Rand's Rational Self Interest

Rand’s philosophy regarding selfishness and altruism contains a crucial dichotomy, as virtually anyone’s philosophy regarding opposite concepts would. However, the opposition in Rand’s concept may surprise those who are not familiar with her philosophy. At a very basic level, Rand is stating that selfishness is actually good, and that altruism is really evil in “Introduction to the Virtue of Selfishness”. Thus, there is opposition found within this opposition, as most people would say the inverse of the aforementioned statement. However, the author reveals there are facets of selfishness which are morally beneficial, and aspects of altruism which are decidedly malefic.

Rand’s philosophy, then, is that the polarization of these terms is responsible for the moral boons of the former and the moral disadvantages of the latter. The author states that most people equate selfishness with a blanket “evil” (Rand 5), which they do not distinguish from the results of selfishness. Therefore, people would say that both a rapist who pursues his selfish desires for flesh and a startup techie concerned with improving his bottom line are both base because “in popular usage, the word “selfishness” is a synonym for evil” (Rand 5). It is because both people are concerned with the outcome of their actions—which behooves themselves—that there are negative connotations around the notion of selfishness. Conversely, the author states that popular opinion adheres to the notion that anything done for the sake of others is morally defensible. Doing things for the benefit of others is an excellent working definition for the notion of altruism. Most people believe it does not matter what the results are; as long as their beneficiary “is anybody other than oneself” it is morally acceptable.

Rand’s philosophy contradicts these traditional notions. She believes selfishness is not evil but has the capacity for a fair amount of good because of the true definition of this term. In her esteem selfishness is only a regard for one’s interest. There is nothing about this denotation that is involved with the results of selfishness. So, if one’s regard for oneself leads to positive outcomes such as enriching oneself or creating an industry out of one’s own inspiration, then selfishness is commendable. On the other hand, she has a very low regard for altruism. Most people view altruism as a requisite for morally defensible... Rand believes such a viewpoint is inherently limiting and contradicts the means by which man survives—by fending for himself (Rand 6).
A fair amount of truth exists in Rand’s concept that the default ethical theory of our society is altruism. This notion is rooted in the longstanding belief that doing things for others is somehow much better than doing something for oneself. In fact, she states that popular conception is that there is a notion of sacrifice which is an integral part of ethical behavior. Sacrificing oneself for others is the core of the idea of altruism.

The specific reason the author contends that the default ethical theory for Western society during the 20th century when she was writing is altruism is because of the way it circumscribes the very field of morality. She posits the notion that altruism is the de facto form of morality because it defines values in regards to who benefits from them. As previously identified, with altruism the beneficiary is always another and never the self. Altruism, then, is responsible for reducing the field of morality simply into a matter of whether or not one is doing something for someone else. If so, one is engaged in ethical actions; if not, one is not engaged in ethical actions.

In this respect, all someone has to do to engage in moral behavior is to do something for someone else. This theory (which Rand discusses but to which she also objects) is extremely encompassing. It does not matter what the actual outcome of something is, so long as the intention was to benefit another it is embraced as altruistic. It is become of the breadth of this philosophy the author terms it a default ethical theory. So many things, such as Hitler’s so-called purging of the Jews to create a master race, fit into this category.

Still the primary problem with this view of altruism in relation to ethics and the reason why Rand refers to it as the default ethics of her day is because it is so broad it all but belies the need to have a true sense of ethics. If all one has to do is claim you authorized an action because it benefits another, one can do almost anything. The danger with this default is that it leaves little room for constructing true principles of morality which are specific, defining, and provide some sort of “moral guidance” (Rand 6). Morality needs more than one principal. If it is limited to solely determining whether or not another gained from an action, there is no need to conceive of other tenets which can affect this sphere of life.…