Turnpoints in decision-making and strategic planning

¶ … turning point represented by the coup d'etat against Ngo Dinh Diem

Conditions in Vietnam were critical during the early 1960s, as the Vietnamese grew more and more impatient as regards the autocratic governance imposed by Ngo Dinh Diem. Even with that, the leaders in Washington did not consider that this threatened their authority in the region. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy were willing to support an anti-communist regime in South Vietnam, regardless of who was in charge of it. The American combat advisors sent into Vietnam were meant to provide guidance to South Vietnamese troops on the subject of guerilla warfare and how it could be fought.

While Ngo Dinh Diem was at a certain moment considered to play an essential role in maintaining the connection with Washington, matters gradually changed, to the point where Kennedy did not think much of Diem. Moreover, the American president was certain that Diem's demise would simply be followed by another individual similarly interested in maintaining good relations with the Washington government. Most of the general public shared Kennedy's thoughts in the matter, considering that the U.S.'s influence in Asia would not be disturbed by conditions in Vietnam.

The 16,000 military advisors in Vietnam were supposed to return from the territory before 1965, at the time when Diem (or any other leader coming to rule over Vietnam) would presumably establish his power. Even after Diem's death, Johnson still hoped that the United States could sustain a non-Communist government in southern Vietnam without having to fight a war in that region" (Moss 136). In contrast to the Americans, the communist Vietnamese were certain that Diem's demise (not considering the circumstances) would have a beneficial effect for their campaign, given that they considered the South Vietnamese leader to be a major impediment.

Observing that Diem's installed a corrupt government, the authorities in the U.S. did not hesitate to support South Vietnamese Generals in the coup they were preparing. Through this support, the U.S. believed that they would strengthen their relationship with Vietnam. However, the Americans failed to understand Diem's influence and the fact that he was the main reason for which communism did not spread over all of Vietnam. In spite of being little more than a tool in the hands of the U.S., Diem was nonetheless a very capable minion. With the purpose of destabilizing Diem's power, Kennedy "recalled the CIA station chief in Saigon, John Richardson, who was known to be friendly with Ngo Dinh Nhu" and "cut off the funds to support some Special Forces under Nhu's Control" (Moss 109).

Predictably, the coup overthrowing and murdering Diem did not last for long and conditions became unfavorable for South Vietnam. Diem was followed by several leaders who appeared to be supportive toward the U.S. And against communist, but none matched the former leader in reputation and in managing abilities. When hearing that the Americans supported the coup, the North Vietnamese realized the mistake their enemies did and embarked on a mission to take over South Vietnam and defeat any troops they encountered in their way, with no regard to their ethnicity.