Cognitive Science Theoretical Investigation of

Cognitive Science Theoretical Investigation of Mind Modularity This paper first provides some background information on cognitive science and the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), then examines the question of the way the mind functions, whether it is modular or a highly plastic general purpose organ. Theories are examined and evidence presented in support of the second theory of plastic adaptation. Background Information in Cognitive Science Cognitive science is aimed at understanding the mind. Neurosciences, cognitive psychology, linguistics, physics, computer science (artificial intelligence) and even philosophy have contributed to cognitive science.

The functioning of the brain and the mind, which are inescapably connected, is studies via experimental techniques in brain research, biophysical models at the level of single cell, statistical methods applied to the recurrent neural networks, various dynamical models of the brain processes and other interrelated studies. All of these advance our understanding of the workings of the mind and enhance education, medicine and social science. The brain routinely categorizes representations of reality and learns how solve problems, and evaluate the different sensory receptions.

This is a process by which the mind acts like a computer and stores information from sensory events into a coded mechanism. A natural approach to the mind should therefore start with models inspired by the brain, models capable of learning, categorization and internal representation of the data. The task of the brain may be roughly divided into two parts: low-level cognition, the preprocessing of the sensory signals in the sensory reception, and higher-level cognition, where the internal representations are used during perception, thinking and problem solving.

For example, lower level cognition is simply seeing or hearing, while higher level cognition is identifying or listening. The difference lies in the attention given by the individual and the purposeful processing of the sensory input. Description of the RTM The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) combines an account of reasoning with an account of the mental states. The RTM has as its starting point mental states, as thoughts, beliefs, desires, perceptions and images. Such states are about things you can measure, such as consistency, truth, appropriateness and accuracy.

RTM defines such intentional mental states as relations to mental representations, and explains the intentionality of the former in terms of the semantic properties of the latter. For example: to perceive an apple is to have a sensory experience, which is related to the apple. RTM also understands mental processes such as thinking, reasoning and imagining as sequences of intentional mental states, those which are initiated intentionally to accomplish a set purpose. (Fodor 1981, 1987) Concepts related to the RTM are implicit learning, categorization, imagery, qualification and modularity.

There are several discussion points around these aspects. Proposal and Methodology of this Paper will dedicate my paper to the problems with the concept of modularity. First I will give a definition of massive modularity, explain something about domain-specific and domain-general hypotheses, and give Fodor's view of modularity. Then I will show that some domain-specific modules can be found in lower level processing. In the next paragraphs I will outline the theory of (Cosmides and Tooby 1992), which argues that there are also modules dedicated to higher level tasks.

Then I will give an overview of Buller's arguments (2005) against specific modules dedicated to higher level processing, and against modularity. Finally, I will argue that the mind isn't strictly modular, but uses domain-general as well as domain-specific processes. Body and Analysis Is the mind modular? This question has been hotly debated in psychology and cognitive science. Recently, a group of psychologists, called evolutionary psychologists, have made a remarkable contribution to this discussion. They claim that we can derive from evolutionary theory proof that the mind must be modular.

They even go one step further: they claim that the mind must be massively modular. The theory of massive modularity holds that the mind is composed entirely of modules, or tiny computers, that evolved in the human prehistory to selectively process information. The various modules worked together to produce complex adaptive behaviors to solve problems faced by our early ancestors. The differentiated brain circuits set these "domain-specific" modules apart from the hypothesis of "domain-general" intelligence,.