Why the Carthaginians lost the Second Punic War and Roman Mediterranean dominance

Carthage

The Carthaginian Defeat in the Second Punic War and Rome's Eventual Expansion

The Roman Republic won the war against Carthage for a number of reasons. Narrowly, Rome's victory was due to the inability of Carthage as a whole to consolidate the gains won by Hannibal. Broadly, the most important factor behind Rome's victory, and subsequent expansion, was its ability to mobilize organized manpower at a rate and scale far beyond that of its adversaries.

This paper will first discuss the elements of Rome's victory which are specific to the second Punic War. It will then discuss the broader, structural factors behind Rome's victory in the second Punic War. Finally, it will explain the role of these structural factors in the subsequent expansion of the Roman Republic.

A Flawed Plan, Flawlessly Executed

Hannibal's campaign against Rome was conducted as flawlessly perhaps as any campaign in the history of warfare. He made no major tactical blunders on the battlefields in Italy. Not only was Hannibal prudent, he was creative, attacking a number of Roman vulnerabilities thence unknown and extracting the most out of these opportunities. However, the lack of a clear military or even political objective to align the efforts of Hannibal and Carthage doomed Hannibal's campaign from the very beginning.

Despite the panic among the Roman populace after Hannibal's victories, Hannibal never had a realistic chance at capturing Rome. (Salmon 1960: 137). Lazenby asserts that Hannibal could have theoretically taken Rome by siege but avoided a protracted siege both because it was not his forte and because it would have left him vulnerable to encirclement by the various Roman legions afield in Spain, Sicily, and Greece. Hannibal's refusal to invade Rome after his devastation of the Roman legions at Cannae suggests that he recognized this. (Lazenby 1996: 41).

A less-cited reason for Hannibal's loss was the lack of coordination and support from Carthage. Hannibal, continuing the precedent set by Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, acted independently of Carthage, so much so that Carthage admitted that it had no control over Hannibal. Although Hannibal's independence from the political leadership in Carthage may have helped him stay aggressive and flexible, it deprived him of valuable assistance in diplomacy and governance in conquered territories. This deficiency was conspicuous when Hannibal had to defend a network of Italian cities from the many Roman legions, as he struggled to keep adequate garrisons at these cities, a problem that the Romans rarely encountered. (Lazenby 1996: 45).

Hannibal's True Objectives

Hannibal's skill makes it hard to believe that he would have initiated such an ambitious campaign without a concrete, viable military or political objective. Salmon believed that Hannibal's true objective was to incite a massive uprising among Rome's allies in order to "detach the Italians from Rome." (Salmon 1960: 137). In contrast, Lazenby suggests that Hannibal's intent was to improve Carthage's bargaining position in a new treaty with Rome, citing Livy's accounts of Hannibal's pre-war speeches as well as the terms of his alliance with Phillip V. (Lazenby 1996: 42).

Although it may be impossible to ascertain Hannibal's ultimate objective in invading Italy, it is indisputable that he did serious harm to Rome's interests there, however temporary. Hannibal was able to fund his war by plundering his way through Italy, providing resources for his army while diminishing the resources of the Roman military. Hannibal demonstrated in his Italian campaign what Cato the Elder would later coin in his own Spanish campaign, that "the war pays for itself." (Livy, 34.9)

Despite the influence Hannibal gained from his wild success in Italy, his new Italian allies seemed to revert to Rome as soon as it looked safe to do so. Salmon rejects the conclusion that Hannibal completely misjudged the nature of the relationship between Rome and her allies. He posits that the Italians would have betrayed Rome, but not to someone so foreign as Hannibal. (Salmon 1960: 139). Thus, despite is considerable bleeding of the Italian countryside, Hannibal could never permanently diminish Rome's ability to make war because he could never convert conquered cities into loyal allies.

Rome's Reaction

Salmon believes that Rome's offensive preparations sealed Hannibal's fate. He believes that Rome's ultimate goal was an amphibious invasion of North Africa comparable to D-Day. Salmon points to Rome's persistence in sending out legions to Spain and Sicily as proof of its strategy to end the war by circumventing Hannibal.

In contrast to Salmon, Donaldson believes that Rome's defensive measures led to Hannibal's defeat. Donaldson is extremely critical of Salmon's evaluation of Roman strategy, commenting that Rome could not possibly have foresaw the demolition of Italy by Hannibal and the subsequent plan for an amphibious invasion of North Africa from Spain. (Donaldson 1996: 141). He believes that the Roman generals played it by ear, with their ear telling them to wait Hannibal out. Donaldson cites the fact that the Roman Senate, partly owing to the legacy of caution left by Fabius Maximus, was exceedingly reluctant to initiate an invasion of North Africa, forcing Scipio to set sail with only two legions.

Certainly, the confoundment of Roman generals conveyed by Polybius and Livy comport more with Donaldson's view of a reactive Roman leadership. Also, Salmon's account assumes that Rome knew the extent of Hannibal's skill at the start of the war. Similarly, Salmon seems to underestimate the rift between Carthage and Hannibal by implying that a Roman attack on Carthage would have ended Hannibal's attack on Italy. Rome heard from Carthage itself at the start of the war that the Barcids were essentially acting on their own. Hannibal may not have left Italy for Carthage if Rome had not destroyed his base in Spain.

Ability to Mobilize Manpower

The lack of a clear objective from Hannibal and Carthage is even more perplexing when examined against the virtually inexhaustible pool of Roman manpower in Italy. The most important factor in Rome's victory, by far, was its superior ability to mobilize manpower. Rome reacted to disastrous defeats at Trebia and Cannae by either commissioning more legions or recalling the many legions already afield throughout the Mediterranean. In contrast, Carthage relied on professional mercenaries and had difficulty replacing large losses.

From as early as the 4th century, Rome was a city-state with the military manpower of an empire. Rome kept a fair, mutually beneficial system of alliances with the neighboring Latin states it had defeated. (Bagnall 2003: 19). Rome seldom encroached upon the territories of their Latin neighbors and exacted no tribute. (Bagnall 2003:19). What Rome got in return was the right to request troops organized along Roman lines to fight alongside their native legions. To mitigate the burden of providing troops, Rome wisely paid for the food and weapons and compensated their allies when it requested troops in excess of their treaty obligations. (Bagnall2003: 19). Because of Rome's reasonable alliance system, it was able to mobilize not only most of the fighting population in Rome, but a good chunk of the fighting population in Italy.

A Network of Faithful Allies

Rome's ability to mobilize manpower was enabled by its ability to integrate its neighbors. Rome's inclusiveness allowed it to integrate with its neighboring Latin states, developing a system of assimilation and colonization that it would eventually project beyond the Latin sphere. (Eckstein 2006: 246).

By its very nature, Rome was a conglomeration of different Latin tribes and intermixed with other peoples very easily. (Eckstein 2006: 247). These allies were even mentioned in the treaty between Rome and Carthage at the establishment of the Roman Republic. (Eckstein 2006: 247).

Rome's Latin allies enjoyed compacts of mutual defense (conubium), mutual contract enforcement (commercium), and free immigration (migration). (Eckstein 2006: 248-249). Rome eventually extended these benefits, commercium, conubium, and migration, to states outside of the Latin sphere after the Latin war. (Eckstein 2006: 248-249). This Latin confederacy established a system of jointly populated Latin colonies which established Rome happened to be the biggest state in this Latin confederation, making it the first city among equals. (Eckstein 2006: 248-249).

Rome could not be attacked without its allies being threatened. In contrast, Carthage's allies had no incentive to protect the city when it was threatened by Rome. Actually, it had more incentive to help the future victor in reducing the city. Carthage's allies proved to be as fickle as its mercenary armies, deserting or revolting as soon as Carthage showed any signs of weakness.

Standardized Military Organization

As the Persian experience in Greece proved, overwhelming manpower in itself is not sufficient for victory if the troops are ill-trained and hungry. Unlike Persia, Rome's perpetual numerical advantage was buttressed by superior organization. The four-part structure of the Roman legion allowed it to absorb a variety of troops, providing a place for new recruits as well as veterans, rich and poor, native and allied. (Polybius 6.35).

Polybius mentions Roman standardization in military organization as one of their greatest strengths. For example, when describing the Roman method of placing their camps, which could not be constructed just anywhere and which required a huge amount of digging, the Romans would rather pick camp on inferior terrain suitable for their camp than superior terrain which could not accommodate their standard camp. (Polybius 6.42). He contrasted this with the Greeks, who placed their camps according to the advantages and disadvantages conferred by the terrain. (Polybius 6.42). In this way, the Roman soldiers could rely on military protocol and camp life being the same even no matter where they were and who was commanding.

Another outcome of Rome's system of military organization was the remarkable discipline of the Roman army. Only property-owners were allowed to serve in the Roman military, which meant that all Roman soldiers had extra incentive to obey commands, to never retreat and to never desert, for fear of squandering their property and reputation back home.

Roman military units were designed in a Gestalt style which reduced the effect of externalities such as inadequate troop strength, partial routs, or bad commanders. Polybius described the virtues of the Roman Maniple:

"The order of a Roman force in battle makes it very difficult to break through, for without any change it enables every man individually and in common with his fellows to present a front in any direction, the maniples which are nearest to the danger turning themselves by a single movement to face it." (Polybius 18.28).

The flexibility of the Roman maniple helped ensure its effectiveness whether fighting at half-strength or combined with other bodies. (Polybius 18.32). Thus, the Roman military was designed to survive hardship and disaster.

Military Ethos of Roman Political Class

Rome could persist in long, drawn-out wars because it had a stable of capable commanders it could send out into the field. A man had to serve in the Roman military for ten years before being eligible to be elected for political office in Rome. (Polybius 6.18). Thus, Rome's best men, in terms of ability and ambition, had to prove their worth in the military field before they could achieve any political position of note. If there was any martial ability to be found in a man, this system brought it out. This military ethos, combined with a standardized system of military organization, ensured a bevy of competent generals, and a handful of remarkable generals, to lead Rome's numerous legions.

The political gains produced by military glory created a bias towards war among Roman military men. Romans valued and rewarded military glory and the most ambitious, able Romans pursued military careers. Aggression was all but guaranteed for Rome's enemies, as Roman generals simply had too much to gain by fighting. This bias towards war proved to be a moral hazard in the early part of the war, inducing ill-advised engagements at Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae. However, this bias towards war also made Hannibal reluctant to make an attempt on Rome, not only because of the stiff defense from the city itself but because of the endless legions Rome sent to Hannibal's holdings in Spain, Sicily, and Carthage, not to mention the legions that could be called back from Greece. Roman politicians and generals often encouraged, and actively provoked, conflict with other states to create opportunities for military glory, which promoted Rome's expansion.