Osolo Peace Accords

Oslo Peace Accords Impact on Middle East Negotiations

Today, the State of Israel continues to be faced with some fundamental challenges and obstacles to its goals of resolving the longstanding conflict between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and neighboring Middle Eastern countries in the region. In spite of the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993, these constraints to progress continue to characterize the negotiation process between Israel and their Middle East neighbors in general and the Palestinians in particular, and it would seem neither side is willing to comprise to the extent that is needed to achieve a lasting peace. To determine what these obstacles and challenges to peace are today, this paper provides a description and analysis of the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993 and the ensuing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on the implementation thereof; a discussion concerning the reaction by Hamas and the collapse of President Clinton's effort to bring about a final status agreement is followed by a summary of the research and salient findings in the conclusion.

Review and Discussion

Background and Overview.

During the numerous changes in governments that took place during the 1980s and 1990s in Israel, differing political ideologies concerning how best to achieve the nationhood goals of Zionism affected the manner in which various governments pursued their respective agendas for expansion in the region. In this regard, Alterman (2002) reports that, "The Labor government elected in July 1992 froze new construction in the West Bank, including many of the units that Sharon's office had in the pipeline. The Likud government that returned to power in 1996 thawed the freeze, but with the comeback to power of Labor in June 1999 and the resumption of the peace talks with the Palestinians, construction for Israelis in the West Bank was no longer a government priority" (103). Although the actual number of immigrants who resided in the West Bank was relatively small, the efforts by the Likud government would come back to haunt them in unexpected ways. According to Alterman, "When the crisis broke out, the West Bank settlement policy weakened Israel's capacity to borrow favorably in the international financial markets, until the Oslo Peace Accords signed in September 1993 changed international attitudes toward Israel" (103). Therefore, this change in international attitudes could not have come at a better time for Israel and provided the state with some significant economic incentives to achieve a peaceful resolution to these longstanding problems, and these issues are discussed further below.

Oslo Peace Accords of 1993.

The Palestine on September 13, 1993 representatives of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements," a document also known as the "Oslo Accords." They were signed at a Washington ceremony hosted by U.S. President Bill Clinton on September 13, 1993, during which Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin ended decades as sworn enemies with an uneasy handshake" (Details of the Oslo Peace Accords 2008: 2).

The Oslo Peace Accords provided a series of mutually agreed-upon general principles concerning a 5-year interim period of Palestinian self-rule with negotiations about their "permanent status issues" being scheduled for no later than the third year of the interim period which were intended to be implemented following the end of the interim period established in the Accords (Details 3). The main points contained in the Oslo Peace Accords, or Declaration of Principles (DOP), are provided in Table 1 below.

Table 1.

Main Points of the Oslo Peace Accords.

Main Point of Accords

Provisions

Transfer of Powers to the Palestinians

The DOP features an agreement in principle regarding a transfer of power and responsibilities to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, so they may have control over their own affairs.

The DOP does not prejudge the Permanent Status

The DOP specifically states that permanent status issues, such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements and borders are to be excluded from the interim arrangements and that the outcome of the permanent status talks should not be prejudged or preempted by the interim arrangements. During this period, the Israeli government retains sole responsibility for foreign affairs, defense and borders. Israel's position on Jerusalem remains unchanged. When the DOP was signed, Prime Minister Rabin stated that "Jerusalem is the ancient and eternal capital of the Jewish people." An undivided Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, with religious freedom for all, is and remains a fundamental Israeli position.

Security remains an Israeli responsibility

In the DOP, Israel and the PLO agree that during the interim period, Israel will remain responsible for security along the international borders and the crossing points to Egypt and Jordan. Israel will also retain responsibility for and the overall security of Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli settlements in those areas, and freedom of movement on roads.

Source: Details of the Oslo Peace Accords 2008: 3-4.

The implementation of the Oslo Peace Accords was intended to follow the four phases outlined in Table 2 below.

Table 2.

Implementation Phases for Oslo Peace Accords.

Implementation Phase

Description

Gaza-Jericho

Self-rule in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, including a withdrawal of Israeli forces from those areas (the "first redeployment"), is to serve as a first step in the implementation of the DOP. The details of the Gaza-Jericho aspect of the DOP were negotiated and concluded in an agreement signed in Cairo between Israel and the PLO on May 4, 1994.

Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities

In the rest of the West Bank, five specific spheres -- education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism -- are to be transferred to Palestinian representatives through early empowerment. Additional spheres may be transferred as agreed by the sides. The DOP proposed that this transfer of powers take place immediately following the implementation of the Gaza-Jericho agreement.

The Interim Agreement and Elections modalities agreement regarding the election of a Palestinian Council and a comprehensive Interim Agreement specifying the structure and powers of the Council will be negotiated. The Interim Agreement will detail the self-government arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza. Concurrent with the elections, Israeli forces are to be redeployed outside populated areas to specified locations. The Palestinian Council will have a strong police force in order to guarantee public order and internal security. Central to the DOP are two economic annexes which outline economic cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians, both bilaterally and in the multilateral context.

The Permanent Status

Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians on the permanent status will commence as soon as possible but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period (May 1996). These talks will determine the nature of the final settlement between the two sides. It is understood that these negotiations will cover remaining issues including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest. Under the DOP, the permanent status will take effect 5 years after the implementation of the Gaza-Jericho agreement, namely May 1999

Source: Details of the Oslo Peace Accords 4-5.

The encyclopedic entry for Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, one of the negotiators of the Oslo Peace Accords, states that, "In 1992, Yitzhak Rabin, who had just ousted Peres as Labor party leader, became prime minister and appointed Peres foreign minister. Peres negotiated the historic Oslo peace accords (1993) with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), for which he was awarded, with Rabin and PLO leader Yasir Arafat, the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize" ("Peres" 2007: 37255). Suggesting that the post-crisis period that existed in 1993 represented a "grand opportunity" for negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and the newly installed Israeli government, Alterman reports that, "The revolutionary news of the Oslo Peace Accords with the Palestinians provided grand economic and political opportunities. The new government was eager to prove itself after 15 years away from power. The incoming Labor government headed by Yitzhak Rabin was highly critical of the excess housing production and was eager to point out Likud's mistakes" (141). Unfortunately, as Miller (2007) points out, "The 1993 Oslo peace accords [were] a period of great hope turned sour" (43).

In contrast to the 1980s and early 1990s when non-entitlement resources were devoted to housing initiatives, the new Israeli government was determined to curtail almost all public-program housing contracts, in some cases even at the expense of compensating developers without any construction being realized (Alterman 141). As Alterman points out, there were some ulterior political motives for this shift in policies. For instance, this author reports that, "The cessation of construction also had a political goal for the new peace-propelling government: to stop ('dry up') the piggybacked construction of housing on the West Bank (Alterman 141).

Based on its perception that economic growth represented a more immediate priority, the new Israel government announced that it would make economic development a higher priority in response to the relatively high unemployment rates that continued to affect many immigrant workers shift priorities to the economy. Much like the announced plans by President-elect Barack Obama to launch the most massive public works program since World War II by investing in the nation's highways and bridges, the same approach was used by the newly installed Israeli government to stimulate the economy. This approach, though, was considered a comprise approach since there were vastly differing views on what issues should be made priorities following the Oslo Peace Accords (Alterman 141). According to this author, "The shift of priorities was visible on the ground within a year or two: major highways and interchanges, long-neglected by the Likud governments, were upgraded. Environmental projects received public funds. Even the long-neglected rail system received a boost, which though modest was nevertheless its largest since pre-State British Mandate times" (Alterman 141). Despite this shift in priorities over the years, Israeli expansion and Palestinian statehood remain at the forefront of the ongoing and convoluted loggerheads being experienced between these two peoples. In this regard, Dunsky (2001) emphasizes that, "The 1993 Oslo peace accords the Israeli government signed with Yasser Arafat stipulated they would negotiate the future of the West Bank and Gaza. Since then, both Labor and Likud have expanded Jewish settlements by 40%. The settlements, basically colonies on Arab land, are illegal under international law" (1).

Ensuing Negotiation between Israel and Palestinian Authority.

From her perspective as a member of the management team for Project Israel 2020, Alterman reports that, "One of its most exciting moments came immediately after the news of the Oslo Peace Accords, in the summer of 1993. The team enthusiastically convened and drew up a think-tank volume -- the first of its kind -- about the implications of peace for Israel's future land use, environment, transportation, economic development, as well as for Jewish-Arab relations" (122). Even these apparently benign initiatives, though, represented a potential sticking point for further negotiations. In this regard, Alterman notes that, "In the Israeli context, commonplace elements of plan making, such as simple demographic projections and urban development policies may become politically volatile issues if they are perceived as touching upon Jewish-Arab relations or security issues" (122).

Unfortunately, the region occupied by the Palestinians and Israel remained a veritable powder keg at the time, and it would seem that almost any excuse would serve to resume the hostilities between them. For instance, according to Miller (2007), "While young Palestinians threw stones during the first Intifada, between 1987 and 1993, they discovered a more devastating weapon in round two. Suicide bombings soared after September 2000, with the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to Jerusalem's Temple Mount, sacred to Jews, and also the site of the Al Aqsa mosque, which Muslims revere" (44). The visit by Sharon was akin to the otherwise-insignificant assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria that sparked World War I, at least on a regional level. In this regard, Miller points out that, Sharon's visit was the flashpoint for the second, so-called 'Al Aqsa' intifada. In January, 2002, a young Palestinian woman named Wafa Idris was catapulted into Palestinian celebrity by becoming the forty-seventh Palestinian suicide bomber -- but the first woman to kill herself while murdering Israelis" (44). The celebrity that was attached to this suicidal act by Idris may be difficult to conceive in the West, but Miller suggests her actions placed her on the same celebrity level as Elvis or Hillary Clinton in terms of her effect on Palestinian society: "Her picture was everywhere in the West Bank and Gaza -- on Palestinian TV, on posters. Poets wrote songs in her honor. Women named daughters after her" (Miller 43). In this environment, it is little wonder that a negotiated settlement to these divisive issues would require some significant statesmanship, and President Clinton's efforts in this regard are discussed further below.

President Clinton's Effort to Negotiate a Settlement.

According to Khatchadourian (2000), "Political matters were bound to be left vague, since as we saw, the [Oslo Peace] Accords concentrated on the transitional autonomy stage, leaving other crucial matters to later negotiations" (78). President William "Bill" Clinton certainly did not enjoy any special advantages when it came to negotiating a peaceful settlement pursuant to the Oslo Peace Accords, and was saddled with some personal baggage of his own at the time. Nevertheless, there are indications that the president was willing to make some compromises of his own for both sides. For instance, Luxner (1998) reports that, "In Washington, the Palestinians have staffed a mission since 1979 under various names -- first as the Palestine Information Office, then from 1988 until 1993 as the Palestine Affairs Centre. After the Oslo peace accords were signed between Israel and the PLO, the modest mission changed its name once again, becoming the PLO Representative Office" (8). In 1997, though, the PLO was forced to cease operations in Washington at the vocal request of the pro-Israeli lobby (Luxner). According to this author, though, "In December, however, President Clinton allowed the Palestinians to formally re-open the office with its nine-member staff, saying that the PLO's presence in Washington was in the national interest of the United States. He took the controversial step by waiving part of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, in which Congress branded the PLO a terrorist organization and severely limited the ability of U.S. officials to have contacts with it" (Luxner 8). Likewise, at a one-day conference at the State Department in Washington, D.C. with 42 other nations, on November 30, 1998, President Clinton suggested that any negotiated settlement must provide substantive positive outcomes for both sides and stated, "No peace stands a chance of lasting if it does not deliver real results to ordinary people" (quoted in Khatchadourian at 78).

During July 1999, following Prime Minister Ehud Barak's taking office, President Clinton met with Yasser Arafat, President Clinton, and Husni Mubarak of Egypt. Based on his preparatory statements, the president noted that he sought to "proceed toward a final agreement with the Palestinians"; however, the president's aides emphasized at the time that, "Syrians are [President Clinton's] first priority. With the Palestinians, Barak can expect drawn-out negotiations involving issues like the status of Jerusalem and the future of the Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories. By contrast, a Syrian deal could come quickly -- " possibly within a year" (Khatchadourian 86).

The inextricably interrelated nature of the different interests of the parties to these negotiations became clear during President Clinton's efforts to negotiate a peace in the region. For instance, just one month later, negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinian broke down in what Khatchadorian describes as "his and Arafat's first public squabble, as Arafat's cabinet quickly rejected the proposal, demanding that Barak should start the [second] withdrawal within three weeks" (quoted in Khatchadorian at 86). Likewise, in July 1999, Egyptian President Barak communicated his optimism concerning the prospects for a resolution of one of the major sticking points, the Golan Heights issue, within the first 15 months in office to conclude peace agreements with Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. Pursuant to achieving that goal, President Clinton corresponded with Assad to emphasize his confidence that Barak "was willing to hold peace talks after a three-year stalemate," and encouraging him to "seize the moment of opportunity' for peace negotiations with Israel"; in addition, President Clinton also requested that Assad "stay in touch with him" (quoted in Khatchadorian at 98).

A report from Bird (1998) suggested that although President Clinton was sincere in his efforts to help mediate a peaceful resolution to the ongoing violence between the Palestinians and Israel, he was the wrong man at the wrong time to achieve these difficult goals based on his personal problems at the time. In this regard, Bird emphasizes that, "President Bill Clinton has his heart in the right place when it comes to the peace process. But his own troubles personally and with Congress prevent him from acting" (15). Nevertheless, President Clinton did go through the motions, at least, but only in a perfunctory fashion. For example, Bird points out that, "As the latest made-for-media sex accusations against him began to unfold in Washington, D.C., the imperiled U.S. president met for two long sessions totaling three hours with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, but avoided honoring him with a luncheon or a dinner. Two days later, Clinton met with President Yasser Arafat of the Palestinian Authority, his partner in a peace agreement now four and a half years old and rapidly falling apart over Netanyahu's unwillingness to make significant withdrawals on the schedule called for under the Oslo accords" (Bird 15).