Socrates' Alleged Hypocrisy: Apology and Crito Reconsidered

Introduction

In the Apology, Socrates demonstrates a willingness to defy authority. He is defiant during his trial and displays clear contempt for his accusers (Plato, 1995 ed). He insists that he has the right to speak about philosophy, despite his enemies' claims that he does not. Socrates maintains that one should never betray what he believes is just, arguing that this reflects the will of the gods, whose beliefs should take precedence over laws.

Yet Socrates' position appears contradictory when examined across his two most famous works. In the Apology, he stresses that when confronted with a law one profoundly disagrees with, one can set aside the general duty to obey and argue their point. However, in the Crito, he argues just the opposite—that one should obey the law to avoid chaos. In modern times, it is legal to disagree with the law, even healthily so, but not to disobey it. The Crito suggests that law transcends individual will. When reading both works, a clear contradiction seems to exist.

This paper attempts to demonstrate that while Socrates may seem a hypocrite in these two works, the texts actually show otherwise. The apparent contradiction can be resolved through careful attention to his implicit views on citizenship and divine agency.

The Nature of the Contradiction

Many scholars debate whether Socrates' arguments truly contradict themselves. While some of Socrates' supporters argue that his positions do not conflict, many others contend that the Apology and Crito provide clear evidence of contradiction (Yahoo, 2004). The debate centers on two seemingly incompatible claims: Socrates emphasizes obedience to the gods in the Apology but stresses obedience to the laws in the Crito.

There is little dispute about the fact that Socrates espouses differing ideas of obedience across the two works. During his defense, Socrates explicitly states:

"If you said to me in this regard: 'Socrates, we do not believe Anytus now; we acquit you, but only on the condition that you spend no more time on this investigation and do not practice philosophy, and if you are caught doing so you will die,' if, as I say, you were to acquit me on those terms, I would say to you: 'Gentlemen of the jury, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy'" (29c-d).

In this passage, Socrates declares that he would refuse the jury's mandate—the law—because he chooses to follow the will of the gods instead. However, while awaiting his death in the Crito, he says:

"To do so is right, and one must not give way or retreat or leave one's post, but both in war and in courts and everywhere else, one must obey the commands of one's city and country, or persuade it as to the nature of justice" (51b-c).

The Persuasion Defense and Its Limits

Here, Socrates argues that one must always obey the commands of the city—the laws. The two statements are incongruent. In the first, he prioritizes divine will over legal authority. In the second, he subordinates individual conscience to civic law, at least when persuasion has failed.

Scholars frequently argue that Socrates' views about persuasion reconcile these two statements. The second quotation states that one must obey the city's commands "or persuade it as to the nature of justice." During his defense, Socrates says he will follow the gods' will. The trial itself is his opportunity to persuade the court. When he later claims in the Crito that he must follow the laws, he has already exhausted his attempt to persuade the court and thus accepts the consequences. Under this reading, Socrates gave up his objections and followed the laws as he claimed he should, making his statements consistent with his views on persuasion (Yahoo, 2004).

However, many scholars argue that this objection is not supported by the texts. In the first quotation, Socrates says he would not obey the jury's command ("I will obey the god rather than you"). This act of disobedience would necessarily occur after his defense and attempt at persuasion. As one scholar notes: "This act of disobedience would necessarily occur after his defense and attempt at persuasion. So, assuming that the jury's mandate is law, Socrates himself refutes the objection by saying that he would disobey the law even if he had failed in his opportunity to persuade" (Yahoo, 2004). The persuasion objection does nothing to resolve Socrates' apparent contradiction.

Furthermore, Socrates' perspective on persuasion is itself contradictory. In the Apology, he discusses failed instruction and subsequent punishment. When informing Meletus that corruption of youth is accidental, Socrates argues: "Now if I corrupt them unwillingly, the law does not require you to bring people to court for such unwilling wrongdoings, but to get hold of them privately, to instruct them and exhort them" (26b). Instruction and persuasion are similar enough to use interchangeably—both involve dialogue to change undesirable behavior. Meletus does not prosecute justly because he never attempts to instruct Socrates; only after attempts at instruction fail is punishment just in cases of unwilled wrongdoing.

This view contradicts what Socrates presents in the Crito. In that dialogue, Socrates is the one who must persuade the city of the injustice of its verdict. After persuasion fails, punishment follows. Yet in the Apology, Socrates suggests that if Meletus cannot persuade him through instruction, then punishment is justified. This demonstrates that even his views on persuasion are internally inconsistent.

Moreover, during the Apology, Socrates never explicitly discusses the need to obey the laws if he cannot persuade them. He has multiple opportunities to articulate this principle but does not. Prior to the verdict announcement, he says: "I do not think it right to supplicate the jury and to be acquitted because of this (begging), but to teach and persuade them" (35c). This would have been an ideal moment to explain his later position in the Crito, yet he does not. The persuasion objection appears to be an ad hoc device used by Socrates to address his followers' concerns about his contradictions, not a principle he held from the beginning.

A more compelling resolution emerges when Socrates' positions are understood through his implicit acceptance of civic membership. In the Crito, the Laws themselves explain Socrates' obligation:

Reconciling Obedience and Divine Will

"Whoever of you stays here and sees the way that we reach judgment and otherwise manage the city, we say that he has already agreed with us in deed to do whatever we bid. And when he does not obey, we say that he does injustice in three ways: in that he does not obey us who begat him; nor us who nurtured him; and in that although he agreed to obey us, he neither obeys nor persuades us if we do something ignobly" (51e-52a).

By remaining in Athens and enjoying its benefits, Socrates implicitly agreed to accept its judgments. The Laws further distinguish between injustice committed by themselves and injustice committed by human beings who administer them: "But, Socrates, obey us, your nurturers, and do not regard children or living or anything else as more important than justice. If you depart now, you will depart having been done injustice not by us laws, but by human beings" (54b-c).

Even though the jury's decision was unjust, Socrates recognizes that the law itself remains worthy of respect. He states: "And even he who has been done injustice, then, must not do injustice in return, as the many suppose, since one must in no way do injustice" (49b). While he may have felt the court's decision was unjust, he could not respond with injustice for the sake of revenge.

The resolution of his apparent contradiction lies in understanding that Socrates obeys the law not because he subordinates himself to the city's authority over divine will, but because he believes the gods placed him in a situation requiring obedience to that law. Socrates believed he was an asset to the city and a servant to the gods (30a). He refused to go against the god that placed him there, commanding him to live and philosophize. Thus, when he accepts the jury's sentence, he does so not out of blind obedience to human authority, but out of piety to the gods. The apparent hypocrisy dissolves when one recognizes that both acts—his defiance in the courtroom and his acceptance of the sentence—are expressions of the same commitment: to obey the divine will as he understands it.

Conclusion

While excellent arguments exist for both sides of this debate, the alleged hypocrisy is resolvable through careful contextual analysis. Socrates chose to be a citizen of his city and in doing so agreed to abide by its laws and accept its judgments regarding his role in the community. The Laws remind him that by remaining in Athens and witnessing its governance, he implicitly consented to obey its decisions.

In the Crito, Socrates recognizes a crucial distinction: he can reject the actions of unjust human judges without rejecting the law itself. The verdict against him was unjust, but the law transcends the particular men who administer it. Furthermore, Socrates does not view accepting death as committing injustice, so he can accept the jury's sentence without compromising his core principle: never doing injustice.

Ultimately, Socrates remains consistent in his fundamental conviction: one should never betray what one believes is just, and the gods' beliefs should take precedence over human laws. However, since the gods placed him in Athens as a citizen bound by its legal order, he willingly accepts his fate. His defiance in the Apology and his submission in the Crito are not contradictory but complementary expressions of a single, unified commitment to divine will and virtue. Rather than viewing Socrates as a hypocrite, we should recognize in him a demonstration of how apparent contradiction can dissolve when we understand an argument's full philosophical context.