The Virginia Tech Shooting

Abstract This paper analyzes the case of Seung-Hui Cho, who killed dozens at Virginia Tech in 2007. The paper examines Cho’s background, his mental illness, the way in which reports of the investigation and incident were changed to hide the inept responses of administrators and police. The paper also examines changes that were made to protocol following the massacre and discusses lessons that can be learned from this incident and how institutions can better prepare themselves to ensure that this kind of tragedy is prevented in the future.

Keywords: Seung-Hui Cho, school shooting, mental illness student Revisions to On and Off Campus Reports As Urbina (2009a) notes, “during the worst campus shooting spree in American history, Virginia Tech officials locked down some administrative offices and warned their own families more than an hour and a half before the rest of the campus was alerted, according to revisions made in the state’s official report on the rampage.” Notification delays were longer than originally reported both on and off campus, and the manner in which students were protected was slipshod at best: for example, “students who were initially locked down at West Ambler Johnston residence hall, where the first two victims were killed, were later released from the building by the police and allowed to attend their 9 a.m.

classes. Two of those students then went to class in Norris Hall, where they were killed by the gunman” (Urbina, 2009a). Likewise, University officials failed to notify the family of Seung-Hui Cho’s first victim, even though she was taken to the hospital where she survived for more than two hours before succumbing to her injuries. Virginia Tech’s delay meant that the victim’s family never got a chance to see her one last time alive.

Instead, the University was more focused on locking down administrators—like the workers in the University’s president’s offices, where a warning was given a full half hour before a formal warning was made to students (Urbina, 2009a). Police also took a half hour longer in responding to the alert than was originally stated in the initial report (Urbina, 2009a). Seung-Hui Cho’s Background Seung-Hui Cho was born in South Korea and raised there until he and his family emigrated to the U.S.

when he was eight. His life had never been easy, and in South Korea, his family had lived in a poor tenement dwelling “in a Seoul suburb in a rented basement apartment—usually the cheapest in a multi-unit building” (Chang, 2007). From Seoul, the family moved to Detroit then to the Washington, D.C. region to be among the South Korean community there. As a teen, Cho was diagnosed with severe anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder, for which he was prescribed treatment (Lyttle, 2012).

Having to learn English in a new country without a strong support system undoubtedly had a negative impact on him, especially as he found it difficult to express himself. As he grew, he exhibited more and more disturbing patterns of behavior and held animosity towards his parents’ Christian religious beliefs, though he also railed against the “moral degeneracy on campus” in a note written just before his rampage (Harnden, 2007).

Indicators of Conflict, Aggression, and Mental Instability There were several indicators of conflict, aggression and mental instability in Cho’s life, beginning with his anxiety disorders, mutism and depression in middle school and lasting well into his 20s before his rampage and suicide. He wrote angry, violent-filled stories at school but was unsocial and uncommunicative with peers (Harnden, 2007). He repressed a lot of feelings, which erupted and exploded in a violent massacre.

Cho was diagnosed by New River Valley Community Services Board in 2005 as being mentally ill and needing hospitalization after a roommate took Cho to the facility for evaluation following Cho’s admission of suicidal thoughts (Schulte & Jenkins, 2007). However, Cho never received treatment. Timeline of the Shootings West Ambler Johnston Hall Shortly after 7 a.m. on 16 April 2007, Cho shot and two students in West Ambler Johnston Hall. Norris Hall At 9:45 am (more than 2 hours later), Cho entered Norris Hall, where he had a sociology class.

Here he killed 30 people before taking his own life within the space of 10 minutes (Johnson, 2007). How the Dorm Shooting Impacted Law Enforcement’s Response Law enforcement locked down West Ambler Johnston Hall until 9 a.m., at which point students were permitted to attend the rest of their morning classes. However, other offices in the school—such as the president’s offices were still under lockdown, which indicates that law enforcement severely bungled their job of protecting students.

The dorm shooting led law enforcement to believe the situation was contained and confined to the dorm. Cho, however, had moved on to the campus to make another attack. Law enforcement should have alerted students and faculty sooner that the location of the shooter was unknown (Urbina, 2009a). Mental Health Providers The behaviors that led to Cho’s interactions with behavioral and mental health practitioners included his interactions with students and teachers from middle school onwards.

On numerous occasions, he startled students and teachers with his assessments of them and of himself. In the 8th grade, he wrote about suicidal and homicidal themes, which alerted his teachers to the need for a psychiatric evaluation, which was conducted at the Multicultural Center for Human Services (Lyttle, 2012). While at the University, he was also taken to a clinic after divulging suicidal thoughts to his roommate (Schulte & Jenkins, 2007). He was also received at the University’s Cook Counseling Center, though these records were not discovered till later.

Seung-Hui Cho’s Diagnosis Cho was diagnosed with selective mutism, major depressive disorder, severe anxiety and as being mentally ill two years prior to the massacre (Schulte & Jenkins, 2007; Lyttle, 2012). Where and When Records of On-Campus Treatment Were Located The records were found “in the home of the former director of the university’s counseling clinic” (Urbina, 2009b). The director of the Cook Counseling Center left the position over a year before the attack.

The records were not found until July 2009, two years after the attack when lawyers representing families in a civil lawsuit found the records among the former director’s possessions in his home (Urbina, 2009b). Faculty Role of Professors in Identifying Conflict Issues with Seung-Hui Cho The role that professors played in identifying conflict issues was significant. Dr. Giovanni discerned that students were not coming to her class because of Cho’s frightening presence.

She helped Cho get in contact with a clinical psychologist and Cho “made an appointment by telephone and sought help occasionally” (Lyttle, 2012, p. 10). Professor Bean had a conflict with Cho when Cho followed him to his office to confront him. Professor Bean asked the student to leave and come back when he was in better possession of his emotions (Lyttle, 2012).

In these instances, the professors were aware of a problem—but they had no way of knowing that the problem would become so violent so suddenly and dramatically. Specific Indicators that Concerned Faculty Specific indicators that alarmed faculty were Cho’s subtle manipulation of students, making them feel sorry for him because he was so quiet and passive-aggressive. They wanted to do something for him because he seemed so out of place but he would counter them with accusations of being promiscuous or of not being good (Lyttle, 2012).

He would rant in emails or in person to person engagements. He selected verses from poetry that reflected his own self-loathing. All of these were red flags. What Type of Authority should a Professor Have? A professor should have the authority to expel a hostile, aggressive or sullen student or to take more initiative to see that the student receives treatment, as the professor is a person in a position of power to have direct contact with the student and to see how the student behaves.

Law Enforcement The decisions made by local law enforcement and campus security to only lockdown the dormitory until 9 and then to fail to alert students appropriately and effectively were poor ones. Classes should have been canceled until more information was obtained as to the motive and whereabouts of the shooter.

The problem here was that Cho had no reports filed with police, so his identity was unknown to them; however, campus security had been made known of his suicidal tendencies thanks to the call from the roommate, which led to Cho’s arrest in 2005 by campus security and diagnoses of mental illness (Lyttle, 2012). He should, therefore, have been on police radar. University Administration The University administration should have been more involved in obtaining treatment for Cho.

As he was diagnosed as mentally ill and arrested by campus security, the administration should have followed up on this arrest with a protocol for Cho to follow or face expulsion. There were too many gaps in the University’s own protocol for dealing with a situation like this (Lyttle, 2012).

Local/State Law Specific changes that were made to local and state law following the massacre at Virginia Tech included: introduction of “legislation that would amend the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, which determines how much of a student's mental health records can be disclosed by a university” (Lyttle, 2012, p. 13).

Additionally, Governor Tim Kaine “signed an executive order that required anyone court-ordered to receive mental health treatment be added to a state database of people prohibited from buying gun” so as to prevent individuals like Cho from obtaining firearms (Lyttle, 2012, p. 14). Role of Technology/Campus Safety Procedures The University now uses mobile tech to alert “students and faculty [with] immediate news about an emergency situation through posts and texts to cell phones” so as to better communicate with them about an ongoing issue (Lyttle, 2012, p. 14).

The University also now has surveillance cameras and speaker systems installed throughout campus to help monitor and alert students and staff (Lyttle, 2012). Changes Made to Campus Safety Procedures at a Separate University in the Wake of the Virginia Tech Massacre In the wake of the Virginia Tech shooting, students at Utah universities were given the right to carry concealed weapons on campus and in class (Lyttle, 2012). This represents a dramatic contrast with many universities that enforce gun-free zones.

Personal Observations/Lessons Learned Observations and lessons learned from this case are: 1) Cho.