Sole-Source vs. Competitive Procurement in DoD Contracting
This paper examines federal procurement contracting in the Department of Defense (DoD), focusing on the tension between sole-source and competitive procurement procedures. Using the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) sole-source contracts with Boeing Inc. (SP0400-02-D-9407 and SPM4A1-09-G-0004) as a case study, the paper demonstrates the pricing weaknesses inherent in noncompetitive arrangements. It then applies game theory to compare total acquisition costs under sole-source, winner-take-all, and split-award competitive systems. The analysis reveals that, due to the rigid, monopsonistic nature of the defense industry, sole-source procurement often yields better taxpayer value than competitive alternatives. The paper concludes with policy recommendations to strengthen DLA's sole-source procedures and prevent future overpayment situations.
- Introduction: Context, legislation, and research purpose
- Definitions of Terms: Key procurement terminology defined
- Case Study: The DLA's Sole-Source Spare Part Procurement from Boeing: DLA-Boeing contracts, audit findings, overpayments
- Procedures of Competitive Pricing: Steps and tools for competitive price analysis
- The Myths and Facts of Competitive Procurement: Game theory analysis of procurement cost structures
- Policy Recommendations: DLA reforms to strengthen sole-source procedures
- Conclusion: Summary of findings and key takeaways
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What makes this paper effective
- It grounds abstract procurement policy in a concrete, audited case study — the DLA-Boeing contracts — giving the argument empirical credibility and real dollar figures.
- It uses game theory modeling to compare three procurement structures (sole-source, winner-take-all, and split-award), making the cost analysis rigorous and quantifiable rather than purely descriptive.
- It resists a one-sided argument: while acknowledging competition's theoretical benefits, it systematically dismantles the assumption that competition always reduces costs in the defense sector.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates the effective use of a comparative case study combined with quantitative modeling. By first establishing real-world procurement failures through an Inspector General audit, and then building a hypothetical game-theoretic model to explain why those failures occur structurally, the author bridges descriptive and analytical approaches. This dual methodology strengthens the policy recommendations section, which flows naturally from both the empirical and theoretical findings.
Structure breakdown
The paper follows a clear problem-solution arc: it opens with legislative context and a statement of purpose, defines key terms, presents the case study and audit findings, describes competitive pricing procedures, critiques the myth of universal competition benefits, and closes with targeted policy recommendations and a summary conclusion. Each section builds logically on the last, and the game theory analysis sits at the structural center, serving as the pivotal analytical moment that justifies the final recommendations.
Introduction
Federal procurement contracting has, over the last few years, been a subject of increased public and congressional interest, particularly because of growing concern that noncompetitive procurement practices may be on the rise in the assignment of government contracts. The rising number of cases and public reports implicating federal agencies in alleged misconduct involving noncompetitive contracts has drawn the attention of both Congress and the Executive branch. President Obama, in his 2009 memorandum on federal contracting, emphasized the need to use competition in the award of federal procurement tenders. The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 was enacted to keep federal agencies in check by ensuring that they (i) develop their procurement procedures as expressly required by statute and (ii) use full and open competition in the issuance of procurement contracts (Manuel, 2011).
There are, however, exceptional circumstances under which the full and open competition requirement does not apply and agencies are permitted to use noncompetitive procedures. These include: (i) when there is a single source for the supply of a required commodity; (ii) when the procurement faces compelling and unusual urgency; (iii) when the agency is seeking to maintain its industrial base; (iv) when international agreements permit anticompetitive procedures; (v) when the acquisition involves a brand-name item meant for resale; (vi) when the acquisition is a matter of national security; and (vii) when the contract or acquisition is necessitated by public interest (Manuel, 2011).
The Department of Defense (DoD) accounts for over 70% of annual federal procurement spending, and is also one of the greatest users of noncompetitive procedures, conducting a bulk of its contract actions on a sole-source basis. As a result of this overreliance on noncompetitive procurement procedures, the department has seen its acquisition costs rise steadily over the last few years (Harrison, 2012). Its supply chain management system has also come under intense criticism for inefficient inventory management, inaccurate demand forecasting, and the maintenance of "high levels of inventory beyond what is needed to support requirements" (GAO, 2010, p. 1).
This paper uses the case study of contracts SPM400-02-D-9407 and SPM4A1-09-G-0004 — sole-source contracts awarded to Boeing Inc. by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for the supply of spare parts — to demonstrate the weaknesses inherent in sole-source arrangements. It uses game theory to show how acquisition costs differ when competition and sole-source procedures are used to acquire goods and services. Harrison (2012), however, cautions against overvaluing competition in procurement. He argues that while competition can reduce costs and serve as an incentive for improving contractor performance, it ought not to be seen as a cure-all solution to the supply chain problems that plague the DoD. In his view, competition would only achieve positive outcomes if it is structured in such a way that competitive pressure sufficiently balances the additional costs of having multiple contractors. This paper will also focus on showing how competition needs to be structured to improve federal procurement spending in the DoD.
Definitions of Terms
Before embarking on the main discussion, it is prudent to provide concise definitions of the key terms used throughout this paper. While these terms may have been defined differently by different researchers, the definitions presented below will be adopted for purposes of this paper.
Procurement: the process by which government agencies obtain from private vendors goods and services that they do not provide or produce for themselves (Manuel, 2011).
Sole-Source Procurement: a form of procurement where purchases are made from only one vendor, either because that vendor is the only one capable of providing the required goods or services, or because the agency is tied to that particular vendor by specific, justifiable reasons. The latter case is more specifically referred to as single-source procurement. The defining feature of sole-source procurement agreements is that there is no possibility of obtaining competitive bids (Manuel, 2011).
Competitive Procurement: a form of procurement where an agency determines whom to contract with and purchase from by soliciting offers from multiple vendors, subjecting them to critical evaluation, and then selecting the option with the highest relative value (Manuel, 2011).
The aim of this paper is to show that (i) despite the inherent benefits of competition, sole-source procurement is still the most cost-effective mode of acquisition in the defense industry; and (ii) the effectiveness of competition in the defense industry — should that option be considered — depends on how the competition is structured.
References
GAO. (2010). Defense inventory: Defense Logistics Agency needs to expand on efforts to more effectively manage spare parts. United States Government Accountability Office. Retrieved January 19, 2015, from
Harrison, T. (2012). The effects of competition on defense acquisitions. University Research Symposium 2012. Retrieved January 21, 2015, from
Manuel, K. T. (2011). Competition in federal contracting: An overview of the legal requirements. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved January 20, 2015, from
Office of the Secretary of Defense. (n.d.). Commercial item handbook (version 2). Department of Defense. Retrieved January 21, 2015, from
The DoD. (2013). Improved guidance needed to obtain fair and reasonable prices for sole-source spare parts procured by the Defense Logistics Agency from the Boeing Company. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense. Retrieved January 19, 2015, from
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