Ethics and Counterintelligence: Building a Virtue-Based CI Framework

Introduction

Intelligence and counterintelligence operations have always been a part of the American Republic (Federation of American Scientists 1996). General Washington was aware of the threat of foreign espionage and the need to counter it (Wettering 2000, 165). The need to deceive those whose intention is to deceive one's nation is in fact an ancient one, identified by Sun Tzu thousands of years ago (Select Committee on Intelligence 1986). Practicing deception while remaining free from the corrupting influences of deceivers has proven to be a challenge, however (Valentine 2016, 45). The circumstances under which counterintelligence in the US was formerly developed and pursued in its infancy, childhood, and adolescence could be said to have predicted what that program would become in its adulthood. Abuses, errors, and mistakes were so rampant that the CIA's counterintelligence program, run by James Jesus Angleton from inception in the 1950s to the 1970s, effectively had to be reconstructed by Director Colby, who faced pressure from Congress and the public (Church Committee 1976, 171). The problem of ethics in counterintelligence is one that to this day has yet to be adequately answered. However, by understanding what counterintelligence was in the beginning, one may be better situated to understand what it is today and why its policies are what they are. By learning from the mistakes made in the past, a better foundation can be set in place for the future.

Both Angleton and the era in which the counterintelligence program was formally organized shaped the nature of counterintelligence at a time when the nation itself was buckling under the stress of paranoia, anger, frustration, and mistrust (Valentine 2016, 23; Wettering 2000, 165). To some degree, the nation has never recovered from the stresses of the post-war climate that birthed the counterintelligence program in America (Valentine 2016, 9). When Director Colby dismissed Angleton from his position as head of counterintelligence at the CIA, Colby inherited a staff that was by that time a full-grown institution. Facing political, social, and economic pressures, the CIA was compelled to reorganize, and as the Church Committee reported, it was "an end of an era in CIA counterintelligence" (Church Committee 1976, 171). Yet the consequences of that era remained. The structure that Angleton had created and the nature of counterintelligence itself had already come into being, much like Frankenstein's monster. Victor Frankenstein rejected his own creation, but that did not mean the creation ceased to exist. In fact, the creation went on to destroy the creator.

Such an ominous analogy may be appropriate, at least according to Wettering (2000), the retired Central Intelligence Agency operations officer who oversaw clandestine operations in Europe and Africa for more than three decades. Director Colby certainly felt as much in the 1970s, when it became apparent that the child the federal government had reared into adulthood was not exactly what the state had hoped for. The Church Committee noted that by 1976 the issues facing the counterintelligence program were "how best to protect the United States, including the proper degree of compartmentation of CI information, methods of operation, approaches to security, research priorities, extent of liaison cooperation, and emphasis on deception activities" (Church Committee 1976, 172). One dominant issue the Senate uncovered was the lack of cooperation among the various agencies on the counterintelligence front (Wettering 2000, 270). Tension between the CIA and the FBI had been high since the former's birth, and while the two agencies could boast of a collaborative spirit in the 1970s, the lack of any substantial counterintelligence office in the FBI meant that the bulk of the work was coordinated by the CIA.

William Evanina, director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, has gone so far as to warn that the challenge of counterintelligence is no longer one the government can address on its own, and that the private sector must bear some of the burden of protecting data and ensuring digital security in the face of foreign intelligence collection (Nakashima 2020). An additional consideration put forward by Tromblay (2017) is that technology has developed rapidly in the last two decades alone, and the counterintelligence program has been slow to cross the generational divide between itself and the digital natives of the 21st century. In response to the rise of new global technological advances, the counterintelligence program has appeared much like a member of an older generation attempting to catch up on what members of younger generations take for granted. Tromblay (2017) calls this the problem of counterintelligence's reactionary orientation—a characteristic of the program defined by the circumstances of its birth. Moreover, with so much data now in the hands of private industry, there is an increased need for counterintelligence to work more closely with the business community. Intelligence operations have always included work within private industry, but in many cases this work was compromised by conflicts of interest (Valentine 2016, 40).

Research Question and Purpose

The research question is: How can the US counterintelligence enterprise support collaboration among the various USIC members and the private sector in an ethical and productive manner? To understand the issues and policies of counterintelligence today, it is worth examining the mistakes and lessons that can be learned from the past when the counterintelligence program formally began under Angleton. The purpose of this study is to propose a standardized ethical framework for guiding the counterintelligence program as it works to collaborate with the private sector in the 21st century.

Research Design

A comparative case study approach is used in this research. The case study analysis focuses on three areas in particular: (1) the use of counterintelligence in the CIA under counterintelligence Chief James Jesus Angleton; (2) the conflation of counterintelligence with counterinsurgency in the FBI's COINTELPRO and the Phoenix Program; and (3) the use of counterintelligence by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN).

Because there is no standard ethical framework in counterintelligence, a problem arises from the risk of subjective or questionable morality seeping into counterintelligence activities (Valentine 2016). To understand the problem, this research design is appropriately qualitative, as the subject is exploratory in nature. Scholarly articles, Senate reports, memoirs, independent research, biographies, and analysis have served as the sources of information.

The purpose for this approach can best be understood in the light of Erikson's model of human development, which enables psychologists to understand the adult by examining the age-related conflicts that must be overcome before the child can proceed successfully to later stages of development (Shriner and Shriner 2014). By examining the early stages of counterintelligence under Angleton, one may gain insight into the policies and issues of counterintelligence today. This study will explore how conflicts of interest, problematic relationships, and a lack of ethical standards led to problems in counterintelligence. The comparative case study approach is a robust one because it allows for triangulation of research. The appropriate model for this approach is that of George and Bennett (2004), which uses a structured-focused research design.

Key Definitions

Conflict Theory: Marxism is the root of conflict theory, but Ralf Dahrendorf promoted conflict theory by comparing it to structural functionalism and arguing that societies have two orientations or "two faces" (Ritzer and Stepnisky 2017, 120). One face suggests cooperation, consensus, and agreement; the other suggests conflict between a class with power and a class without. Conflict between these two faces is what explains, according to this theory, the actions of individuals and institutions.

Counterintelligence: Bellaby (2012) defines counterintelligence as "any action or activity that is knowingly designed and intended to encourage an audience of some sort to believe in something which is untrue" (147). Typically, counterintelligence (CI) is associated with misleading or duping an adversary so as to prevent that adversary from gaining a crucial advantage. CI is as important in the private sector as it is in the public sector today, as information has become a vital resource in the digital age.

Critical Theory: Critical theory stems from the post-Marxist view that the revolution predicted by Marx failed to occur because of cultural factors and institutions that prevented the class without power from fulfilling their Marxist mandate. This theory explores the ways in which the culture of those with power is used to prevent those without power from challenging it (Horkheimer 1972). The theory assumes that Marx was correct in predicting a worker uprising.

Duty Ethics: Kant put forward the concept of deontology, also known as duty ethics. The concept is that morality is determined by the extent to which one fulfills one's duty to the state (Messilbrook 2013). The line between duty to state and personal ambition, however, has been crossed innumerable times throughout the history of counterintelligence (Morley 2017; Valentine 2016), making deontology a complicated framework with serious limitations in terms of utility and application.

Ethical Egoism: Ethical egoism is the notion that the ends justify the means and that so long as one can identify a personal benefit to what one does, it can be morally justified. It goes against the notion of Kant's deontology by advocating subjective desire over external duty (O'Neill 1989). However, Sheppard (2012) explains that the world of deception running through counterintelligence aligns with the "general tenor of ethical egoism" (19), implying that an unhealthy subjective character animates the CI community.

Lockean Ethics: Locke's view was that liberty is the fundamental law of nature and that the state should preserve liberty insofar as it is able (Pettit 1997). Lockean ethics as a system is problematic because it can branch off in two directions at once—toward utilitarianism, in which liberty is curbed only by utility to the common good, or toward ethical egoism, in which the ends justify the means.

Structural Functionalism: Structural functionalism is a theory that explains social organization in terms of how relationships and institutions work together to bring stability and functionality to a community (Ritzer and Stepnisky 2017). Rather than identifying the problematic nature of these relationships, this theory identifies their positive aspects. Its inverse theoretical approach could be called conflict theory.

Utilitarian Ethics: Utilitarianism defines the moral action as that which produces the greatest common good (Carson 2010). However, it has no framework for defining the "good"—unlike the system of virtue ethics, which associates the "good" with transcendental ideals that form a person's character as they are pursued in thought and action.

Virtue Ethics: Also known as character ethics, virtue ethics is not unique to the West but was embraced equally in the East for thousands of years. In the West, it dates back to Aristotle; in the East, to Confucius (Slingerland 2011). The basic idea of virtue ethics is that actions are deemed moral if they contribute to the cultivation and development of one's character. A state that has tarnished its reputation through bad-faith interactions signals an untrustworthy character and risks exclusion from a larger network of international collaboration (Mattox 2002).

Chapter Outline

This thesis first provides a review of literature that focuses on four themes: the problematic nature of deception, the role of ethics in CI, the need for a framework for analyzing the work of CI in the past, and the lack of clarity and collaboration in the CI community. The third chapter discusses the methodology used for this research. The fourth chapter presents the findings and the fifth chapter discusses those findings.

Literature Review

The aim of this examination of the literature is to fill the wide gap that remains in counterintelligence research regarding an appropriate ethical standard that can guide and foster an ethical culture, as called for by Bellaby (2012) and Valentine (2016). The purpose of this review is to identify the lessons that have been learned and presented by researchers on this topic and to identify an appropriate theoretical framework for assessing the way forward. The research question for this study is: How can the US counterintelligence enterprise support collaboration among the various USIC members and the private sector in an ethical and productive manner? The themes this review examines are: (1) the problematic nature of deception in intelligence work; (2) the role of ethics in counterintelligence; (3) a framework for analyzing the past; and (4) the need for clarity and collaboration in counterintelligence efforts among the various agencies, organizations, and actors.

Deception is at the core of counterintelligence, yet it is a problematic core because of the corruption associated with deception in ethical systems. Mattox (2002), for example, observed that the practice of deception "is subject to limitations imposed by the demands of morality" (4). Mattox (2002) makes the good point that intelligence professionals must "act in good faith even with those who are their adversaries" (4). Yet this point is not supported by all researchers, including Cohen (2016), who argues that there are no moral limits on military deception. Mattox (2002) makes the stronger argument for numerous reasons: first, he supports his argument with a moral framework justifiable based on long-term results, which he calls the limitation of long-term negative effects. When deception is used cautiously and morally, the adversary is more willing to accept it as a norm of state conflict; moreover, the adversary—who may become a state ally in the future—will not hold ill-will on this account (Mattox 2002). But when moral limits are removed, as Cohen (2016) suggests they should be, there is no foundation for future trust.

Cohen's (2016) argument fails because it is based on a zero-sum-game approach to statecraft: he does not anticipate the very real possibility of and need for collaboration with states that are adversaries today but potential allies in the future. Cohen (2016) implicitly views the entire act of counterintelligence from the standpoint of ethical egoism, which is highly problematic from rational, ethical, and political standpoints (Lyons 1976). Without imposing moral conditions on counterintelligence, the possibility of developing trusting relationships in the future is lost. The Mossad's abandonment of its former motto, "Thou shalt make war by way of deception" (Ostrovsky and Hoy 1991, 1), after other states expressed displeasure with it, proves the point that Mattox (2002) makes: states must be conscious of the moral limits of deception. The opposite position of Cohen (2016) can only be accepted from an ethical egoism point of view, and ethical egoism is the most relative and least effective ethical position, as pointed out by Lyons (1976).

Unfortunately, morality within the realm of modern counterintelligence is often the first casualty, as history shows (Valentine 2016). The official beginnings of counterintelligence under the leadership of James Jesus Angleton have illustrated the extent to which the art of deception can create problems within the intelligence community (Morley 2017, 69). Within this community there is no standard ethical framework applied, but there should be (Bailey and Galich 2012, 77). Valentine (2016), Unkefer (2013), and Pfaff and Tiel (2004) all point to even less emphasis on ethical cohesion within counterintelligence specifically. If there were a more unified, standardized moral framework applied throughout counterintelligence, it is likely that its history in the US would be less fraught with conflicts of interest, human failings, ulterior motives, problematic relationships, and questionable tactics.

Counterintelligence has often been linked with the idea of national security, yet as Nolan (1997) shows, it is dangerous to conflate the two. Writing from the standpoint of private industry, Nolan (1997) states explicitly that "while security seeks to protect a firm's assets by a combination of policies, procedures and practices, counterintelligence, properly understood, aims to engage and neutralize a competitor's collection efforts through a variety of imaginative, flexible, and active measures" (53). Confusing counterintelligence with security is precisely what has happened in the past and is reflected in contemporary national counterintelligence strategy. American policy on counterintelligence has not been developed with Nolan's (1997) important warning in mind. Instead, it has been formulated with a view toward removing all moral limits and recommitting itself to the pursuit of victory in the zero-sum game that policymakers wish to see the nation playing.

It is helpful to consider how self-deceptive American policy has become in order to illustrate the points that Nolan (1997), Mattox (2002), and Valentine (2016) make. The strategic objectives of the 2020–2022 National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States are: (1) to protect the nation's critical infrastructure, (2) reduce threats to supply chains, (3) counter the exploitation of the US economy, (4) defend American democracy against foreign influence, and (5) counter foreign intelligence cyber and technical operations (4). These objectives differ from the 2018–2022 National Counterintelligence and Security Center Strategic Plan. Under Director William R. Evanina, integration of CI and security activities was a top priority and theme of the 2018–2022 strategy, but the strategic goals were distinct: Goal 1 was to "Advance our Knowledge of, and our Ability to Counter Foreign and other Threats and Incidents"; Goal 2 was to "Protect US Critical Infrastructure, Technologies, Facilities, Classified Networks, Sensitive Information, and Personnel"; Goal 3 was to "Advance our Counterintelligence and Security Mission and Optimize Enterprise Capabilities through Partnerships"; Goal 4 was to "Strengthen our Effectiveness through Stakeholder Engagement, Governance, and Advocacy"; and Goal 5 was to "Achieve our Mission through Organizational Excellence" (National Counterintelligence and Security Center Strategy 2018–2022, ii).

The difference between these two strategy documents reveals the issue of mission creep—the gradual blurring of lines, blurring of objectives, expansion of meanings, and taking liberties with original mandates. The official responsibility of counterintelligence is to "collect information and conduct activities to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations" (National Counterintelligence and Security Center Strategy 2018–2022, 2). The conflated, mixed, broad, and somewhat vague strategic objectives developed for the counterintelligence community in 2020 reflect the same problems that plagued the CI community's Phoenix Program, which Valentine (2016) has called the "blueprint" for all current intelligence action (50). Tromblay (2017) has concurred that the intelligence community is overstretched and overtaxed, and that counterintelligence is being tasked with too many objectives foreign to its mission. The issues identified by Tromblay (2017) are that "the U.S. government has attempted to partner with the private sector on counterintelligence (CI) awareness and response, [but that] these efforts have been plagued by a limited concept of which industry sectors are at risk, inconsistency in programs, and redundancies across agencies" (1). Overall, there is a lack of reconciliation between vision, mission, and what is being asked of CI.

To summarize the problem: the area of action for counterintelligence may be one thing in terms of a mission, but the strategic operations and integration of counterintelligence with security and other state-sanctioned actions threatens to perpetuate the same problems that led to the Church Committee's (1976) conclusion that the CIA had created a counterintelligence monster (172). While it is acknowledged that the CI community should work more closely with private industry (Nakashima 2020), the reality of how this collaboration is to take place, ethically and practically, remains a problem to be addressed. Nolan's (1997) warning has been largely ignored because the framework of ethical egoism has been adopted from the beginning under Angleton, who worked closely with the Mossad from the start of CI operations (Morley 2017). Rather than rooting CI in the strong moral foundations of the West—virtue ethics, deontology, or utilitarianism—Angleton adopted the ethical egoism framework of the Mossad, and that has made all the difference.

One of the problems encountered in studying counterintelligence is how to approach it from an ethical point of view (Pfaff and Tiel 2004). Defining an ethical framework is essential in approaching the subject, yet problematic at the same time because counterintelligence has not been approached in the same way by those who practiced or continue to practice it. Bailey and Galich (2012) make a very effective argument for why a more traditional and defined ethical framework is needed in CI. Pfaff and Tiel (2004) explain that currently there is a lack of ethical focus in CI, but Bailey and Galich (2012) get to the root of the matter: no agencies in CI appear to be interested in setting moral limitations on the practice of CI. While various theoretical assumptions have been applied to critical studies of the CI community in the past, none of these studies have actually gone so far as to recommend an ethical framework. Erskine (2004) addressed the utilitarian ethics of CI (360); Pfaff and Tiel (2004) argued that every ethical approach to CI is rooted in Lockean or deontological ethics (1–2); Mattox (2002) approaches the topic from the standpoint of virtue ethics, arguing that if leaders do not "act in good faith even with those who are their adversaries," the risk of damaged reputations can undermine the diplomatic strategies of the state and create greater problems than before (4). Each of these studies illustrates the shortcomings of ethical application in CI, but none of them presents a way forward or a sufficient solution.

The problem is real: to support the point of Mattox (2002), Lieberthal and Jisi (2012) explain that the alliance among China, Russia, and Iran—all considered counterintelligence targets in the 2020–2022 National Counterintelligence Strategy—has come about as a direct response to the perception of these states that the US has acted in bad faith and cannot be trusted. What is the solution? None of these studies by themselves provides a holistic solution, because the problem is ultimately cultural. To understand that point, one has to consider the traditional purpose of ethics in both the West and the East and how that purpose differs from the modern approach to ethics from the standpoint of egoism.

Researchers consistently suggest that ethics matter in all aspects of statehood, no less in counterintelligence than in any other sphere (Bellaby 2012; Erskine 2004; Bailey and Galich 2012; Pfaff and Tiel 2004). Because there has been no standard ethical framework used in counterintelligence, a need for consistency in application of an ethical system to CI must be assumed. Bailey and Galich (2012) make this point most effectively by explaining the code of ethics in the intelligence community and identifying its weaknesses and problem areas. However, having a code and implementing a code are two different things, and this is where culture comes into play. The culture in the US is what must be addressed, as Valentine (2016) deftly shows.

With power as the main impetus, other drivers of human action—such as virtue ethics, duty ethics, utilitarianism, and ethical egoism—may be used to explain the problems that arose within the counterintelligence program from the 1950s to the 1970s. Relevant theories include conflict theory, structural functionalism, and critical theory. Horkheimer (1972) fills a gap in cultural studies by drawing the connection between media, the state, and the cultural aims of the elite, describing better than anyone else in the field how the ethics of the people have been formed by an elitist group in power. However, by itself critical theory is an inadequate theory because social action is more than a quest for liberation. Equally inadequate by itself is structural functionalism, because it does not consider the role that conflict plays in society. With a focus on how ethics play a part in decision-making, structural functionalism, conflict theory, and critical theory can together help to explain the complex culture of CI in America.

Because of the confusion regarding culture, cultural values, and ethics, there is no consensus on how to analyze the past, as Pfaff and Tiel (2004) show. Nonetheless, there is a need for a framework for analyzing the past, because only with such a framework can one begin to understand the mistakes and the lessons that can be learned. Before one can rightly consider the role that ethics should play in the field of counterintelligence, one must decide on the cultural perspective from which to judge. Morley (2013) illustrates how Angleton was influenced by Israel's culture of statecraft, though he does not emphasize this point sufficiently. That influence is at the heart of America's lack of moral restraint in counterintelligence. The lack of moral restraint has been well documented (Valentine 2016), but the cultural influence responsible for that lack has not received adequate focus. As Bellaby (2012) states, counterintelligence is "any action or activity that is knowingly designed and intended to encourage an audience of some sort to believe in something which is untrue" (147). Trafficking in untruths is highly risky if not approached with a firm ethical framework in place.

Erskine (2004) provides an initial step toward thinking about CI from a more traditional ethical perspective, one that is realistic, consequentialist, and deontological. Erskine (2004) is not unrealistic in appreciating the ambiguous moral nature of CI, stating that "not only is deception intrinsic to clandestine collection, but it is also central to counter-intelligence activities such as the deployment of 'double agents' and the sending of false messages when it is we who would rather keep our secrets to ourselves" (372). More pointedly, Bellaby (2012) assesses the underlying reason for the failure within the counterintelligence program in the past: widespread deception "can damage society as it chips away at, and could destroy the social bonds of trust and as a result breaks down the moral and social relationships that hold a society together" (149). A further problem, identified by Bailey and Galich (2012), is that there has never been a standardized ethical framework used within the counterintelligence program and that, just as freedom of religion can quickly lead to freedom from religion, freedom of choice with regards to ethics can quickly lead to freedom from ethics.

The ethical framework used to analyze the past must be realistic, as Erskine (2004) argues. The fact is that deception is part of the trade in counterintelligence: "intelligence professionals around the world are taught and encouraged by their leaders and agencies to use unethical tactics or 'tradecraft' (e.g. lie, deceive, steal, and manipulate) in order to obtain [crucial] information" (Coyne et al. 2013, 27). There is no way to avoid this fact, and negotiating with it from an ethical standpoint puts or removes limitations on human behavior. Those limitations can be the difference between a successful counterintelligence operation and a failed one (Unkefer 2013). To prove the need for such a framework, it is helpful to draw upon Valentine's (2016) work, which is factual rather than theoretical. Valentine's study of the CIA from its inception is unique among other researchers, as he was given special access to CIA agents by Director Colby. His reporting provides a unique personal look into the history of intelligence in the US, serving as a historical record of errors, mistakes, and problems within the intelligence and counterintelligence enterprise resulting from a lack of ethical imperatives.

Not only has a need been identified for collaboration between the CI community and private industry, but there is a recognized need that the globalized world has changed the way in which nations must interact: more collaboration and less intrigue is required. For example, Godson and Wirtz (2000) state that "the breakdown of the traditional barriers to national sovereignty—increases the information and economic channels" that international players must navigate, foster, and maintain (432). Godson and Wirtz (2000) further point out that "foreign denial and deception affects the quality of life in the United States by causing policymakers to waste scarce public resources and to fail to anticipate strategic threats" (435).

The absolutist side of this discussion has a much better argument than the relativistic side. As Bernardi (2013) states, "Usually, information control generates an escalation of counterintelligence measures, because information control on the part of one State invites other governments and agencies to counteract, by means of countermeasures against espionage and deception" (50). When one nation deceives, another will follow. Angleton faced the problem of escalation throughout his entire career (Morley 2013). This is why the absolutist position of Kent (2019) makes practical sense. It may be better simply to focus on collaboration and clarity than on attempting to deceive.

In this context, the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (2020) has identified a "need to clarify the role of CI in the era of globalization" (1). Yet the culture of deception has spread all over the globe. Developers, technicians, production personnel, IT personnel, business development personnel, human resources personnel, and facility personnel are all potential targets of foreign actors and foreign collectors of intelligence (National Counterintelligence and Security Center, n.d.). Private industry is at risk because it possesses intellectual property that foreign actors covet, and business activities can be exploited. Counterintelligence operations could be used to deliberately leak false information to known foreign actors, but doing so runs the risk of escalating a larger conflict among nations, as Bernardi (2013) notes. Thus, one must step back to the standpoint of culture, and perhaps even to absolutism, in order to establish the conditions necessary for collaboration and clarity, as Kent (2019) proposes.

Since counterintelligence came to maturity in the US in an era of conflict, it is helpful to approach the subject from the standpoint of conflict theory and the theories developed around it, all of which focus on the ways in which power is sought and used by groups to obtain or maintain possession of vital resources or a balance of relationships that ensure stability and order in a system. The literature shows that the problem of ethics in counterintelligence has had no easy solution and that the art of deception is such that it fosters a gray zone of disinformation, conflicts of interest, and corruption. The outcome of this situation was that counterintelligence suffered from a poor culture and various other issues, resulting ultimately in the dismissal of Angleton and an attempt to restart the program. As the program now tries to address the issues of the 21st century, guidance is needed to steer the counterintelligence program away from the errors and policies that derailed it in the past.

Methodology

There is no standard ethical framework in counterintelligence, which presents a problem because of the risk of subjective or questionable morality seeping into counterintelligence activities (Valentine 2016). To understand the problem, this research design is qualitative because the subject is exploratory in nature. The aim of the research is to explore by way of comparative case study analysis the counterintelligence program under James Jesus Angleton, CI in the Phoenix Program and the FBI's COINTELPRO, and CI in the FBN. Scholarly articles, monographs, Senate reports, memoirs, independent research, biographies, and analysis serve as the sources of information. Data was analyzed using content analysis, with themes drawn from the literature and arranged to give a clearer understanding of how ethics might be better utilized to guide the integration of the counterintelligence enterprise with the private sector in the 21st century. Concepts of ethics were operationalized by defining them in accordance with accepted scholarly practices. Potential biases were addressed by bracketing them out at the beginning, as recommended by Johnston, Wallis, Oprescu, and Gray (2017).

The comparative case study approach relies heavily upon secondary data analysis—data that has already been compiled. For this study, three works in particular serve as the starting point: Unkefer's (2013) memoir of working with the FBN, 90 Church; Morley's (2017) biography of Angleton, The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton; and Valentine's (2016) collection of research on the Phoenix Program as well as the FBN. Analysis of these works is then complemented by analysis of relevant archival data, gathered using snowball sampling—reviewing sources identified in the original data and using those sources to gather additional sources. Secondary data analysis is typically used in literature reviews and systematic reviews to provide a foundation for further research or to compile past information from decades of previous research into one research article, and it can be of equal importance in case study analysis (Walliman 2017).

The ethical perspectives from which these counterintelligence cases will be assessed are: (1) virtue ethics, (2) duty ethics, (3) utilitarianism, and (4) ethical egoism. These are the four main relevant ethical systems typically utilized in ethics discourse to discuss actions and their morality in today's world (Pojman and Fieser 2012). As Pojman and Fieser (2012) note, "moral principles concern standards of behavior; roughly speaking, they involve not what is but what ought to be" (3). The goal of this study is to identify what the ethical framework ought to be for the counterintelligence community going forward.

The advantages of secondary data analysis and archival studies are that they provide a good way to review what information is available in either published or unpublished form (Walliman 2017). The limitations of this method are that it is not generally going to provide any new empirical insight on a subject. However, since the aim of this study is exploratory in nature and intends to focus on the issue of the application of ethics in counterintelligence, this limitation is not seen as negative.

Purposive sampling will also be used in conjunction with snowball sampling to obtain data. Purposive sampling is acceptable for qualitative research because in qualitative research one is exploring a problem rather than attempting to test a hypothesis (Marshall 1996). In a qualitative study, one might conduct a focus group, interview, or case study, all of which will likely use a purposive sampling approach because it gives the researcher a better focus on people who represent the population and a chance to understand in more detail what this population is like. The qualitative researcher gains more direct insight into a specific population through purposive sampling. The characteristics of this study are such that randomization with regard to data collection is not of primary importance, since no theory or hypothesis is being tested.

In conclusion, this research study uses the comparative case study analysis approach. The goal of the research is to identify what the ethical framework ought to be for the counterintelligence community going forward. The data will be analyzed using content analysis and organized thematically. The framework by which the data will be analyzed will be the ethical frameworks of virtue ethics, duty ethics, utilitarianism, and ethical egoism. Sampling methods will be purposive and snowball.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study has been to propose a standardized ethical framework for guiding the counterintelligence program as it works to collaborate with the private sector in the 21st century. By using comparative case study analysis, it has shown that CI under Angleton, CI in the Phoenix Program and the FBI's COINTELPRO, and CI used by the FBN have all suffered from a lack of ethics. These cases' problems are best characterized as stemming from reliance upon ethical egoism, an evolution of Lockean ethics and an outgrowth of a poorly defined or constrained utilitarianism.

To support collaboration among the various USIC members and the private sector in an ethical and productive manner, the CI community must standardize virtue ethics as the preferred and essential ethical system. It must engage in character education so as to provide a foundation for the type of virtue that is to be fostered. It must develop a more suitable culture in which virtue ethics can subsist and in which character formation can be facilitated. The lack of collaboration among the CI agencies is a result of the lack of trust and transparency. The blending of CI with other intelligence activities is a corruption of the usage of CI: controversial and illegal CI activities have been justified internally and before Congress by appeals to national security. CI should not be conflated with national security but rather with the conscientious usage of deception to mislead and confuse adversaries—and this objective must be pursued within a virtue ethics framework to prevent abuses.

Deception is an ancient tool that has often been used throughout societies around the world. Problems arise when self-deception sets in, or when one begins deceiving those one is meant to serve. This has been a danger in CI from the beginning. Angleton fell to self-deception and failed to recognize to whom he owed his loyalties first and foremost. Anslinger sought to serve too many different stakeholders with different interests and neglected to give his agents a proper ethical framework. The FBI used COINTELPRO to spy on American citizens. Phoenix was designed to give CI agents carte blanche in a foreign land where torture and other illegal means could be used without constraint. At no time did agents have a code of ethics or ethical framework to fall back on. At no time did they partake of character education as part of their training. They existed in a subjective and ambiguous gray zone of government work, where a war culture was the only culture informing them.

To facilitate collaboration among the various CI agencies and the private sector, the CI community must establish a clear framework for accountability. Implementing a virtue ethics framework and insisting upon character education and proper oversight is essential. This would admittedly require a total overhaul in terms of how intelligence is approached in the US, but such an overhaul should not be viewed as overwhelming; rather, it should be viewed as absolutely necessary for the common good of the nation. The nation is more than just a handful of established families with international business interests. There are more than 300 million people in America, and each of them is a stakeholder. By collaborating ethically and openly, the CI community serves them all in turn.