This essay addresses a central question in Hobbes's political philosophy: what prevents individuals from breaking covenants in the state of nature when no external enforcement exists? Through analysis of chapter 14 of Leviathan, the paper demonstrates that Hobbes contended covenants are only valid when backed by coercive power capable of deterring violation. The essay employs modern game theory, specifically the Prisoner's Dilemma framework, to illustrate why rational actors would default to betrayal absent such enforcement. By modeling two individuals negotiating a peace agreement, the paper shows that the Nash Equilibrium outcome—mutual defection—aligns with Hobbes's prediction that fear of punishment, not mere desire for peace, ensures covenant compliance. The analysis concludes that while Hobbes lacked formal mathematical tools, his reasoning correctly anticipated modern rationality theory regarding contract enforcement and social cooperation.
A central question in Thomas Hobbes's political philosophy concerns what prevents individuals from breaking covenants in the state of nature. If no good reasons exist to honor an agreement—and no external power enforces compliance—what mechanism ensures that people keep their promises to one another? To answer this question, we must turn to the contexts Hobbes establishes in Chapter 14 of Leviathan, where he discusses the First and Second Natural Laws, as well as the concept of Contracts.
Hobbes defines a covenant as a contract in which one or more parties bind themselves to a future obligation. Crucially, he insists that words alone are insufficient to secure compliance. As Hobbes writes, "Words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions without the fear of some coercive power." This observation conveys the core of Hobbes's argument: a covenant is valid only if a contract can be enforced and its terms upheld by a common power that is overwhelming to both sides. Without such enforcement, rational individuals have no incentive to honor their agreements.
The example Hobbes presents illustrates this principle clearly. If two people simply agree not to attack one another but lack any mechanism to enforce this agreement, they have no reason to obey the covenant. Each person faces a constant temptation to break the agreement when the opportunity presents itself, especially when the other party's guard is down. Under these conditions, the desire for peace proves insufficient as a binding force.
One might argue that the desire for peace itself could serve as the common force, motivating both parties to maintain their covenant. However, Hobbes's analysis reveals a deeper problem. Even if both parties genuinely wish for peace, the temptation to attack the other person—particularly when their defenses are low—becomes the most rational action. An individual who breaks the covenant while the other person remains committed gains an enormous advantage. From a rational perspective, this betrayal becomes the optimal strategy.
To understand why this reasoning holds, we can examine the situation through a modern lens by constructing a mathematical model. The scenario Hobbes describes falls into a category of situations known as the Prisoner's Dilemma, a framework extensively studied in game theory and decision theory. This model reveals the logical inevitability of covenant violation absent external enforcement.
In Hobbes's two-person scenario, suppose each person gains 0.5 units of food if both honor the covenant. If one person kills the other, the aggressor gains 1 unit of food while the victim loses their life. If both betray the covenant and attack one another, both gain nothing but also avoid death. The critical insight emerges from analyzing rational decision-making: each person will choose the action that is optimal regardless of what the other person does.
Applying game theory, we can see that betrayal becomes the dominant strategy for both parties. Consider person p1's reasoning: if p2 keeps the covenant, p1 gains more by betraying (1 unit instead of 0.5 units). If p2 betrays, p1 is still better off betraying as well (gaining 0 units rather than losing their life). This logic applies symmetrically to p2. Therefore, regardless of what the other person does, each individual has a stronger incentive to betray.
The result is what game theorists call Nash Equilibrium—the outcome where both parties make their individually optimal choice, leading both to betray the covenant. In this equilibrium, neither party gains the 0.5 units they would have received through mutual compliance. Instead, both achieve 0 units, making them worse off than if they had cooperated. Yet rationality drives them toward mutual defection.
This mathematical formalization demonstrates what Hobbes understood intuitively: absent coercive power, covenants collapse under the weight of rational self-interest. The Prisoner's Dilemma model proves that Hobbes was correct in his prediction about human behavior in the state of nature. Although Hobbes lacked the formal mathematical tools of modern game theory, his reasoning anticipated the logical structure that contemporary analysis confirms. The observation that force is required for contract validity flows directly from the rational incentives facing individuals in covenant situations.
"Why force validates contracts and prevents violation"
"Community as alternative enforcement mechanism"
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