Negotiating Peace in the Middle East

The Art of Negotiation Introduction The Syrian conflict has lasted for several years now and peace talks have gotten underway just as many times, with numerous players adopting different sides of table. The problem with the negotiation process when it comes to Syria is that it is still somewhat unclear as to who is in charge, who stands to lose what, which party has the most leverage, and who will be the major players to settle the conflict and negotiate a lasting peace.

This paper will examine the issues and contrast them with the interests of the various parties who have a stake in the negotiation of peace in the region and how this difference has affected the negotiation process thus far.

It will also analyze the ethical behavior and tactics that have been used throughout the negotiation process, as some of these tactics have raised many questions about how far stakeholders can and should be willing to go when it comes to negotiating the peace in a region that is fraught with hostilities and conflict. Finally, this paper will determine the best alternative to a negotiated agreement as well as the worst alternative and develop a proposal for both a distributive and an integrative negotiation strategy for this negotiation.

The Syrian Negotiation The Syrian conflict is centered on the rule of Bashar al-Assad, who presently serves as the dictator of Syria. Democratically elected, Assad is popular among the Syrians; however, his neighbors in the region—i.e., Saudi Arabia and Israel—are determined to see regime change so that they can benefit from 1) laying pipe through his state and collecting profits from pumping oil and gas to Europe, and 2) expanding their own territory and national security (Engdahl, 2014). As an ally of Israel, the U.S.

is heavily leaning towards supporting regime change and has so in the past with respect to Syria. However, now that Russia and Iran have emerged as defenders of Assad and have helped to drive back ISIS and the U.S.-supported rebels, the game has changed substantially and regime change no longer seems possible save for an all-out war between world powers U.S. and Russia.

In order to get these various countries to the table, hammering out what each side wants and how likely that is to be possible has been the subject of numerous talks. Currently, the 8th round of negotiations has taken place—yet still there is little sign of any real peace having yet been achieved (Wintour, 2018).

Cease fires have occurred, but with Israel’s and the U.S.’s joint attack (along with France and UK missiles) in the wake of allegation of chemical weapons usage by Assad against his own people (later demonstrated to be fake news), negotiations seem both unlikely to result in a win-win for all sides and more important than ever if all-out war is to be avoided. Issues vs.

Interests The interest range from the need for stability in the region (Russia’s aim) to the need for economic gain via pipelines through the region (Saudi Arabia’s aim) to the need for security through the weakening of foes (Israel’s aim—by overthrowing Assad, Iran is weakened as it has one less ally in the region) to the need to assert global dominance and support of its allies in the region as well as to oppose Russian influence on the global stage (the U.S.’s aim) to the need to support the Syrian people and Syrian nationhood and independence (Assad’s aim) (Al Jazeera, 2018).

The issues range from humanitarian efforts (claimed by the U.S. with regard to stopping alleged chemical attacks which have been shown to be false flags) to maintaining autonomy in the region in the face of terroristic threats from ISIS and other terrorist-backed organizations and agencies that seek to destroy Syria. The U.S.

on the one hand wants to leave Syria (as President Trump has said) and on the other hand wants to continue to police the region to ensure that ISIS is defeated and that Assad does not use chemical weapons.

Its position is thus somewhat contradictory, which is the result of a contradictive set of groups within the Trump Administration and various actors, from Nikki Haley to John Bolton to James Mattis to Trump himself who do not appear to be on the same page at all when it comes to addressing the issue of what the U.S. is doing in Syria and what it wants.

Russia has been clear that it wants peace (as this will help it to secure its own borders—which is why it has largely assisted in routing ISIS in Syria and why it wants Assad to remain in power: he is not a puppet president of the West). Iran wants peace and security—same as Russia. Saudi Arabia and Israel want regime change and a puppet president installed. This would benefit them they believe—but regime change would benefit no one else (Engdahl, 2014).

How the Difference Affects the Negotiation The negotiation is affected by these differences because it is virtually impossible on all of these sides coming together and agreeing on a common outcome. Israel and Saudi Arabia appear determined to push forward in their antagonism of Assad. Israel continues to attack the nation, firing missiles at bases where Iran has facilities. The U.S. has also launched missiles in response to suspected chemical weapons usage. Russia has threatened to retaliate should either Israel or the U.S.

continue its attacks on Syria—but so far it has not made good on that promise. Iran has also threatened to go to war with Israel if its interests in Syria are attacked. All of this makes negotiation quite difficult as each no attack only raises the likelihood of a worst alternative occurring (Engdahl, 2014).

Ethical Behavior and Tactics Used So far, the ethical behavior of Russia and Syria has been well documented as both have worked, with Iran, to stymie the biggest terrorist threat in the region ISIS—which was what the U.S. said it was going to help do yet the U.S. was always found to be aiding “rebels” instead of Russia and Syria against ISIS (Al Jazeera, 2018).

The Western-backed White Helmets have been accused by Russia of faking the chemical attacks purportedly orchestrated by Assad, the reason for the false flag being to give the U.S. a pretext to attack and engage in regime change to support the aims of Israel and Saudi Arabia while simultaneously undermining Russia and Iran (TASS, 2018).

The U.S.’s aim to bring about a negotiation in which its own interests and those of its allies are guaranteed has been supported by the claims of the White Helmets which are used to inflame international sentiment against Assad—but Russia has shown that these claims are insubstantial and not to be believed.

What is to be believed is that Russia, Iran and Syria have neutralized ISIS in the region while the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Israel continue to demonstrate hostility towards Syria and its allies. How They Affect the Negotiation All of this has the effect of breaking down negotiation.

Numerous attempts have been made to get all parties to agree on Syria’s future—whether Assad should stay or go, whether a new government should be developed, whether Russia and Iran should have bases in the region, whether the U.S. should have bases, and so on.

BATNA At this point the best alternative to a negotiated agreement is a prolonged stalemate in the region, with Russia continuing to support Syria’s air and ground defenses, Iran continuing to work with Syria and Russia in terms of combating ISIS and other threats to the region’s stability; Saudi Arabia, Israel and the U.S. all biding their time and waiting for another opportunity to engage in a strategy that will provide them with a chance to achieve their aims.

In other words, the present situation as it currently is, while not good, is still the most desirable outcome short of a negotiated agreement as at least ISIS is defeated, Syria is somewhat stabilized, Assad remains in power offering some protection for his people, and Saudi Arabia, Israel and the U.S. are kept at bay.

The only other BATNA would be if the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Israel found another way to get a pipeline to Europe, ensure national security, and effectively monitor the region in order to promote ideals of democracy, freedom and peace. WATNA The worst alternative to a negotiated agreement is all-out war with Russia and Iran on one side, and the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia (along with the UK and France to a limited capacity) on the other side.

This could certainly be the impetus for WWIII—though it would not be good for any country and the cost and loss of life would be very high especially considering the possibility of nuclear weapons being used. In a worst alternative, all countries would suffer and there would be no chance for a win-win situation. The zero-sum game approach would result in total destruction and no stakeholders would be able to lay claim to success.

Proposal for a Distributive Negotiation Strategy A proposal for a distributive negotiation strategy would be that Assad must leave and so too must Russia and Iran from the region or they will be destroyed by the West, Saudi Arabia and Israel. The alternate proposal from the other side would be that the U.S. must withdrawal from the region, Israel must stop attacking and Saudi Arabia must stop funding terrorists or.