This paper examines Aristotle's philosophical account of incontinence, derived from the Greek concept of akrasia, which describes the failure of rational self-control in the face of passion and desire. The paper contrasts Aristotle's position with Socrates' denial that moral weakness is possible, arguing that Aristotle's framework more accurately reflects human nature. It traces Aristotle's hierarchy of moral character—from temperance through continence and incontinence to intemperance—and explores his nuanced view of pleasure as a necessary component of virtuous living rather than an end in itself. The paper concludes that Aristotle's account better accommodates the reality of human moral failure without reducing all wrongdoing to deliberate vice.
The paper employs philosophical contrast as its primary analytical method. By presenting Socrates' denial of incontinence alongside Aristotle's acceptance of it, the writer demonstrates how to use competing positions to illuminate and strengthen a central claim. This technique — often called dialectical reasoning — is a hallmark of philosophical writing and shows an understanding that ideas gain clarity when tested against opposing views.
The paper opens with a definitional introduction establishing akrasia and Aristotle's position. It then moves through Aristotle's moral hierarchy (temperance, continence, incontinence, intemperance), addresses Aristotle's nuanced treatment of pleasure, pivots to critique Socrates' contrary view, and closes with a comparative conclusion defending Aristotle. The argument flows logically from definition to analysis to critique to resolution.
Incontinence is a term used by philosophers. It stems from the Greek word akrasia, which means lack of mastery — or the condition in which a person is unable to withhold his or her desires. According to Aristotle, it describes human passion and desire and the act of giving in to one's pleasures without considering whether that act is the right thing to do. Akrasia, as a philosophical concept, has been debated since antiquity, with Aristotle and Socrates holding sharply opposing views on its very possibility.
Socrates believed that incontinence does not exist, because if a person truly knew what the right thing to do was, he would not act in the opposite direction — since judgment, in his view, overrules all desires and pleasures. Aristotle, by contrast, believes that incontinence is not necessarily a mark of bad character, since a person can at times act irrationally. Incontinence does exist, and it does not mean that a person who gives in to his or her pleasures is of bad judgment; it only means that at the moment of the act, he or she was led by passion and desire rather than by rational thinking.
Aristotle holds that there are certain things which should be avoided in terms of character: vice, incontinence, and brutality. Of the three, brutality is the rarest. It was understood as exceeding vice to such a degree that it strips a person of their humanity, making the one who exhibits it barely human at all. Aristotle believed that a man does what he knows is wrong because of his passions, but this does not mean all men act this way. He claims that the continent man also has certain passions, yet does not give in to what is harmful, because reason governs his behavior.
In his argument, Aristotle draws important distinctions between virtue and vice — examining why a man commits vices or why he chooses to uphold certain virtues. Both virtue and vice require a person to consciously know what they are doing. Yet there are many occasions when people act on impulse and do not act deliberately, because they act according to passion rather than reason. Aristotle's ethics demand that virtue requires a person not only to do the right thing, but also to act for the right reason and to have the right desire — a standard that he acknowledges is complicated and within each individual's own judgment to discern.
Incontinence is "knowing the better" — knowing the right thing to do — yet acting not merely on one's desires but succumbing entirely to one's passions. This makes a person selfish. It is not regarded as a vice, however, since the act was not done deliberately. With incontinence, a person has both the wrong desire and the wrong action even though he has the right reason. A continent person, by contrast, acts according to virtue and does so for the right reason, but his desires are bad; he does not act according to his will yet acts deliberately. This makes him not quite as good as the temperate person.
According to Aristotle, if one were to rank people from best to worst in moral character, the order would be: temperance first, then continence, then incontinence, and finally intemperance. Intemperance is the worst because the intemperate person has both bad desires and bad reasoning, and acts deliberately rather than out of passion.
Aristotle is not a hedonist; however, to him, pleasure is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, he argues that one of the necessary conditions for a person to be virtuous is that he take pleasure in acting virtuously. A person therefore needs to know how to act on his passions and pleasures in order to become virtuous. A virtuous person's desires should align with right reason, so that virtuous action is itself pleasant — this is the full measure of what it means to be virtuous.
Additionally, since acting in accordance with right reason — that is, acting virtuously — is supposed to lead to happiness, it follows that virtuous action should also be pleasant, at least in some sense, even if not in the purely physical sense. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics does not defend pleasure as the highest good or even as an end in itself, but pleasure accompanies the highest good as well as lesser goods, and this is part of what it means to be human.
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