How Does Public Policy Work

Abstract This paper looks at the public policy of R2P and humanitarian intervention abroad, which serves as a major drain on American resources and benefits a foreign country more than it does the U.S. The money spent on these wars waged under the banner of R2P could be better spent on projects at home.

The solution to this flawed policy is to address the elephant in the room, which is the Israeli lobby, to end the wars in the Middle East and put that money into healthcare, education or infrastructure back home, and to deny the persons in the State Department who serve under one administration from serving under the next so that they cannot force their continuity of government onto the incoming administration.

Introduction Much has been made of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine that has become the de facto, go-to reason for intervening in other parts of the world, from Iraq to Libya and now Venezuela. It has served as the framework for so much of American foreign policy that the public and some Congressmen (like Senator Rand Paul) have objected to the egregious use of the doctrine as a screen for imperialistic ambitions.

While there are many public policy issues that impact Americans directly—from the opioid epidemic to the swelling prisons to the problems in education and the achievement gap to the economic problems that seem to have been hanging over the nation since 2008, the policy of R2P is one that most Americans do not think much about—and yet it has a tremendous impact on their lives and on the resources of this country.

For one thing, many Americans would like to see universal health care in the U.S.—yet when it comes to the problem of who is to pay for it, they cannot say. No one wants to see taxes raised. Yet what if a program that free health care could be paid for without raising taxes? Everyone would want to know where the money would come from.

The answer to that question is easy when one looks at the amount of money that is spent on foreign wars and so-called “humanitarian intervention” that is often done to hide an ulterior motive. In the news today, Americans are hearing all about how evil Maduro is in Venezuela, just like they used to hear all about how bad Assad was in Syria, and Gaddafi in Libya and Hussein in Iraq.

Were it not for social media today and alternative news sites poking holes in the disinfo spread by Pompeo, Rubio, Bolton and their mainstream news mouthpieces, America might already have invaded Venezuela with soldiers and effected regime change there. Regime change under R2P comes with great risks, however, and this paper will describe those risks and discuss three proposed policies to address this issue.

The Problem of R2P: Using Humanitarian Intervention and Democracy as an Excuse to Destabilize Countries and Engage in Regime Change Though Evans (2008) identifies a continued need or justification for the responsibility to protect (R2P) by citing the existence of mass atrocities around the world even to this day, there is a contrary perspective that indicates the political and imperial manner in which the R2P doctrine can be used as a cover for hegemonic aims (Gleijeses, 1995).

Humanitarian intervention has been used as the excuse of the West, for instance, in various invasions around the world since 9/11 (but well before that as well) on up to the current crisis in Venezuela, over which the U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo and Sen. Rubio along with Ambassador Bolton have been using social media to promote R2P and justify regime change in the South American country in order to drum up support (both domestically and internationally) for American military action in the southern hemisphere.

Stakeholders and Affected Constituencies Stakeholders in this issue are all ordinary Americans, as they are the ones ultimately who foot the bill for R2P. They are the constituents who are underserved so that a select group of hawks in the State Department can engage in perpetual war abroad for the benefit of their Israeli supporters. However, there are also stakeholders abroad: nations, such as Russia and China, who find themselves having to intervene after U.S.

intervention causes a spectacular mess, leading to millions of displaced immigrants flooding into Europe and the spread of terrorism under ISIS (which Russia, fortunately, has been able to thoroughly eradicate since entering in to help Syria at Assad’s request; the U.S.’s presence in Syria was never requested and is to this day an illegal occupation).

This public policy one is faced by both the federal government and state governments because many states could benefit were those dollars that are spent on war instead spent on beefing up infrastructure at home, providing free health care to all, and increasing equity in education. The Cost of R2P for Americans The U.S. has spent nearly $6 trillion on war in the Middle East since 2001 (Macias, 2018). And this is just the cost in dollars on the war itself.

There are untold costs in lives and human suffering (Kang et al., 2015). There is also a moral cost of using R2P as an excuse to invade other countries. Ethical considerations include the very real risk that even when R2P appears justified, “humanitarian intervention has negative consequences which overrule its noble intentions” (Welsch, 2003, p. 8)—case in point being the situation of Libya today now serving as a failed state following the Western campaign to end the reign of Gaddafi.

Would it be possible to reduce these costs by addressing this issue? Of course. Would there be a cost involved in addressing the issue? Almost certainly. There would be tremendous pushback from the Israeli lobby and those who work for the lobby within the State Department. They are the pragmatists and purists of whom Evans (2015) refers. Evans (2015) argues, however, that R2P “was designed for pragmatists rather than purists, with full knowledge of the messy reality of real-world state motivations and behavior” (p. 1).

By acknowledging that negative consequences can occur, Evans attempts to justify humanitarian intervention and the deaths of multitudes, the destruction of infrastructure, and the displaced masses (as seen in the Syrian conflict, with hundreds of thousands of immigrants streaming into Europe and creating a socio-political crisis there as well) by defining this as collateral damage and to be expected.

The decidedly idealized concept of protecting people abroad that underscores R2P vanishes in an instant in Evans’ “pragmatic” view of intervention (typically accompanied by aerial bombardment that has little to do with protecting innocent people on the ground). Evans notes that the UN was quick to adopt the R2P doctrine and that countries’ leaders since then have been hesitant to put the doctrine into action.

Evans laments this dragging of the feet by certain world leaders, but his point is invalidated by the Syrian conflict example, which further shows the major difference between the Western promoted concept of R2P (created by Evans himself) and the Asian respect for not entering another sovereign country to offer protection until asked. Russian’s Putin did not enter into Syria until Assad explicitly requested Russia’s services. The U.S.

on the other hand invaded the region without being requested and its presence in Syria has been condemned by Assad ever since. Western leaders decidedly chose sides against Assad and began supporting the Syrian rebels (also known as terrorists or ISIS) while at the same time conveying the idea to the Western public that it was engaged in battling ISIS.

ISIS was not defeated, however, until Russian forces working in conjunction with Hezbollah and Iran routed them, destroyed their supply chain networks, and beefed up Syria’s borders by installing a missile shield.

Suddenly, the West could no longer fuel the conflict under the guise of humanitarian intervention and so it had no choice but to declare ISIS defeated, as Trump has done—though the hawks in his government lament his plan to pull out of Syria as misguided and short-sighted: they want to stay, whether the doctrine of R2P can be used as a cover or not.

Evans (2015) uses Rwanda and other atrocities as justification for intervention, which he calls “protection” to side-step the fact that the U.S. is intervening in parts of the world without a clear mandate from sovereign countries for assistance. Atrocities are commonly viewed as the reason for humanitarian intervention, and the West primarily attempts to assert its own virtue (virtue signaling at the state level) by purporting to assist the victims of aggression in other countries.

The R2P doctrine is, in fact, older in spirit than WWII—but the rampant Holocaust memorialization that has transpired since the defeat of Germany has helped to provide the necessary visceral content for promoting the doctrine. The actual effects of the doctrine are rarely if ever discussed by Evans or the propents of R2P: the focus is always primarily on the theoretical moral justification for the “protecting” those people suffering from rogue regimes who are bent on genocide.

For some reason, these same proponents of R2P always turn a blind eye to the genocide committed by Israel towards the Palestinians on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, but perhaps the West, Evans et al. feel they have a right to be selective in how they apply their humanitarian assistance.

Those who take the initiative to examine the other side of the doctrine—i.e., the outcomes of its application—find, like Thakur (2016), that “illegal invasions and chaotic occupations” are common outcomes of R2P in action (p. 422).

R2P may have some noble ideals and principles at its foundation, but the outcomes, as shown by Thakur and the motives as shown by Gleijeses, indicate that these noble ideals and principles fall prey to the rather pragmatic sentiment of those who, like Evans, are willing to accept more than a few casualties in the ultimate quest to alleviate the suffering of the innocent overall. There is, at root, a rather utilitarian philosophical position being used by the advocates of R2P.

Those who oppose it or at least view it from another perspective (the perspective of outcome) may also employ the utilitarian or even the deontological position to make their point. Those who focus on the actual outcome of R2P tend to take the more skeptical position.

Proposed Policies to Address This Issue Re-Route Funding for the Military to Cover Universal Health Care in America Since the Pentagon is so bad at accounting anyway and spends trillions on wars that never end and never come to any good (Philips, 2003) but that have high casualties both abroad and for returning soldiers who suffer from PTSD (Kang et al., 2015). As Macias (2018) shows, the war is a drain on America’s finances. The country has gone deeper into debt and has nothing to show for it.

Moreover, the policy of R2P has made America less safe. As Best (2002) points out, there is a big negative to spending so much on counterterrorism and R2P in the Middle East: “Counterterrorism is highly dependent upon human intelligence (humint), the use of agents to acquire information (and, in certain circumstances, to carry out covert actions). Humint is one of the least expensive intelligence disciplines, but it can be the most difficult and is undoubtedly the most dangerous for practitioners.

Mistakes can be fatal, embarrass the whole country, and undermine important policy goals” (p. 2). When the cost in dollars and in lives is so great that every sane person could easily see that the costs outweigh the benefits, it should be simple to realize that all the money spent on waging war and fighting (or aiding, as the case may be) terrorism is simply not worth it. That money and time and energy could be spent on investing in America’s future and in America’s health.

People in the U.S. could have free health care and then some if all the money spent on war in the Middle East were redirected into health care back home.

Deny Anyone Who Held a Position in a Previous Administration from Retaining that Position under the Next Administration This would prevent perpetual war hawks like John Bolton and go-to regime changers like Eliott Abrams, who participated in the Iran Contra scandal and was convicted of lying to Congress in order to keep it all secret, from serving under multiple administrations and maintaining a deep-state like pursuit of regime change and imperialism under the perpetual guise of R2P.

Some would complain that it undermines the continuity of government—but that would be the point. If the continuity of government had been undermined at the end of 2008, the endless war in the Middle East might not have dragged on into two more administrations—and yet it has. Trump ran a campaign on ending the wars in the Middle East—and so too did Obama.

And yet once in office, both were convinced by those who continue on in the State Department from one administration to the next that it was important to keep the wars going. Even after Trump order the troops out of Syria, his order was met by pushback from several around him and it now remains doubtful that the soldiers will ever leave. Force AIPAC to Register as a Foreign Lobby This would oblige the most powerful lobby in the U.S. to divulge how it spends its money.

Currently it does not have to and much of the money spent by AIPAC is believed to go to the campaigns of congressmen and women, who in turn vote for whatever policy AIPAC wants supported—at both state and federal levels. For instance, Congress recently voted to make it illegal in all the states to oppose boycotting Israel. At the same time, Congress routinely votes to look the other way when it comes to apartheid and war crimes committed by Israel.

Additionally, it has no problem supporting foreign wars in the Middle East that support the ambitions of greater Israel. Essentially, the wars in the Middle East have been all about that, championed by dual-American-Israeli citizens in the State Department, such as Abrams, Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, Richard Perle, and Robert Kagan. This would also allow representatives like Ilhan Omar greater freedom to criticize the lobby if she wants and to allow for a greater discussion of the role that outside money plays in American politics.

A great deal of scrutiny has been given to the Mueller investigation to see whether the Trump Administration colluded with Russia to steal the election. Yet no scrutiny or legal investigation is ever made into the role that Israel plays in American politics. When Netanyahu visits Congress and receives 26 standing ovations from Congress, something is seriously wrong in the American government that such fawning could ever be displayed to a foreign leader (Cohen, 2015).

The American government seems more interested in doing the bidding of Israel than it does in doing the bidding of its own citizens at home. That has to stop, and outing AIPAC as a foreign lobby is a good place to start to address the issue of perpetual war in the Middle East under the guise of R2P, when it is really just an excuse to carry out the plan for greater Israel put forward by Oded Yinon (1982) in an Israeli policy paper from the 1980s.

Solution The impact of getting the U.S. out of Syria could be tremendous and would certainly help the country to re-focus on what matters at home. Since 9/11, America has been at war with terrorists in the Middle East and now, nearly two decades later, fatigue has set in. Americans are tired of war. They want peace and a return to prosperity.

President Trump has sensed as much and it was his promise to bring both that appealed to so many Americans in the first place: they were tired of leaders who said one thing on the campaign trail and did another when they got to office. His focus has been on fulfilling his campaign promises and if he continues to do so by bringing the troops home, the voters will know that he is a different kind of leader—a leader who can be trusted.

They would rush to support you again in 2020. The more promises he keeps, the more favorable the outcome will be in the upcoming election for him. The U.S. public opinion regarding Syria is clear: the people do not understand what Americans are doing there or why they are still there. It has long been known that ISIS is on that ropes. The U.S. does not need Syria or the Middle East and they do not need the U.S.

The R2P doctrine was a screen all along—a cover to get U.S. forces into the Middle East to implement the Oded Yinon policy. The region has been so destabilized and bombed out by two decades of warring that the policy has nearly been perfectly implemented. The ones who will benefit from a U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East are first and foremost the American servicemen and women. Too many American soldiers and veterans, are suffering from PTSD and.