Demographic Profile and Motivation of Suicide Bombers

Suicide Terrorism: Driven to Death
Introduction
Who are the terrorists engaging in suicide bombings? What motivates them to act? These are some of the questions Merari (2010) tackles in Driven to Death. They are not entirely new questions, as other researchers have asked them as well—but Merari (2010) does provide new insight into the phenomenon of suicide bombing by conducting field work and independent research to uncover more information on this particular subject. This paper explores some of the findings of Merari (2010) and compares them with what other researchers have had to say, particularly on the subject of what motivates terrorists to act.
Demographics
While many scholars argue that there is no demographic profile of the suicide bomber, Merari (2010) disagrees and presents his own demographic profile based on his own research. The argument of general scholarship is that anyone can be a suicide bomber, young or old, rich or poor, male or female. Merari (2010) states that a “rough profile” does exist and that the primary source material that he has been compiling in his database for decades supports his assertion (p. 61). Merari admits that his data is not complete and that it essentially consists of the facts he could gather from public reports of bombings in Israel and Lebanon from the 1970s onward—but that the data for the most part indicates a clear demographic trend.
Yet Merari has gone even beyond the published records of bombers—for example, the Israeli media may list a girl’s name, age and marital status, but to obtain information about the bomber’s socioeconomic status one must engage in investigative research and examine the subject’s friends, family and neighborhood. To know about the religiosity of the subject one must do the same. In short, it requires field work investigation—something that cannot be done from a library or one’s university office, which is where a great many scholars and researchers spend most if not all of their time. Merari has the advantage of getting out of the office and into the field, and thus is able to compile a more sensible demographic profile of the suicide bomber.
In terms of gener, Merari (2010) shows that of the nearly 3000 suicide bombings over the course of more than three decades (1974-2008), 95% of them were committed by males. However, there are qualifications to these numbers depending on the time or era in which they were committed as well as the region. For example, in Lebanon it is much more common to find female suicide bombers, as Merari (2010) claims that during the same timeframe “7 out of a total of 41 suicide bombers were women (17%), all sent by secular groups” (p. 62). Yet Hizballah also conducted suicide bombings in Lebanon and it recruited only males—so among secular groups, roughly 1 in 4 suicide bombers was actually a woman in Lebanon.
Compared to Palestine, the statistics are different. During the first intifada, from 1993 to 2000, all suicide bombings were conducted by males from either Hamas or the PIJ. However, during the second intifada starting in September of 2000, 6% of the 175 documented suicide bombers were female. What contributed to the rise of female bombings was the inclusion of secular groups Fatah and the PFLP—but the PIJ also used three female suicide bombers during the second wave and worked in conjunction with the secular group Fatah. Hamas also used two female bombers in the second wave (Merari, 2010). What this indicates is a cultural shift even among orthodox groups towards including women in the role of suicide bomber.
In Russia, the demographic is even more strongly tilted towards women, with nearly 50% of all suicide bombings among Chechen rebels in Russia being committed by women (Merari, 2010). In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers seem to have a high percentage of female suicide bombers but exact figures are unknown (Merari, 2010). The same goes for Turkey where the majority of suicide bombers are actually female. Al-Qaeda is different, however, and of its 140 documented suicide bombers after 2003, all of them save two were male (Merari, 2010).
What Merari (2010) thus discovers is that the divide between using predominantly men as suicide bombers and including women in the activity runs along religious ideological lines. Orthodox groups tend to use male suicide bombers almost exclusively. Secular groups are far more inclusive in terms of gender.
In terms of age, suicide bombers tend generally to be young with an average age of 21.6 in Lebanon, 22 in Palestine, 15 among the Tamil Tigers, 23.4 in Russia, and 25.8 in Turkey (Merari, 2010). Marital status of suicide bombers is more difficult to analyze, for as Merari (2010) points out he only has information on marital status for 8.5% of those subjects in his database (p. 73). Of the statistics available, upwards of 90% of suicide bombers appear to be unmarried. Additionally, educational background is also difficult to determine, as Merari (2010) only has data on this factor for 5% of those in his database. One surprising finding, however, is that among Palestinian suicide bombers the individuals tend to be “much better educated than the population from which they emerged” (Merari, 2010, p. 74). Socioeconomic status has also been difficult to assess but from the research available, it appears that the majority of suicide bombers in Palestine come from middle class backgrounds—though this may be a relative categorization since what would pass for middle class in Palestine would not even pass for poverty level in most Western nations.
Poverty vs. Culture as Cause of Terrorism
According to Merari’s (2010) research, therefore, it does not seem to be the case the poverty causes terrorism but rather that poverty may be one of the conditions that support the ideological, nationalistic, and secular worldviews that motivate and inspire suicide bombings. However, it cannot be considered a main factor because these groups have various reasons and motivations for acting, most of them focused on socio-political aims, religious aims, and war aims. The underlying cause of terrorism is cultural—not financial.
The role of culture in supporting and inspiring terrorism has been well-documented in the past by individual investigators and researchers who have attempted to understand what causes terroristic plotting. Education plays a big part in the development of terrorist mentalities as well, as Merari (2010) points out. Others have concluded the same, including DeCook (2018). However, education does not only take place in the classroom. Cultural education and cognitive learning is greatly influenced by media, groups and peers, as Bandura (2018) points out.
Thus, people who are online are also more likely to come under the persuasion of certain ideas and people who want to use them for their own interests. Chatfield, Reddick and Brajawidagda (2015) have shown how vulnerable, young people are more likely to be used or influenced by people they meet online in chat rooms or on forums or social media platforms, especially if they are already angry about something happening in society and feel that another side or group deserves to be attacked. They will look for individuals who share their opinions online and make friendships, or they will join groups or hang around with peers who are leaning that way because they feel that this helps to give them a sense of identity (Costello & Hawdon, 2018). The people who are looking for recruits know what to look for—young, impressionable individuals who are willing to die for a cause: they are passionate and positive and believe deeply in what they are being fed in terms of nationalistic or ideological policy (Koch, 2018).
Conclusion
Terrorism is not an activity that is ordinarily motivated by poverty in most situations. Merari (2010) has shown for example that the majority of individuals who engage in suicide bombings from Palestine (one of the poorest regions of the world) come from what could be considered middle class backgrounds. They are motivated not by the dire economic situations in which they live—at least not solely—but by ideological beliefs that tend to be religious, nationalistic, and secular in some cases. The point is that there is no one factor that can be identified as the primary motivating factor: groups, peers, media, education, culture, religious conviction, region, age and gender all play a part in determining who becomes a terrorist and whether one will end up becoming a suicide bomber. Other researchers have noted that the Internet is also increasingly playing a huge role in determining who becomes a terrorist because of the fact that it connects so many people together so easily and it ends up bringing like-minded people with violent beliefs together where they can support one another and exchange ideas about how best to proceed into the world of terrorism.
References
Bandura, A. (2018). Toward a psychology of human agency: Pathways and reflections. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 13(2), 130-136.
Chatfield, A. T., Reddick, C. G., & Brajawidagda, U. (2015, May). Tweeting propaganda, radicalization and recruitment: Islamic state supporters multi-sided twitter networks. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research (pp. 239-249).
Costello, M., & Hawdon, J. (2018). Who are the online extremists among us? Sociodemographic characteristics, social networking, and online experiences of those who produce online hate materials. Violence and gender, 5(1), 55-60.
DeCook, J. R. (2018). Memes and symbolic violence:# proudboys and the use of memes for propaganda and the construction of collective identity. Learning, Media and Technology, 43(4), 485-504.
Koch, A. (2018). Trends in Anti-Fascist and Anarchist Recruitment and Mobilization. Journal for Deradicalization, (14), 1-51.
Merari, A. (2010). Driven to death. Oxford University Press.