Does Free Will Exist? Six Major Philosophical Views

The concept of free will has been debated by philosophers over centuries — not only regarding its very existence, but also regarding its elements, the extent to which it may or may not exist, and its moral implications. Though an exhaustive review of differing philosophical treatments of free will would require hundreds of pages, this paper briefly examines several major philosophical positions and some of their most notable proponents. In reviewing these sources and their differing approaches, we can see that philosophers define free will differently, examine disparate aspects of it, and arrive at somewhat different implications for morality.

One of the most notable proponents of unrestrained free will was René Descartes. Identifying free will with freedom of choice, Descartes simply defines free will as "the ability to do or not do something" and takes the extreme position that "neither divine grace nor natural knowledge ever diminishes freedom; on the contrary, they increase and strengthen it" (Descartes, Cottingham and Stoothoff 101). For Descartes, the breadth and depth of the will is breathtaking, for the will "can in a certain sense be called infinite, since we observe without exception that its scope extends to anything that can possibly be an object of any other will — even the immeasurable will of God" (Descartes, Cottingham and Stoothoff 173).

Possessing essentially boundless free will, humans are readily held morally responsible for their actions: "I cannot complain that the will or freedom of choice which I received from God is not sufficiently extensive or perfect, since I know by experience that it is not restricted in any way" (Descartes, Cottingham and Stoothoff 101). In Descartes' estimation, even in those instances when we may be deceived, our free will enables us to "withhold our assent in doubtful matters and hence avoid error" (Descartes, Cottingham and Stoothoff 171).

One of the most famous proponents of a rationality-based free will is Immanuel Kant, who sets forth his thoughts on free will and morality in several works, including the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. For Kant, free will and morality are ultimately grounded in reason. We know we have free will because we know that we have duties. Rejecting the idea that morality is based on practical facts, feelings, or selfish interests, Kant believed that there are a priori truths — rational laws that apply to all rational beings (Kant 506–7). Those truths create "imperatives" for humans, who are only partially rational.

In Kant's schema, there are two basic types of imperatives: the hypothetical imperative, which states that if you want goal "B," then you ought to do "A"; and the categorical imperative, which simply states that you ought to do "A" (Kant 507–8). Acting on a hypothetical imperative means acting in a "heteronomous" moral way — following someone else's laws. The categorical imperative, by contrast, means acting on principles that one could will to become universal, which is an autonomous form of morality. The supreme moral law in this framework is: "Act only on a maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant 510).

Kant illustrated this formula with two perfect duties — not committing suicide and not making deceitful promises — and two imperfect duties: to develop one's talents and to help people in need (Kant 511–12). Within Kant's construct, freedom and morality appear to be two sides of the same coin: to follow our rational principles, which is moral behavior, is to be free, and that is a noble end in itself.