The Peloponnesian War

Thucydides may be counted among the foremost historians of the West to utilize a rigorous chronological standard. He recorded events based on their year of occurrence, and every year was divided into two seasons: a campaign-filled summer and a relatively inactive winter. The historian documented the Peloponnesian War in great detail.

In spite of hailing from Athens and having taken part in the war, Thucydides is commonly believed to have provided an overall neutral narrative of it with regard to the parties involved.

The foremost volume in Thucydides 'History of the Peloponnesian War covers a summary of Greece's early history, a programmatic historiographical note, and an explanation for why the War was waged. With the exception of some brief excursuses (particularly 6.54-58 on Tyrant Slayers), its remaining volumes (2-8) concentrate strictly on the War and nothing else.

Though Thucydides' book focuses on the war's military facets, the events are employed as a channel to broach many other War-related subjects. A number of passages in the book describe, in particular, the war's culturally and socially degenerative impacts on mankind. Thucydides' book puts much emphasis on Greeks' lawlessness and atrocities perpetrated against one another in war's name. The Melian dialogue and other such events described in the book are early examples of power politics or real politik (Thucydides).

Following the Athens-Corcyra pact of 433 BC and the siege over Potidaea, Corinth's position was in jeopardy. Further, while Sparta was anxious about Athens' growing might, it didn't wish for war. According to the Spartans, they could have peace if Athens would agree to withdraw measures against Megara, a Spartan ally. Pericles, the leader of Athens did not agree to this, as the two states had, at one time, reached an agreement that an arbitration approach would be utilized to settle disagreements. Any decision, on Athens' part, to grant Sparta what it desired would be tantamount to accepting orders from Sparta, which was unthinkable, thus leading to the eruption of war. The Delian League and Athens faced attacks by the Peloponnesian League and Sparta. In Diodorus's words, Sparta didn't simply wage war, but also sought Persia's aid.

The simple though sound plan adopted by Athens during this ancient war with Sparta was formulated by Pericles. Athens' ground troops wouldn't engage Sparta's comparatively better infantry, even were the former's dominion to be ravaged. Large Athenian attacks on the town of Phalerum, occupied by Sparta, would be carried out using warships dispatched from the Piraeus port. In the event the Spartans laid waste to Athens' farms and killed its livestock for the purpose of heavily damaging its supplies, Piraeus would ensure they received supplies by sea. This plan aimed at maintaining pressure on Sparta's occupation to ultimately invade it whilst ensuring minimum friendly casualties. It was predicted by Pericles that the greater quantity of supplies, funds and warriors on Athens' hand would ensure its victory over Sparta.

Sparta's strategy proved to be a lot more uncomplicated as compared to Athens' plan. They planned on attacking the Athenian League's (Athens and allied states') dominions. However, they weren't lucky in this quest as a majority of Athens' territories were well-defended and Sparta's strategy ultimately proved to be ineffectual and hopeless. This resulted in a delayed Spartan victory. In the end, Sparta invaded important positions around Athens, dealing a deadly blow to Athens.

Initially, Sparta's army decided upon a battle plan wherein the squad at the front would remain firmly standing, not allowing any attacking squads to pass. In the course of the Athenian army's vain endeavors to break down the shield wall, the central squad would destroy its infantry with its spears. Ultimately the Spartan formation's aim was to evolve into a common Greek Phalanx tactic that entailed the application of the aforementioned formation on a much larger scale, ensuring pressure on huge invading enemies from the flanks and the front, resulting in an enemy defeat on account of Greek encroachment and infiltration (Athenian and Spartan tactics and strategies, 2016).

This campaign, commonly known as Demosthenes' campaign, was an unsuccessful offensive tactic adopted by Athens in the northwestern region of Greece in the initial Archidamian War. During the year 426 BC, Demosthenes was made commander of a thirty-ship-strong navy that set out to the Gulf of Corinth from Athens.

This battle fought during the Peloponnesian War ended in a Spartan defeat at sea. Sparta's navy, commanded by Mindarus, aimed at rescuing a little convoy of allied forces which was forced to touch shore at Dardanus; however, the Thrasybulus-led Athenian navy launched an attack on it.

This third battle in the Peloponnesian War was fought in the year 405 BCE, and is recognized as the final significant battle in this campaign. Lysander led a flotilla of Spartan ships that shattered Athens' navy, thus bringing the war to a close, as Athens was no longer able to make contact with the empire or import food grains (Authur, 2017).

Following the Sicilian Expedition's defeat in the year 415 BCE, and with Alcibiades's assistance (Alcibiades was a general from Athens who defected to Sparta), Spartan was able to enjoy more victories at battle against Athens. This general coached the Spartan warriors in naval war tactics (Carr, 2016).

However, Sparta's status as the most powerful Greek city-state didn't last long. Its unending thirst for dominance in North and Central Greece, Sicily and Asia Minor, led it to a second long-drawn-out conflict, namely the 396-387 BC Corinthian Wars against Athens, Persia, Thebes, and Corinth. This conflict ended in the 'King's Peace'; while the Spartan rule was relinquished to Persia, it could still dominate over Greece. But in its attempt to overcome Thebes, it suffered defeat in the critical Leuctra battle fought in the year 371 BC against Thebes's exceptional general, Epaminondas. Hence, the actual victor in the Peloponnesian War was, possibly, the Persian Empire, or even Macedonia, in the end, as it effectively and easily attacked and defeated Greece's enfeebled and mutually distrustful city-states under King Philip II (Cartwright, 2013).

References

Athenian and Spartan tactics and strategies. (2016). Retrieved from https://wh1maya.wikispaces.com/Athenian+and+Spartan+tactics+and+strategies

Authur, k. (2017). List of peloponnesian. Retrieved from http://www.ranker.com/list/a-list-of-all-peloponnesian-war-battles/reference

Carr, K. E. (2016, September). End of the peloponnesian War. Retrieved from http://quatr.us/greeks/history/peloponnesian2.htm

Cartwright, M. (2013, June 1). Peloponnesian War. Retrieved from http://www.ancient.eu/Peloponnesian_War/

Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. n.d. February 2017.