Protecting American Ground-Based Space Assets

Protecting American Ground-Based Space Assets

The objective of this work is to examine how the United States will be best able to protect ground based assets from terrorist attacks, such as down-link radar sites, launch facilities including control rooms and fuel supplies and to further examine whether terrorism in space is a viable option to the 'lowest bidder' such as Iran being close to putting rockets into low-earth orbit.

Cyber-warfare or electronic-warfare are both terms used to describe the nature of warfare in today's conflicts. Cyber-warfare is enabled through information technology and electronic communications on and off the battlefield, in space and on ground, and in real-time. A news article in the Economist reports: "These days America fights not in a fog of war but, as one senior air force officer puts it, in a "huge cloud of electrons." Large amounts of information, particularly surveillance videos, can be beamed to soldiers on the ground or leaders in America. The officer says this kind of "network-centric" warfare is "as revolutionary as when the air force went from open cockpits to jet aeroplanes." (2008) While this sounds extremely advanced the truth is that one little glitch in an electrical supply within a 'ground-based' operation can pull the plug on the whole system making ground-based protection of space assets a primary consideration for military defense strategy. Another problem is that extremely heavy traffic in bandwidths already present challenges for security in this area due to possibilities of signals being unintentionally jammed. Finally, the consideration exists for protecting these assets from terrorists groups that would intentionally jam the military security system of the United States. Still this is not the largest concern as will be demonstrated in this research study.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The work entitled: "Disharmony in the Spheres" published January 17, 2008 in 'The Economist' magazine relates that many strategists state the argument that the assets of the United States space system that is most vulnerable are those which are "...closer to home." (the Economist, 2008) Ground stations and control centers, particularly those of commercial operations, are exposed to conventional bombing, whether by armies or terrorists. Communication links to and from satellites are open to interference. In cyber-warfare, critical parts of the space system could be attacked from distant computers." (the Economist, 2008)

I. NEW TYPES of TRAINING

The problem is that with no purposeful external interference that: "American forces struggle to find enough bandwidth and to prevent the myriad of electronic systems from jamming each other. Some remedial action is being taken. Backup ground stations are being set up in case the main GPS control centre outside Colorado Springs is disabled. New satellites will have a more powerful GPS signal that is harder to block. America is experimenting with satellite-to-satellite communication by laser, which can carry more data and is less prone to interference than radio waves. And the armed forces are starting to train for warfare with few or no data links. Simulated attacks by both space and cyberspace "aggressors" are being incorporated into events such as the regular "Red Flag" air-combat exercises over the Nevada desert. but, said an officer at one recent wargame, there are other ways of doing things. "If you really want to take us down, why go to space? You could just try to take out the control tower or bring down the electricity supply to the base." (the Economist, 2008)

II. GROWING RELIANCE on SPACE: DANGEROUS DEPENDENCE

The Economist article goes on to state that while: "...space wizardry has made possible unprecedented accuracy...this growing reliance on space and cyberspace [might] become a dangerous dependence, a fatal weakness?...the Pentagon worries about what would happen in America came up against a major power, a 'near-peer' rival (as it calls China and Russia), able to intercept space assets with missiles and space mines, or to disable them with lasers and electronic jammers. The precise nature of these weaknesses is a well-guarded secret. But wargames simulating a future conflict over Taiwan often end up with the 'Red Force (China) either defeating the "Blue Force" (America) or inflicting grievous losses on it by launching an early attack in space, perhaps by setting off one more nuclear explosion s above the atmosphere." (2008) Further stated is the fact that the Chinese "routinely turn powerful lasers skywards, demonstrating their potential to dazzle or permanently blind spy satellites...space is no longer a sanctuary; it is a contested domain." (the Economist, 2008) Further, this article informs that tracking the entirety of space is much akin to attempting to track a ship by naked eye (the Economist, 2008; paraphrased) which is very difficult.

Battle for Space: Estimated Number of Actives Satellites (end 2007)

Source: The Economist: (2008)

III. MORE DISTRIBUTED and REDUNDANT SATELLITE SYSTEMS

The work of Bolt, Colletta, and Shackelford entitled: "American Defense Policy" described as a mainstay source for instructors for more than 25 years relates that economic vulnerability exists as these systems "naturally become attractive targets of attack for rival states, terrorists, and other enemies, and therefore it will be necessary to place weapons in space in order to protect them." (2006) However, as noted in the previous report, ground-based asset protection is just as critical. It is additionally stated by Bolt, Coletta, and Shackelford that satellite systems should become "...individually less valuable through the construction of satellite systems that are more distributed and redundant, with more, smaller satellites doing the same jobs as fewer, large, expensive ones. The ultimate goals would be for the communications and other satellite infrastructures to become like the U.S. interstate highway systems: economically vital but not worth attacking because its resilience means that none of its individual components is critical." (2006)

IV. SMART-PLANNING to ENSURE KEY CAPABILITIES REMAIN in PLACE

The work entitled: "Space Weapons Basic: An Introduction to Space Weapons" published by the Union of Concerned Scientists states "smart planning can ensure that attacks on individual satellites cannot remove key military capabilities..." which are stated to include:

1) Development of the ability to rapidly replace or bypass damaged satellites; or 2) Compensation provided for lost satellite functions on a regional basis by using backup systems that are not space-based." (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2006)

The Union of Concerned Scientists report additionally states: "...the United States should work to strengthen the taboo against attacking satellites...cancel provocative space weapons development programs, and take an active role in international discussions to develop laws, rules of the road, and transparency measures for space, including consequences for any country to attacks satellites." (Union of Concern Scientists, 2006)

The work of Clayton Chun (2000) entitled: "Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers" states that the reliance of the United States upon space systems: "...for numerous military force applications is a tempting target to many nations. The post-cold-war era has left the United States with a downsized military in terms of personnel, equipment, and bases. This situation has forced our military to rely on a number of force multipliers such as space-based systems to overcome force size, enemy geographic advantages, and distance concerns. For example, on 8 May 1998, the United States' National Reconnaissance Office launched an Orion signal intelligence spacecraft that allows the nation to eavesdrop on military communications from Pakistan, India, China, and North Korea. The current drive towards using asymmetric strategies to defeat an enemy has, in one sense, opened the opportunity for a foe to attack our very strength through unconventional methods. The more capable the technology, the more our forces rely on it due to the reduced costs and improved capabilities provided to a joint force commander. Unless the United States, and the Air Force in particular, take precautions to defend vital space assets against such threats as ASATs, our forces likely will become more vulnerable to foreign threats despite our technological and military superiority." (Chun, 2000)

The work of Earl (1998) relates that the news is rife with countries "...cottoning to known terrorists. Their future actions could do irreparable damage to U.S. space resources. Among surreptitious deeds, terrorists could disrupt radio-transmission of directive commands to space-borne assets-even though encrypted, critically alter positioning of satellites, counter with jamming the transmission and reception of space-earth communication and television relays, obstruct geo-stationary-orbit positioning and faculties, as well as other disastrous procedures. For the United States to counter these, as a minimum even today, radio traffic to and from space must feature agile-frequency modes or innovative encryption techniques." (Earl, 1998)

V. IMPORTANCE of LOCAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

The work of Chenoweth and Clarke entitled: "The Politics of Vulnerability: Constructing Local Performance Regimes for Homeland Security" states that no matter the national character of homeland security policy "the reality is that all terrorism is local. Ultimately so are all security initiatives." (Chenoweth and Clarke, 2006) Proposed in this work is a local governance arrangement which are."..capable of bringing about systemic changes in how security issues are addressed at the local level, giving a strategic decision and priority to vulnerability issues. This is more a matter of coordination..." (Chenoweth and Clarke, 2006) These performance regimes are required to take part in three challenges stated to be the challenges associated with:

1) Overcoming asymmetrical incentives and enlist diverse stakeholders around a collective local security goal despite varying perceptions of its immediacy;

2) Persuading participants to sustain their involvement in the face of competing demands, and 3) Overcoming collective action problems to create a durable coalition around performance goals necessary to reducing local vulnerability." (Chenoweth and Clarke, 2006)

VI. TERRORISM in 'LOCATION SPECIFIC' (CHENOWETH and CLARKE, 2006)

Chenoweth and Clarke stress that...terrorism is location-specific" and "cities especially are at risk." (2006) This must certainly be true in relation to high profile space and military industry specific locations. It is reported that since 2003 "there is some evidence of greater sensitivity to spatial variations in risk: Congress slowly increased the funding for port and railroad security and reorganized territorial funding to target the higher risk levels in urban areas." (Chenoweth and Clarke, 2006) it is critically necessary that local communities "organize to address vulnerabilities: risk-based programs alone cannot prepare cities for the damaging effects of an attack. As a result, national security priorities necessitate a focus on local governance strategies that successfully address vulnerability." (Chenoweth and Clarke, 2006)

Chenoweth and Clarke states that a paradox exists: "...the grater the national security threats, the more important the local role, but that role appears to be problematic and contested. It is possible that this uneven local role can be attributed to budget constraints, institutional inertia, insufficient support and incentives from the federal government, or basic shortsightedness, as the Century Foundation suggests. But isolating these factors overlooks the extent to which lagging local responses are best seen as collective action problems. The argument here is that questions of local capacity and coordination are most effectively conceptualized as governance issues: the creation of local governance arrangements are necessary to bring about systemic changes in how security issues are addressed at the local level and to give a strategic direction and priority to local vulnerability issues." (2006) Stakeholders in this mobilization on a local level are "...multiple, across jurisdictions and both public and private sectors. There is no one hierarchical authority in charge, so there is an unprecedented need for cooperation among stakeholders who seek mutual benefits but have little experience in dealing with each other." (Chenoweth and Clarke, 2006)