Cognitive Science

Mental Structure Jerry Fodor's four accounts of mental structure subvert behaviorism by revealing a modular mind. The first account of mental structure in Fodor's theory is Neocartesian, and relates to the mind as being related to the structure of knowledge. The second account of mental structure relates to functional architecture and horizontal faculties. The third refers to functional architecture and vertical faculties, and the fourth with associationism.

All of these models of mental structure and function can be illuminating, but the one that seems to be substantiated most readily by research in cognitive science and neuroscience is the architecture of verticality. Vertical faculties refer to mental faculties arrayed in such a way suggesting a hierarchy. The hierarchy is not a judgmental one, in which those faculties deemed "higher" are more advanced. Rather, the hierarchy refers to a structural or procedural order in which some functions are broader or more like umbrella faculties.

This is why Fodor has remained committed to a view of modularity that permits more nebulous features of mind. Recent research into what might otherwise be esoteric aspects of cognitive and social psychology, such as Direct Social Perception Hypothesis, relate best to an account of mental structure rooted in functional architecture and vertical faculties (Lavelle, 2015). Broader mental functions such as social cognition become an overarching structure, like the frame of a building.

Modular structures within this frame allow for the various forms, features, and mechanisms of perceiving other people's psychological states. For example, intuition felt on a physiological level like gut instincts would be subservient processes to the overarching realm of what could be construed as telepathy. Likewise, reading body language and other communication faculties would also be serving the same function.

Just as telepathy and mindreading fall under the rubric of pseudoscience unless their actions can be computed within a cognitive science framework, so too has phrenology been deemed irrelevant and pseudoscientific (Bastos, Gava & Vargas, 2014). However, Fodor inadvertently built upon the phrenological model with the architecture of mental structures and their modularity. As Bastos, Gava & Vargas (2014) note, Fodor posited a version of mental faculty organization with inherent verticality.

The reason why verticality can be deemed superior as for explaining the mind is that vertical faculties "are constructed from relatively specialized skills of each individual," (Bastos, Gava & Vargas, 2014). Thus, individual differences can be accounted for within Fodor's mental structure model. There may be no actual physical structural location for mental faculties like intelligence or memory, which are spread throughout the brain. However, there can be cognitive structures organized in such a way as to stimulate top-down mechanisms much like an elevator in a building.

Using the architectural metaphor, it is easy to see how the verticality model works well for describing the mind. A central processing system may be at play, serving as a sort of concierge or at least, an information control center. There are security measures that are like gateways of information or stimuli flowing in and out of the mind, governed by faculties like selective attention. Various processes such as the interpretation of stimuli based on memories or stereotypes will have evolved.