This paper examines how two major contemporary theologians—Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg—address the classic theological problem of evil and divine goodness. While both thinkers ground their responses in Christian eschatology and the resurrection of Christ, they diverge significantly on the nature of human freedom, God's omniscience, and divine suffering. Pannenberg emphasizes human autonomy and creaturally independence as necessary conditions for free will, whereas Moltmann stresses God's participation in human suffering and adopts a more nuanced view of divine omnipotence. The paper concludes that despite their differences, both theologians locate the resolution to evil in the future Kingdom of God and the redemptive promise of physical resurrection.
How is it possible for God to be good in a world full of evil? This is one of the most essential questions all theologians grapple with, including Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg. Although there are similarities between both thinkers, according to Kane (2005), both theologians have fundamentally different points of view regarding human freedom. These differences form the foundation for their distinct approaches to theodicy—the attempt to reconcile divine goodness with the existence of evil in the world.
For Pannenberg, all human beings have the freedom to fulfill their human destiny in a positive or a negative fashion. "The ability to decide among possibilities of conduct is a high form of creaturely independence," but true freedom finds its fullest expression in the Trinity (Kane 2005: 41). This emphasis on human agency becomes central to his theodicy.
Furthermore, although creation may manifest imperfections, this is not a reflection upon God, who remains separate from his creations which are given free will and agency to choose evil (Kane 2005: 42). In other words, if there is evil in the world, it is because of human origins, not because of God's imperfection. God could not give his creation all of his infinite wisdom and perfection without making the creation a rival God; hence the existence of evil in the world. "If the creator willed a world of finite creatures and their independence, then he had to accept their corruptibility and suffering and the possibility of evil as a result of their striving for their own autonomy" (Kane 2005: 42). Pannenberg thus locates the source of evil squarely in the finite, autonomous choices of created beings.
In contrast, Moltmann suggests that suffering is a reality and that suffering is an opportunity to understand God better. He acknowledges the challenge of believing in a good God given a world full of suffering innocents. But Moltmann points out that even God in the form of Jesus cries out against the injustice of suffering, indicating God's own awareness of and response to this problem. "Although Jesus went willingly... he did not suffer passively... he cried out 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' (Mk. 15:34)" (Kane 2005: 44). Rather than maintaining divine transcendence at a distance from suffering, Moltmann's theology emphasizes God's participation in human anguish.
Despite these divergences in their emphasis, there are still common, resonant themes between the two theologians. Both "point to a future that for atheism is an impossibility: a good future without suffering" in the form of the future Kingdom of God (Kane 2005: 45). Although suffering may exist in this imperfect world given humanity's imperfection, God ultimately offers the promise of eternal redemption from suffering.
Through resurrection in a physical, historical sense, there is hope from a redemption from evil. This point of view is seen as a fundamental shift from previous, common views of the hereafter. "Israel's religion of promise was eminently of this-worldly in orientation," before Christ, according to these theologians, "repudiating any notion of resignation to the beyond of epiphany religion. For Israel, death cuts one off from God and the promise" (Otto 1992: 81). Regardless of whether one agrees with this view of Judaism, Moltmann and Pannenberg's perceived contrast underlines the importance of physical resurrection in the person of Christ as an essential solution to the problem of the existence of evil.
Moltmann calls the resurrection of Jesus an event without precedent and an example of God's true goodness, even though evil is a reality (Otto 1992: 83). The resurrection becomes a metaphor, a stand-in for a much larger historical transformation. Both theologians thus anchor their theodicies in eschatological hope—the promise of a future reconciliation that transcends but does not erase present suffering.
Moltmann's conception of God is much more physical than Pannenberg's in that he stresses the similarity between Jesus and humanity, including Jesus' moment of despair. In contrast, "Pannenberg retains a largely traditional understanding of God as omnipotent and omniscient" (Kane 2005: 45). Moltmann takes a more nuanced view of God's knowledge and abilities by stressing the inability to create a perfect world and "by making God a fellow-sufferer" (Kane 2005: 45). For both, evil is not something to be shrugged off or merely the absence of good: it cannot be rationalized but must be understood in the larger context of God's relationship with the world. Their distinct theological vocabularies ultimately serve a common conviction—that evil and suffering, while real and demanding of serious theological reflection, do not have the final word in a world oriented toward God's redemptive future.
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