Weapons of Mass Destruction

Countering the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)
Purpose Statement
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons of mass destruction (WMD) area a threat that can completely disrupt an entire nation’s way of life. The current situation in China is a perfect illustration of what can happen when a biological weapon is used to destabilize a nation’s economy. China is currently grinding to a halt as the Covin-19 virus spreads like wildfire through China. The example shows how devastating a WMD can be when used in an attack. The purpose of this study is to examine ways to prevent or reduce the risk of a CBRN WMD attack. By looking at the use of international treaties, the rise of terrorism, and counter-proliferation strategies, this paper will assess the measures available for achieving the aim.
Research Question
What can nations do to prevent or reduce the risk of CBRN WMD attacks?
Literature Review
International Strategies
While international treaties may seem like an effective approach to reducing the risk of a CBRN WMD attack, treaties are not a full-proof plan as they can be broken or not renewed. The current Security Council Resolution 1540 is a new approach to reducing the risk of WMD proliferation. This new approach of international legislation has been passed through Council resolutions with the goal being to implement new regulations that “legally bind all UN members immediately and automatically without exception and are equivalent to those in a treaty instantly ratified by all UN members” (Asada, 2008, p. 303). In other words, by using the infrastructure and rules of the UN, the Security Council Resolution 1540 is an attempt to curb WMD proliferation.
In spite of the benefits of this new approach, however, there are still problems that come from international legislation, including the difficulty of enforcing it and creating an environment in which the problems of countries that engage in WMD proliferation can effectively be treated (Asada, 2008). The problem of enforcement is exacerbated by the destabilization of nations and regions, such as the Middle East, where Libya has become a failed state and the threat of the spread of WMDs is made worse because of the instability there now. Yet, even before Gaddafi’s overthrow, the state was seen as a rogue state by Western powers (Hochman, 2006). In 2003, Gaddafi had signaled that he would be ending the development of the country’s stockpile of WMDs, which was why Western powers had considered Libya a threat to security. Gaddafi had always denied the nation was developing WMDs—but his turnabout in 2003 showed that he was now willing to seek rapprochement with the West. This led to private investment in Libya and an economic stimulus for the country. By playing by the rules of the West regarding non-proliferation, Libya became more intimately tied to the West—at least for a time. Revolution still followed, and the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya under the Obama Administration, after which Hillary Clinton callously quipped, “We came, we saw, he died” (CBS, 2011), showed to what extent Western powers were willing to go not only to alienate a nation that is allies in the Middle East still saw as a threat but also to what extent they were willing to go to remove people from power whose leaders had fallen out of favor. The Oded Yinon (1982) strategy for Greater Israel was in play at that point and the repercussions can still be seen to this day. The threat of WMD proliferation has spread as a result.
But is this method of acting a good or effective one? Today, groups are fighting for control of Libya, with warlords and the terrorist organizations competing for dominance. The threat of WMDs being smuggled out or used by one of these groups has increased with the overthrow of Gaddafi. Instead of making the world safer, the Western leaders who oversaw Gaddafi’s removal have made the region more unstable. As Hochman (2006) notes, rehabilitation was a good idea, as it showed an alignment of motives and goals among diverse countries. A system in which countries could benefit from mutually inclusive aims could help to reduce the threat of WMD development and dispersal.
This may be way there was such uproar when President Trump decided to abandon the nuclear treaty with Iran. European nations were shocked that the US should pull out of what to all intents and purposes appeared to be a working solution to Iran’s need for nuclear energy and the West’s need to know that Iran was not ramping up productions for the purposes of developing nuclear weapons (Yarhi-Milo, 2018). It was a measured and monitored treaty—but then the US pulled out of it and Iran immediately threatened to ramp up its production of uranium enrichment and develop a nuclear arsenal. What this shows is that the reliance upon international solutions to the reduction of risk of WMDs spreading is short-sighted (Asada, 2008). There is really no solution to the problem, and the rise of extreme terrorist groups funded by powerful states like Saudi Arabia or Israel, or moderate rebels by the US, can only worsen the situation.
Yarhi-Milo (2018) points out the problem of credibility and what happens when world leaders’ credibility crumbles: their reputations become worthless. This is the case with the Trump Administration, according toYarhi-Milo (2018)—but it is really nothing new. Lang (1937) described a similar situation nearly a century earlier when he argued that the problem the world faced was one of personality and character. To prevent wars among nations, the leaders of nations had to be reign in personalities and put principles first. To prevent the kind of destruction that rained down on parts of the world in WW2, principles and the development of character would be the only thing capable of keeping the floodgates back. Regulations and treaties would only sound nice. They would not actually be enough to prevent a nuclear holocaust like what was seen in Japan (Stone & Kuznick, 2012).
The Rise of Terrorism
And now the world is faced with a new threat—non-state actors who may possess and use CBRN WMDs. In the past, the threat was mainly from state actors, upon whom a degree of pressure could be place. Leaders could negotiate behind closed doors and away from the press to save face and to hammer out differences outside the public limelight. They could arrive at treaties are resolve differences. The rise of extremism has changed the playing field and created an environment in which such types of negotiation are impossible. Terrorism has created an unfriendly and hostile environment all over the world. WMDs are no longer seen as a way for a nation to protect itself against attack, the way Gaddafi portrayed it (Hochman, 2006). Now, WMDs are seen as a means of attacking others and are viewed as a way to wage war on the enemy.
Yet, as Forest (2012) points out, few terrorist groups actually have WMD capabilities: “Of the hundreds of terrorist groups that have existed over the past century, only a handful have used (or tried to use) any kind of WMD. Furthermore, we know of only a small number of terrorist groups in existence today that have publicly declared an interest in acquiring and using WMD” (p. 52). This indicates that there may not be the necessity for fear that has coincided with the rise of terrorism in the West. Most terrorist groups do not have the ability to acquire WMDs—or at least they did not in 2012 when Forest made his assessment. Nearly 8 years have passed and destabilization has increased in the Middle East. Rogue states like North Korea and Iran are openly talking about developing nuclear weapons and using proxies to combat the Western presence in their vicinity if necessary.
What could possibly prevent the spread of terrorist groups, sponsored by rogue states and given access to a nuclear arsenal or other WMDs? As the recent outbreak in China has shown, biological weapons in the wrong hands can lead to massive destruction in life and economic terms. The very fact that these weapons exist in the first place is an indication that the danger is clear and present. Forest (2012) proposes that the threat is mitigated by technical constraint: “essentially, CBRN weapons are complicated and difficult to build, transport, and successfully deploy against a specified target” (p. 54). However, if rogue states have the means of developing the technology and supplying it to proxies, the risk rises exponentially. Forest (2012) readily admits that “some groups may have significant technical and global capabilities, but thus far have not expressed an interest in CBRN weapons, suggesting that perhaps strategic constraints have kept them from crossing the WMD threshold” (p. 60). What happens when the strategic constraints disappear? The problem can become real in a hurry. This may be where counter-proliferation strategies come into play.
Counter-Proliferation Strategies
Counter-proliferation strategies require a great deal of organization, interdepartmental collaboration, and collaboration among various nations in order to be successful—and this may be too unrealistic to be effective. Inter-agency collaboration among intelligence agencies in the US is notoriously poor and the present environment is one in which it is unlikely for the necessary level of collaboration to actually take place. As the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (1999) points out, this type of strategy “requires a clear delineation of responsibilities,” which is not something that is likely to be implementable (p. 8). Specifically, this type of collaboration must rely upon “specific mechanisms to plan and execute operational responses to the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction, whether diplomatic initiative, foreign assistance, security assurances, covert action, or military retaliation” (Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1999, p. 8). Diplomacy, foreign aid, security forces, intelligence, covert operations and military action are all options on the table. The trouble is that each of these operates almost exclusively of one another. Though there may be some overlap among some of them—for example between diplomats and intelligence or covert operations and security forces, the vast majority of the time there is little organization and interaction among these agencies and departments.
The result is a lack of counter-proliferation strategies that work. The FBI has developed its own singular approach to counter-proliferation and its strategies have helped to some extent in deterring the spread of WMDs. Carter (2004) described several of these tactics in the wake of 9/11 to show the world that the US was capable of stopping terrorists from getting or using WMDs. Tagging, signals intelligence, miniaturization, sting operations and covert operations were all described by Carter (2004) in his report on overhauling counterproliferation. However, there is a counter-counter-proliferation strategy in place that runs in opposition to deterrence. This strategy can be seen in the Yinon (1982) strategy developed nearly four decades ago for Greater Israel in the Middle East. When the US is formally and informally allied with sponsors of terrorism, such as Saudi Arabia or Israel it begs the question of how a house divided can continue to stand (Stone & Kuznick, 2012). In the effort to stop the proliferation of WMDs, the US works with nations that are dedicated to destabilizing the Middle East, supporting terrorist cells or groups, and proliferating the weapons that the West is supposed to be trying to stop. In such an environment, the framework of Forest (2012) falls short of expectations and does not provide much in the way of optimism. The greater threat is the threat of an entire region of the world coming undone by interventionism and pockets of terrorists gaining footholds in these regions. If they are supported by rogue nations, counter-proliferations strategies as described by Carter (2004) may be insufficient to fully address the problem to a satisfactory degree.
The big threat is the threat making enemies instead of friends with state actors, who have great influence over non-state actors. Diplomacy is a strategy that should not be ruled out—but the current administration has attempted to try different strategies instead and the result has been a loss of credibility (Yarhi-Milo, 2018). Now the risk of WMDs spreading is growing in the Middle East.
Summary
International strategies, the rise of terrorism and counter-proliferation strategies are all factors to consider in the goal of reducing the risk of CBRN WMDs from spreading around the world. Security Council Resolution 1540 is one option that nations are considering and that would lead to a theoretically enforceable UN decision. However, the fact remains that enforcing regulations on the world’s stage is highly inconsistent and depends upon the good will of all states involved. The moment a state no longer wants to play by the rules of the UN, the effective force of the resolution is null and void, and other states take immediate notice.
Additionally, the rising tension around the world between nations, from Russia to China to the US to the states in the Middle East has fueled a rise in demand for weapons. The US and Russia have ended their non-proliferation treaties and there have been plenty of signals in the mainstream media that Cold War 2.0 is now here, with the stockpiling of WMDs a certainty. The use of poxies in the last Cold War was evident and this time around the same utilization of proxies is bound to occur as well. Already this can be seen with Iran, which has threatened to support proxy non-state actors in fighting the US in the Middle East. If Iran develops WMDs it is almost a certainty that it will provide these to non-state actors as they fight the US.
Counter-proliferation strategies like those implemented by the FBI may work to some degree, but these efforts require a great deal of collaboration among nations and agencies, and other actions are being taken at state department levels that undermine what these agencies are doing. In the end, there is a lot of uncertainty around how to stop the spread of WMDs, and Lang (1932) may be correct in that the only chance of stopping their spread is the reigning in of personalities and improving of the character of the world’s leaders.
References
Asada, M. (2008). Security Council Resolution 1540 to combat WMD terrorism: effectiveness and legitimacy in international legislation. Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 13(3), 303-332.
Carter, A. B. (2004). Overhauling counterproliferation. Technology in Society 26(2-3), 257-269.
CBS. (2011). Clinton on Qaddafi: We came, we saw, he died. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mlz3-OzcExI
The Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. (1999). Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, D.C.
Forest, J.J.F. (2012, Winter). Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism. Journal of Strategic Security 5, 4. Retrieved from http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context=jss
Hochman, D. (2006). Rehabilitating a rogue: Libya's WMD reversal and lessons for US policy. Parameters, 36(1), 63.
Lang, C. G. (1937). Archbishop's Appeal: Individual Will and Action; Guarding Personality. London Times, 28.
Stone, O., & Kuznick, P. (2013). The untold history of the United States. Simon and Schuster.
Yarhi-Milo, K. (2018). After credibility: American foreign policy in the Trump era.  Foreign Aff., 97, 68.
Yinon, O. (1982). A strategy for Israel in the nineteen eighties. KIVUNIM (Directions): A journal for Judaism and Zionism, 14(11).