U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea's nuclear program

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

The objective of this work is to examine U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea and to identify some policy issue in the area of peace and conflict and analyze the situation and the proposals to resolve this issue upon some theoretical understanding of the problem and its resolution.

The forceful stance taken by the Bush administration in the first term of President Bush's presidency was one that resulted in North Korea fearing even more greatly than previously for national security reasons that this is the primary driver behind North Korea and its seeking to harness nuclear weapon and energy production.

The work of Lin (2006) entitled: "The North Korean Nuclear Test and Its Implications" reports that North Korea conducted a nuclear test on October 9, 2006 "and thereby became the world's ninth nuclear power..." (p.1)

The factors that contributed to the nuclear test are stated by Lin (2006) to be of a complex nature and multiple in number. According to Lin (2006) the nuclear test conducted by North Korea is quite simply "the latest manifestation of the ongoing Cold War on the Korean peninsula and North Korea's consequent insecurity." (p.1)

This is stated to be due to the fact that although the Berlin Wall fell more than fifteen years ago, "North Korea and the U.S. still have not established diplomatic relations and the armistice agreement that halted the Korean War in the 1950s has yet to be replaced by a peace-agreement." (Lin, 2006, p.3) This situation however is stated by Lin to be one that has "proved beneficial to the strategic interests of the United States since it provides a valid excuse for a strong military presence in the region, which, in turn, is a prerequisite for continued U.S. leadership in East Asia." (2006, p.3)

I. SECURITY DILEMMA OR ROGUE STATE?

The work of Kim and Yi (2005) entitled: "Security Dilemmas and Signaling During the North Korean Nuclear Standoff" states that the provocative foreign policy of North Korea has resulted from North Korea's "security dilemma." (p.1) The work of Xizhen and Brown (2000) hold that it is common for North Korea to be considered a rogue state or one that "operates outside the norms of global society and which presents an ever-present threat to regional security." (p.1)

However, the work of Xizhen and Brown relates that North Korea is a state "whose external support system rapidly and traumatically disappeared a decade ago; a state confronted by hostile neighbors who wish to undermine its regime and who are heavily armed or possible military actions against it; and a state whose limited ability to participate in the global economy is confined to selling abroad for hard currency the few things that it does well: military equipment, including missile technology." (2000, p.1)

It is stated that the policies that the United States, Japan, South Korea and China should be examined and policy shifts should be examined that involve these states providing North Korea encouragement to take a more active role and one that is more positive in building a "durable framework for Northeast Asian regional authority." (2000, p.1)

III. ENGAGEMENT, CONTAINMENT, & TRANSFORMATION

The work of Efimova (2007) entitled: "North Korean Nuclear Problem in Regional and Global Context" states that the conflict "on the Korean peninsula has both global and regional dimensions, since in its origin lay disagreement between the two Korean states and at the same time it has been influenced by the interplay of the major powers that landed support to the corresponding allies." (p.2)

One reason that the Korean peninsula attracts such great attention is due to the regions specific location between Japan and China and on the border of Russia which results in this region being "attractive as a sphere of influence for each of the major powers, since exclusive dominating positions of one of them on the Korean peninsula could directly challenge the security of the others." (Efimova, 2007, p.104)

The negative position of the United States in regards to the "character of political regime in Pyongyang is believed to have represented the most difficult stumbling block to be overcome in the course of the settlement." (Efimova, 2007, p. 114)

North Korean authorities have made it clear that if they are to reach a "stable and proactive solution of the nuclear problem" that they would first require assurance that the United States and its allies did not have any intention to overthrow the country's political regime. It is reported that on February 13th, 2007 that a breakthrough occurred in the "Six-party talks...in line with the previously agreed Joint Declaration of 2005, the "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement were signed, under which Pyongyang agreed to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facility and admit inspectors for verification within 60 days." (Efimova, 2007, p. 114

) While there appears to be an intent to move toward normalization of relations it is clear that the United States requires that Pyongyang make concessions in the areas of "human rights, counterfeit of the U.S. dollars, cigarettes and pharmaceutical, drug production and trafficking..." As well as others. (Efimova, 2007, p.116)

Efimova (2007) states that the peaceful approach of dealing with the DPRK "presumes two main policy lines -- engaging North Korea or containing it." (p.116) The strategic calculation of the 'engagement policy' is stated to have as its bases the premise that "it is necessary to reassure the North Korean regime, since it lacks security guarantees and thus has adapted a hostile policy and produces nuclear weapons." (Efimova, 2007, p. 16)

Efimova relates that experts in the U.S. have examines the engagement option in combination with activities for deterrence as being that which is "most adaptable to the North Korean case." (p.117)

Efimova (2007) states that the "hawk engagement' implies "a pragmatic engagement strategy targeted at rewarding a regime in order to have leverages of influence over it, simultaneously having the process under control and being able to react in another way if necessary." (p. 117)

This approach acquired additional support during the second term of President George W. Bush and it is held by Efimova that this approach was one that was "balanced and moderated...which concerned also the interests of the U.S.A. allies in the region and sought for a broader international support." (2007, p.118)

Stated as another possible strategy in the policy of containment was aimed at the isolation and containment of North Korea along with the nuclear threat that North Korea poses prior to a policy change or alternatively a change in the DPRK political regime. The first term of President Bush and his administration in Washington D.C. was characterized by an approach towards North Korea that was of a 'hard-line' natured approach.

Efimova (2007) relates that while a regime change has been considered that the problem with this method of change is that it implies the use of force and military force at that. The evolutionary or transformative approach is one that is considered to be much more "stable" as well as being more "predictable" however, the gradualness of this approach to change implies a great deal of time will be involved. While the promotion of transformation of the regime in North Korea would serve to compliment the activities of diplomacy and policies of deterrence, it is noted by Richard Hass that "a foreign policy that chooses to integrate, not isolate, despotic regimes can be the Trojan horse that moderates their behavior in the short run and their nature in the long run." (2005, p.78, as cited in: Efimova, 2007, p.126)

Efimova (2007) states that the solution in terms of diplomacy "seems more constructive and advantageous, if combined with fostering gradual evolution of the North Korean regime, when it would eventually give up its nuclear ambitions and receive in change assistance for the country's development." (p.126)

Options that might be considered include the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution" that served to impose economic sanctions on the DPRK and which would effectively bring about enforcement of international control over the proliferation activities of North Korea as well as military action on the part of the United States along with a coalition of states. (Efimova, 2007, paraphrased)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

North Korea underwent internal changes as well as changes due to external factors that placed North Korea in a defensive stance in its focus on strategically avoiding threats and in rebuilding its own self-reliance economically. For North Korea since the Berlin Wall fell the use of conventional weapons by North Korea in defending itself from external foes has not been a feasible proposition, therefore, it is apparent that North Korea acquired nuclear capabilities because of the value of these capabilities as use as a method for ensuring adequate self-defense in what the regime in North Korea views as a highly unstable security environment and one in which North Korea is quite terrified that will result in the United States becoming aggressive from a military standpoint.

It really can not be held as true that the reason for the development of nuclear capability in North Korea was one that was driven simply on the bases of the country's elite and their own personal interests but instead has arisen as a problem because of the North Koreans lack of any real leverage politically, economically and in the way of resources. The present regime in North Korea has not real intention of engaging the country at the global political level as this regime has effectively isolated itself. The current policy of the United States is the promotion of counter-proliferation strategies and offense strikes that are pre-emptive in nature and geared toward the disarmament on the level of diplomacy or alternatively the launching of military conflicts against Third World countries who have acquired nuclear weapons or nuclear capabilities. What remains uncertain is how it is that the United States can with any validity claim that while it has the right to ownership of nuclear weapons and use of nuclear capabilities that other smaller and poorer countries should be disallowed the same rights of ownership, procurement or development or at least in the view of countries and their regimes such as that in North Korea.