Hume and Descartes on God, Miracles, and Knowledge

Introduction

A great many ideologies produced throughout human history are connected to divinity and the idea that God, or some other divine force, will selectively intervene in human affairs in order to bring about otherwise impossible events. Any such theology must be underscored by a belief that some higher force — one with a direct interest in the affairs of humanity — both exists and has the capacity to manipulate events accordingly. This is an idea that British philosopher David Hume categorically rejects in Section X of his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

Hume's work takes a position of distinct opposition to the notion that the existence of God has any plausible proof that we may feel comfortable in accepting. To Hume, the human perspective is an individual filter of experience that promotes distinctly differing conceptions of rationality. This approach tends to define knowledge in inherently flexible terms, contingent upon experiences that differ from one person to the next.

Hume's Empirical Skepticism and the Problem of Miracles

In contrast to the empirical perspective espoused by Hume, there is a more absolutist belief system that engages with knowledge quite differently. To those in this school of thought, rationality is the formulating constant that allows for the assumption of absolute cognitive and moral principles. A fundamental belief in a moral and rational order defined by a divine power, for example, tends to refute the concept that knowledge could be mutable according to perspective. Instead, it is considered rational for all sound and reasoning individuals to achieve a certain degree of consensus on those "certainties" which may be regarded as knowledge. However, Hume notes that these certainties are subject to the vulnerability of human perception and the variability he identifies. Hume contends:

"It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the testimony of the Apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of his senses." (Hume, Sec. X)

It is exactly thus that Hume's work casts him in opposition to the religious perspective that has driven many a philosopher or religious leader to claim possession of absolute knowledge. It is this very claim, Hume would argue, that allows such individuals to concoct the notion that miracles may be possible in the mortal realm. This contributes to the primary thesis of this discussion: that the belief in a supernatural order is a disposition Hume argues is irrational, and that it is based on a composite cultural and moral entity reflective of humanity's own goals, ambitions, and devices.

Arguments such as that posed by Hume serve as a hard counterpoint to the spiritual claims driving many religious traditions. Given the time of his writing in the eighteenth century, Hume's ideas frequently clashed with the beliefs of the ruling Catholic Church. The contrast is particularly observable in his position on the supernatural, which strikes one as a concerted point of contention with the divine implications of Catholic mysticism. It is also the case, however, that Hume differed from those contemporaries who similarly disputed the plausibility of a higher force.

For instance, in the ideas of French philosopher René Descartes we can see some of the core ingredients of empiricism and theology that have entered the defining conversation on knowledge and rational thought. However, his perspective would differ significantly from that of Hume on humanity's capacity to reason about its own knowledge. Interestingly, Descartes' contributions to philosophical discourse were often informed by his experiences while he slept. His dreams were a fertile ground for revelations, including the one which prompted him to initiate the science of rationality. It is sensible, then, that these experiences would prompt him to explore the relationship between the dream-world and the physical world that we collectively regard as real.

Descartes, Dreams, and the Limits of Human Knowledge

Descartes' systematic approach to establishing an understanding of what is rationally true inherently required him to reject all assumed notions of truth. This skeptical starting point — which he characterized by its unfounded but universally accepted nature — led Descartes to cast doubt on assumed facts and apply testing methods to them, thereby seeking to provide a living framework entirely governed by empiricism. Such a doctrine inclined Descartes to conclude that a person cannot accept themselves as capable of distinguishing between experiences in dreams and those which occur while awake. His assessment is derived from his own epistemological framework and, within the parameters he designed, is a functionally acceptable one. He establishes meaningful similarities between our experiences in both realms.

Descartes' view on dreams stems from his broader system of epistemology, guided by the pursuit of Knowledge — a term he capitalized to demonstrate the canonization of the concept it implied. His order of rationality was guided by a principle of accepting as certain only that for which he could remove any trace of doubt. In this way, he was not entirely dissimilar from Hume. However, as he reflected on his experiences while asleep and dreaming, he found it inconsistent to accept his waking state as necessarily real. Instead, he recognized that:

"As long as it is not unthinkable that waking-quality experiences should be reproduced in a dream, then . . . we're unable to meet the burden of proof requisite for Knowledge — there are never any [unshakably] sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep." (Med. 1, AT 7:19, qtd. in Newman, 3.1)

Descartes establishes what he sees as a reason to doubt that one can assume oneself to be awake simply because one perceives it to be so. This inherently raises the prospect that human experience is precipitated by delusion and is thus incapable of attaining Knowledge of God's existence. Descartes' investigation of the complex debate over the nature of dreams finds its greatest ideological import in suggesting the possibility of such an illusory negotiation of the world.

Conclusion

This is among the most compelling statements in Hume's work. It denotes that the absence of invulnerable evidence to contradict the claims of the divine is not tantamount to proof that a miracle has occurred. As Hume states, the great majority of us are given over to experiences and perceptions that do not involve miraculous occurrences or supernatural observances. Therefore, acceptance of the existence of such things is adopted from the statements and declared observations of a select minority of individuals throughout human history. These individuals have provided us with scriptures that speak to the existence of miracles, wonders, and a higher being responsible for these events. But to Hume, these documents comprise a weak claim to knowledge and may only be understood, more precisely, as belief.

In the formation of knowledge, Hume contends persuasively, we are better served by trusting our own senses. Descartes, by contrast, argues that not even these senses can be trusted. Still, both thinkers seem to agree that a belief in the supernatural — or in God specifically — lacks rational or epistemological basis.

Hume, D. (1910). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Harvard Classics, 37. P.F. Collier & Son.

Newman, L. (1999). Descartes' Epistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.