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Proposal and Methodology of this Paper will dedicate my paper to the problems with the concept of modularity. First I will give a definition of massive modularity, explain something about domain-specific and domain-general hypotheses, and give Fodor's view of modularity. Then I will show that some domain-specific modules can be found in lower level processing. In the next paragraphs I will outline the theory of (Cosmides and Tooby 1992), which argues that there are also modules dedicated to higher level tasks. Then I will give an overview of Buller's arguments (2005) against specific modules dedicated to higher level processing, and against modularity. Finally, I will argue that the mind isn't strictly modular, but uses domain-general as well as domain-specific processes.
Body and Analysis
Is the mind modular? This question has been hotly debated in psychology and cognitive science. Recently, a group of psychologists, called evolutionary psychologists, have made a remarkable contribution to this discussion. They claim that we can derive from evolutionary theory proof that the mind must be modular. They even go one step further: they claim that the mind must be massively modular. The theory of massive modularity holds that the mind is composed entirely of modules, or tiny computers, that evolved in the human prehistory to selectively process information. The various modules worked...
The differentiated brain circuits set these "domain-specific" modules apart from the hypothesis of "domain-general" intelligence, in which most mental tasks are performed by a single flexible mechanism. The difference between massive modularity and domain-general intelligence is one of mechanism: in the first case, there are different circuits dedicated to different tasks; in the second, there is a single immense circuit that accomplishes a multiplicity of tasks.
The modularity hypothesis of the mind goes back to the 19th century movement called phrenology which claimed that individual mental faculties could be associated precisely with specific physical areas of the brain. Someone's level of intelligence, for example, could be "read" from the size of a particular bump on his posterior parietal lobe. Jerry Fodor, drawing from Chomsky and other evidence from linguistics, revived the idea of the modularity of mind in the 1983 publication of his Modularity of Mind. (Fodor, Jerry 1983)
According to Fodor, a module falls somewhere between the behaviorist and cognitive views of lower level processes. Behaviorists tried to replace the mind with reflexes that are encapsulated and cognitively impenetrable by other cognitive domains. Cognitivists saw lower level processes as continuous with higher level
Is the mind modular? This question has been hotly debated in psychology and cognitive science. Recently, a group of psychologists, called evolutionary psychologists, have made a remarkable contribution to this discussion. They claim that we can derive from evolutionary theory proof that the mind must be modular. They even go one step further: they claim that the mind must be massively modular. The theory of massive modularity holds that the mind is composed entirely of modules, or tiny computers, that evolved in the human prehistory to selectively process information. The various modules worked together to produce complex adaptive behaviors to solve problems faced by our early ancestors. The differentiated brain circuits set these "domain-specific" modules apart from the hypothesis of "domain-general" intelligence, in which most mental tasks are performed by a single flexible mechanism. The difference between massive modularity and domain-general intelligence is one of mechanism: in the first case, there are different circuits dedicated to different tasks; in the second, there is a single immense circuit that accomplishes a multiplicity of tasks.
The modularity hypothesis of the mind goes back to the 19th century movement called phrenology which claimed that individual mental faculties could be associated precisely with specific physical areas of the brain. Someone's level of intelligence, for example, could be "read" from the size of a particular bump on his posterior parietal lobe. Jerry Fodor, drawing from Chomsky and other evidence from linguistics, revived the idea of the modularity of mind in the 1983 publication of his Modularity of Mind. (Fodor, Jerry 1983)
According to Fodor, a module falls somewhere between the behaviorist and cognitive views of lower level processes. Behaviorists tried to replace the mind with reflexes that are encapsulated and cognitively impenetrable by other cognitive domains. Cognitivists saw lower level processes as continuous with higher level
If you fail to reproduce my findings, it is not due to some fault in your apparatus or in the control of your stimulus, but it is due to the fact that your introspection is untrained." (1878-1958) IV. Functionalism Structuralism resulted in a reaction that became known as Functionalism which was influenced greatly by the work of William James and the theory of Charles Darwin. Functionalism had as its emphasis intelligence
The works of Borko and Putnam (1998) expressed the contemporary perspectives to the concept of contextual learning. Situated recognition (uses both social and physical contexts),social cognition (uses an individual's construction of a given knowledge) as well as distributed cognition which employs or relates to both the social and situated nature of cognition (Clifford and Wilson,2000). While employing this ideas, I emphasize on problem solving, recognition of the fact that
Tom Shulich ("Coltish Hum") A Critical Comparison of Behavior Therapy and Rational-Emotive Therapy In this paper, I consider the benefits and drawbacks of behavior therapy and the cognitive therapy. These are talking therapies that now have over a half-century of application in clinical settings and are still used today in conjunction with, or as an alternative to, drug treatments of psychological disorders. I conclude that these therapies are still useful, though each
Behavioral and Cognitive Behavioral Theories Psychodynamic and Cognitive Behavioral Theories In this paper, there is going to an examination of Cognitive Behavioral and Psychodynamic theories. This is accomplished by focusing on: the two theories, their theoretical concepts, micro skills / techniques and a summary of these ideas. These elements will show how each one can address issues impacting the patient and the long-term effects upon them. In the world of psychology, there are
In other words Emotional Intelligence means that the individual is capable of: (1) Accurately perceiving emotions in oneself and others; (2) Uses emotions to facilitate thinking; (3) Understands emotional meanings; and (4) Manages emotions well. This model is referred to as the 'ability' model of emotional intelligence. (Mayer & Salovey, 1997) DANIEL GOLEMAN-PERSONAL & SOCIAL COMPETENCE Daniel Goleman proposed the model of emotional intelligence based on the Personal and Social competencies
76). As automation increasingly assumes the more mundane and routine aspects of work of all types, Drucker was visionary in his assessment of how decisions would be made in the years to come. "In the future," said Drucker, "it was possible that all employment would be managerial in nature, and we would then have progressed from a society of labor to a society of management" (Witzel, p. 76). The