Defending Plato's Idea of the Good in the Republic

Introduction: The Claim and Plato's Challenge

The assertion that "whatever might be its philosophical value, the idea of the Good has no political relevance" goes completely against Plato's philosophical tenets and contrasts sharply with his two major syllogisms concerning the Idea of the Good and the relevance of the Good in a political environment. It is the aim of this paper to defend Plato's viewpoint as presented in the concluding comments of Book One and the opening arguments of Book Two of the Republic, with the assistance of Plato's dialogues with Polemarchus and Thrasymachus and the challenges raised by Glaucon and Adeimantus.

Justice and Its Definitions in Book One

In Book One, the passage related to justice demonstrates Socrates' powerful intellect and his unflinching skepticism. The conversation seems to end at several points without clear-cut conclusions, as when Socrates says: "The just is happy, and the unjust miserable? So be it. But happiness and not misery is profitable . . . injustice can never be more profitable than justice." What appears to function here is a kind of irony, in which Socrates and his interlocutors accept without hesitation certain opinions that otherwise leave the reader pondering their vapid conclusions.

With Polemarchus' definition of conventional morality — "It is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies . . . It is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil" — the vulnerability of the speakers becomes apparent in their imprecise terminology. Not surprisingly, Socrates probes every deviation and every term, exposing all weaknesses and limitations in his search for absolute Truth. It is this prodding that eventually leads Thrasymachus to accuse Socrates of answering every question with another question.

Socrates' response quickly clarifies the situation: "And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy." Plato, by contrast, appears to acknowledge a great deal. The core argument in the Republic revolves around the first of Plato's syllogisms: (A) To be happy, one must participate in the Good; (B) to participate in the Good, one must be just; (C) therefore, to be happy, one must be just. This is diametrically opposed to Polemarchus' position, for if an individual is truly good and just as a result of being happy, then any act of retaliation against an enemy is itself an unjust act.

Thrasymachus, Tyranny, and the Limits of Power

The second definition of justice emerges through Thrasymachus' justification for tyranny, in which he declares that "in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government . . . the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the strong." This declaration, like that of Polemarchus, is directly opposed to the positions of both Plato and Socrates, who suggest that the stronger may not always be aware of their influence over their subjects, making it necessary at times for the weaker to disobey.

The conversation progresses to a point where tyranny (as perfect injustice) and benevolent rule (as perfect justice) are juxtaposed against one another. Socrates ultimately prevails through a series of examples, arguing that justice is not in the best interest of the stronger because "the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do" is what, in the long term, "is for the injury of the stronger." This illustrates that the pride and ambition of the unjust man are in fact symbols of his weakness, while the just man — though manipulated by the strong — remains humble, wise, and objective. You can explore the broader significance of this argument in the context of Plato's philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Conclusion: The Political Relevance of the Good

Plato's two syllogisms appear to be dependent upon one another and often converge into a single philosophical paradigm. In relation to the prime assertion, the question of whether knowledge of the Good is politically relevant can be answered in the affirmative. If Plato had his way, society would be organized and governed by so-called "philosopher kings" who understand the connections between being good, just, and objective. Yet even with these enlightened persons in charge, the right and proper "opinion" would only work for a limited sphere of possibilities — especially those associated with the familiar — while true knowledge, even that held by the unjust and those without the Good, will always operate effectively.

The paper has demonstrated that Plato's Idea of the Good is not a remote metaphysical abstraction disconnected from civic life; rather, it functions as the very foundation upon which a just political order must be built. Without it, rulers become self-serving tyrants, citizens become calculating opportunists, and the community loses any coherent basis for distinguishing legitimate governance from mere force.

Bibliography

William S. Boardman, Forms in Plato's Republic [online pages], accessed December 20, 2002; available from www.lawrence.edu/fac/boardman/FORMSRepublic.html.

Benjamin Jowett, trans., The Project Gutenberg E-text of the Republic by Plato [online e-book], accessed January 26, 2003; available from ftp://sailor.gutenberg.org/pub/gutenberg/etext98/repub11.txt.

W.H.D. Rouse, Great Dialogues of Plato (New York: New American Library, 1956).