Struggle to Achieve Political Objectives in United States

Despite possessing overwhelming military power, the United States has sometimes struggled to achieve political objectives for a variety of reasons: first, the U.S. changes its administration every four to eight years and this means a new approach to policy is brought in each time, which makes it difficult for a consistent international policy to take hold. Second, if “strategy is a concept for relating means to ends,”[footnoteRef:2] the means (military power) may stay the same but the ends are changing every time power changes hands, which means strategy is always undergoing redevelopment. Thus, the political objectives are not achieved because the objectives may change along with strategy. Third, the global opinion towards the U.S. has itself changed over time, meaning that allies are more and more hesitant to work with the U.S. after the disastrous Iraq War and the bungling of the Libyan regime change and the Syrian intervention. The Muslim population is divided in its stance towards the U.S. Saudi Arabia remains an ally, but one that is also open to working with Russia. Turkey is openly being courted by Russia. Iran is openly antagonistic towards the U.S. As Mary Habeck notes, the U.S. has many enemies that want to see the U.S. brought low for all of its meddling in the Middle East.[footnoteRef:3] For these reasons, the U.S. has sometimes struggled to achieve its political objectives. [2: Carl H. Builder, “The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis,” 2.] [3: Mary Habeck, “Why They Did It,” Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror, 1..
As Gray points out, there is a “multiplicity and sheer variety of sources of friction” in the U.S. when it comes to developing policy.[footnoteRef:4] The variety of sources are there because there are so many different moving parts to the problem of establishing and pursuing political objectives. There is the State Department, the military, the intelligence community, the White House, Congress, and business interests—and all have roles and parts to play in shaping policy. Many of the players will stay the same from one administration to the next—but the White House is always changing hands and whoever is in charge at the White House is going to be the one with the most pull in matters of policy. The White House may have different views than the intelligence community; it may be in a contentious relationship with Congress. The military may have a different view on a matter than the White House, and the State Department might have its own perspective. Businesses may have their own takes as well, and then there are always the allies who have things to say. So as the White House changes hands every four to eight years, the entire policy approach has to be restarted all over again, which can make it hard for consistency in achieving objectives. [4: Colin S. Gray, “Why Strategy is Difficult,” JFQ, 8.]
Because of the changing administrations, the strategy will change as well, which means the players are left having to figure out what their roles are going to be, how to adapt, and how to alter course when that becomes a priority. In many cases there may be a long-term objective set up under one administration, but as soon as a new administration comes in there may be a push for a change mid-stream. A new strategy has to be developed because the ends have altered. Other factors such as where power is concentrated by other countries—i.e., a shift in power from Russia to China—will catch the attention of policy makers and they will want to develop new strategies as well.[footnoteRef:5] With so many alterations to strategy, coherence and consistency, which are needed to successfully achieve objectives, are often missing. [5: Stephen Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival, vol. 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 172.]
Finally, the problem of perception plays a part. The U.S. has lost some of its good reputation among other countries over the years because of its interventionist policies that have led to wide-scale destruction and destabilization. Countries like Iraq, Libya, Syria, and many others have become hotbeds of terrorism—and countries like Russia, Iran, and China use that information to oppose U.S. initiatives elsewhere. China is trying to create a trade route with the One Belt One Road Initiative, which would take power from the U.S. on the world’s stage. Russia is seeking a way to circumvent economic sanctions by avoiding the U.S. dollar altogether and other countries like Iran are interested in doing the same. Thus, with more and more countries actively seeking to marginalize the U.S., the influence of the U.S. has been weakened, which also makes it harder for the U.S. to achieve its political objectives abroad. Even old allies are wondering if it is time to form relationships elsewhere, as Turkey is doing and as other states are likely to do.
In conclusion, to achieve international political objectives, it requires stability, consistency of vision, coherent and consistent strategy, and support from allies around the world. In recent years, the U.S. has faced challenges in every one of these areas. The White House changes hands every four to eight years and was constantly undergoing shifts in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, there is a political outsider in the White House, which has impacted how strategy and objectives are determined. It has also led to more allies asking questions about what the U.S. is doing. So in spite of the nation’s military power, the struggle to achieve political objectives remains—for one cannot simply make war and expect one’s desired outcomes to come about. Iraq, Libya and Syria have shown that to be the case. The U.S. has waged war in the Middle East for years, and yet terrorism remains and unless the U.S. objective was to destabilize the region it is difficult to say what the gain was.
Bibliography
Builder, Carl H. “The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis.”
Gray, Colin S. “Why Strategy is Difficult,” JFQ.
Habeck, Mary. “Why They Did It,” Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror.”
Walt, Stephen. “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival, vol. 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 156-179.