laxity.

At the center of Kant's argument is the premise that the same reason which applies to the empirical nature of scientific discourse must rationally apply in the same way to ethical discourse. Accordingly, Kant contends that "physics will have its empirical part, but it will also have a rational one; and likewise ethics - although here the empirical part might be called specifically practical anthropology, while the rational part might properly be called morals." (Kant, 20) This is a viewpoint which will be met with objection throughout this discussion based on its primary assumption that all human imperatives are rational in some demonstrable way but that many of these may depart from immediate moral 'rightness.' This brings us to the consideration of a specific subject within the discourse over moral rightness, relating to that crucial subject of truth. The case example of lying is held to the light of the utilitarian perspective and to Kant's perception of moral reason. This offers us a useful framework for examining the idea and act of lying.

The act of lying is one to which any of us may be predisposed, given the ease with which such a false witness can be accomplished. Likewise, human beings are prone to such an act due to the frequency with which opportunities and imperatives for such are available. Deviating from the truth may serve to protect an individual from retribution for his actions or to deflect an awkward social situation. Likewise, it may be a commonly taken approach to avoiding the prospect of injuring one's feelings or provoking undue conflict. With its potential incarnations manifold and its presence typical in human interaction, lying is an act which is challenging to moral discourse. It is almost universally accepted that lying, as a principle, is 'bad.' However, it is a sin to which even 'good' people may be predisposed.

This brings us to consideration of an oppositional school of thought to Kant's. British philosopher Jeremy Bentham was a scholar to whom John Stuart Mill, in his 1838 treatise on the influential thinker, attributed the quality of progressiveness. Indeed, one of Bentham's great contributions to the field of discourse on the prime determinants of individual rights is his insertion of logical pragmatism into the formulation thereof.

Bentham rejected the simple notion that there are certain guaranteed natural rights to which all men are entitled and should thus be rewarded with just by the virtue of their existence, instead premising the value of a utilitarian perspective. He objected to the idea that any individual or group should be given an ethical framework through which he or it could then dictate that which is right and that which is wrong. This, Bentham contended, would be a contradiction to the preservation of individual rights. He even goes so far as to signal the necessity for a change in approach to contending with any questions regarding the prescription of rights, here channeled through the words of John Stuart Mill. The remarks seem directed in their derisive tone at the unempirical thinkers espousing the Law of Nature as a singular lens for evaluating human rights:

Instead of taking up their opinions by intuition, or by ratiocination from premises adopted on a mere rough view, and couched in language so vague that it is impossible to say exactly whether they are true or false, philosophers are now forced to understand one another, to break down the generality of their propositions, and join a precise issue in every dispute." (Mill, 1)

Guided by the central principle that morality may defined as the creation, extension or preservation of happiness for the largest number of people at all times, Mill's ideas are conceptually antithetical to Kant's devotion to absolute morality. Where Kant presents the argument that moral order is impossible to define without permanent standards that are shaped by man's dignity, Mill works within a system that must inherently be pragmatic. In his perspective, "morality is no longer to be understood as faithfulness to some divinely given code, or to some set of inflexible rules. The point of morality is seen as the happiness of beings in this world and nothing more; and we are permitted-even required -- to do whatever is necessary to promote that happiness."(Rachels, 92)

Mill's conditional approach to lying, for example, is analogous to the discussion which Rachels engages over the utilitarian perspective on euthanasia. If Kant's points are to be assimilated when adopting a moral stance which is consistent with man's dignity, such absolute terms are inevitably defined by dominant social structures. The inextricable relationship which theology and morality have shared throughout history tends to have a tangible impact on the way these hegemonic standards are defined. "The dominant moral tradition in our society is, of course, the Christian tradition. Christianity holds that human life is a gift from God, so that only he may decide when it will end. The early church prohibited all killing, believing that Jesus' teachings on this subject permitted no exceptions to the rule." (Rachels, 93) This jars with the utilitarian view however, which does not readily accept biblical tradition as the most likely route to happiness. If it be established, Mill would argue, that the euthanasia of an individual suffering intractable pain would bring a greater balance of happiness than unhappiness, the mercy-killing would actually be the only morally acceptable path.

The application of this approach to the question of lying invokes a similar resolution. Utilitarianism provides that "according to the Greatest Happiness Principle, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain. And as rich as possible in enjoyments.'" (Rachels, 91-92) Within the framework of this notion, it would be morally unacceptable to avoid lying when the truth has the potential to provoke unhappiness. The flexibility of Mill's approach asserts that one must consider this balance before making an ethically informed decision between the use of truth or some strategic fabrication in personal exchange. A prominent example may be a politician's divergence of truth for the purposes of preserving the integrity of his office and his constituency, if it be deemed that revelation of the truth could be damaging to these parties.

Kant, rejects this flexibility outright, however. Beyond its deviation from his established disposition toward moral absolutes, Mill's approach violates Kant's maxim about man as an end rather than a means. Man is to be the motive for moral acts, with his dignity defining right and wrong. Mill's perspective, contrarily, makes happiness the end. With happiness the motive, man becomes a means. If man is the means to happiness, the pragmatism of utilitarianism is merely a conditional way for us to use one another. When we deem it the most justifiable means to our ends to lie, we subvert the dignity of those whose ignorance is the facilitation thereto.