Mind modularity versus plastic adaptation in cognitive science

Cognitive Science

Theoretical Investigation of Mind Modularity

This paper first provides some background information on cognitive science and the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), then examines the question of the way the mind functions, whether it is modular or a highly plastic general purpose organ. Theories are examined and evidence presented in support of the second theory of plastic adaptation.

Background Information in Cognitive Science

Cognitive science is aimed at understanding the mind. Neurosciences, cognitive psychology, linguistics, physics, computer science (artificial intelligence) and even philosophy have contributed to cognitive science. The functioning of the brain and the mind, which are inescapably connected, is studies via experimental techniques in brain research, biophysical models at the level of single cell, statistical methods applied to the recurrent neural networks, various dynamical models of the brain processes and other interrelated studies. All of these advance our understanding of the workings of the mind and enhance education, medicine and social science.

The brain routinely categorizes representations of reality and learns how solve problems, and evaluate the different sensory receptions. This is a process by which the mind acts like a computer and stores information from sensory events into a coded mechanism. A natural approach to the mind should therefore start with models inspired by the brain, models capable of learning, categorization and internal representation of the data. The task of the brain may be roughly divided into two parts: low-level cognition, the preprocessing of the sensory signals in the sensory reception, and higher-level cognition, where the internal representations are used during perception, thinking and problem solving. For example, lower level cognition is simply seeing or hearing, while higher level cognition is identifying or listening. The difference lies in the attention given by the individual and the purposeful processing of the sensory input.

Body and Analysis

Is the mind modular? This question has been hotly debated in psychology and cognitive science. Recently, a group of psychologists, called evolutionary psychologists, have made a remarkable contribution to this discussion. They claim that we can derive from evolutionary theory proof that the mind must be modular. They even go one step further: they claim that the mind must be massively modular. The theory of massive modularity holds that the mind is composed entirely of modules, or tiny computers, that evolved in the human prehistory to selectively process information. The various modules worked together to produce complex adaptive behaviors to solve problems faced by our early ancestors. The differentiated brain circuits set these "domain-specific" modules apart from the hypothesis of "domain-general" intelligence, in which most mental tasks are performed by a single flexible mechanism. The difference between massive modularity and domain-general intelligence is one of mechanism: in the first case, there are different circuits dedicated to different tasks; in the second, there is a single immense circuit that accomplishes a multiplicity of tasks.

The modularity hypothesis of the mind goes back to the 19th century movement called phrenology which claimed that individual mental faculties could be associated precisely with specific physical areas of the brain. Someone's level of intelligence, for example, could be "read" from the size of a particular bump on his posterior parietal lobe. Jerry Fodor, drawing from Chomsky and other evidence from linguistics, revived the idea of the modularity of mind in the 1983 publication of his Modularity of Mind. (Fodor, Jerry 1983)

According to Fodor, a module falls somewhere between the behaviorist and cognitive views of lower level processes. Behaviorists tried to replace the mind with reflexes that are encapsulated and cognitively impenetrable by other cognitive domains. Cognitivists saw lower level processes as continuous with higher level