Euthyphro's Three Definitions of Piety and Socratic Critique
This paper analyzes Plato's dialogue Euthyphro by examining the three definitions of piety that Euthyphro offers Socrates and the philosophical shortcomings Socrates identifies in each. The first definition — piety as prosecuting wrongdoers — is dismissed as a mere example rather than a universal standard. The second — piety as that which is dear to the gods — is shown to be relativistic given divine disagreement. The third — piety as the part of justice attending to the gods — is exposed as superficial. The paper then proposes an alternative definition of piety as "union with Truth," understood as the conformity of the intellect to reality, and anticipates how Socrates might question and extend that definition through his characteristic method of inquiry.
- Introduction: Socrates' goal and paper overview
- Euthyphro's First Definition of Piety: Piety as prosecuting wrongdoers, refuted as mere example
- Euthyphro's Second Definition of Piety: Piety as dear to the gods, refuted as relativistic
- Euthyphro's Third Definition of Piety: Piety as justice toward gods, refuted as superficial
- An Alternative Definition and Socratic Critique: Piety redefined as union with Truth
✍️ How to write this paper — guide & tools ▾
What makes this paper effective
- The paper follows a clear, logical progression — working through each definition in turn before offering its own — which mirrors the structure of the dialogue itself and makes the argument easy to follow.
- Direct quotations from the primary text are integrated naturally and used as the basis for analysis rather than as decorative filler, grounding each evaluative claim in Plato's own words.
- The original definition of piety as "union with Truth" is presented with intellectual humility, and the author anticipates likely Socratic objections, demonstrating genuine engagement with the philosophical method rather than passive summary.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates the technique of dialectical engagement: it does not merely summarize Plato's text but actively enters the conversation by proposing a new definition and then subjecting it to the same Socratic scrutiny applied to Euthyphro's definitions. This self-critical move — asking "what would Socrates say to my answer?" — shows philosophical reasoning rather than simple exposition.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with a brief introduction establishing Socrates' epistemic goal. Three body sections then address each of Euthyphro's definitions and Socrates' refutations in sequence, drawing on both primary and secondary sources. A final section introduces the student's own definition of piety and models a hypothetical Socratic dialogue around it, ending with an open-ended question that reflects the inconclusive nature of the original text.
Introduction
Euthyphro offers three definitions of piety, none of which satisfies Socrates. Socrates' goal in this dialogue is to reveal the shallowness of Euthyphro's reasoning and to move closer to an understanding of truth. As Rudebusch (1999) puts it, Socrates' objective is "to point out that one who is aware of one's ignorance is in a better position to learn the truth than one taking oneself to know" (p. 13). This paper presents Euthyphro's three definitions of piety, Socrates' refutations of each, an alternative definition of piety, and a consideration of how Socrates might respond to that alternative.
Euthyphro's First Definition of Piety
In his first definition, Euthyphro tells Socrates that piety is "doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of similar crime — whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be — that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety" (5e). The definition is stark and simple, and it is equally clear that Euthyphro regards himself as a very pious person. Socrates immediately subjects this claim to scrutiny.
Socrates cross-examines Euthyphro, pressing him for a more precise definition: "When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder" (6d). The irony is pointed: Socrates is already aware that Euthyphro is not genuinely interested in truth but only in justifying his own conduct. By gently mocking the implication that charging one's father with murder is itself an act of piety, Socrates exposes Euthyphro's concern with the letter of piety rather than its spirit. For more on the Euthyphro dialogue and its place in Platonic philosophy, the full text and scholarly context are widely available.
Euthyphro's Second Definition of Piety
It is Socrates who seeks an objective standard — an absolute criterion by which actions may be judged: "Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions" (6e). Euthyphro obliges with his second definition: "piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them" (7a). This opens the way for Socrates to expose Euthyphro's supposed piety as fundamentally relativistic.
Socrates points out that even the gods dispute among themselves about what is just or unjust, pious or impious. If piety is simply whatever pleases the gods, and the gods disagree, then piety itself becomes a relative concept — something Euthyphro is forced to concede. Once again, Socrates demonstrates that he is genuinely searching for truth, while Euthyphro proves himself shallow and inconsistent. The Euthyphro dilemma, as it is known in moral philosophy, remains one of the most discussed problems in the philosophy of religion.
References
Napolitano, A. (2010). Lies the Government Told You. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson.
Plato. (n.d.). Last Days of Socrates. Retrieved from http://socrates.clarke.edu/
Rudebusch, G. (1999). Socrates, Pleasure, and Value. UK: Oxford University Press.
Create your account
Always verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.