Catherine Z Elgin and considered judgment

Elgin

Seeking the truth in an imperfect world: The superiority of Elgin's rational equilibrium model of epistemology

The philosophical study of epistemology is the study of what human beings can or cannot know. Traditional foundationalism states that the only valid criteria for what constitutes knowledge is a state of total certainty and thus emotions, metaphors, examples, and fiction are not knowledge because they are not literal truths. Katherine Elgin argues in her text Considered Judgment that reflective equilibrium rather than a state of total certainty should be the standard of knowledge, and that such uncertain elements as fictions and examples can play a role in some contexts as valid criteria for knowledge. Elgin persuasively defends the idea that since all systems of knowledge are enclosed, or self-referential, one can only make use of specific pre-set or independent procedures to validate one's beliefs -- there is no single, overarching system of proof that subsumes all other categories of knowledge in a 'total' fashion.

Foundationalism argues that knowledge can only be attained through a perfect procedure where the thinker has a definite criterion for a correct outcome and a method the results of which are guaranteed to satisfy the criterion. For example, math has a specific system of 'correctness' to determine if an equation is valid. However, the standards of math are set by a specifically defined way of 'knowing.' The classic syllogism that 'Socrates is a man, all men are mortal, therefore Socrates is mortal,' depends upon a knowledge of what constitutes mortality, logic, language and even, on a larger level, that such formulaic deductions are valid and useful ways of 'knowing' even in the absence of a real-world test. But what is 'correct' in a mathematical or philosophical proof might not be correct when telling a story or painting a painting, because an irregular angle or a distorted perspective might make for a more striking perspective that is correct to the artist's vision and a transgression of space and time might be necessary to get across a fiction-writer's desired moral in telling his or her tale. Thus, Elgin's imperfect procedure is superior because recognizes an independent criterion for a correct outcome but has no uniform method by which the results are guaranteed to satisfy the criterion. The mathematician's goal might be to determine the angle of a triangle; the painter's goal might be to assault the viewer's eye with a distorted or 'wrong' proportion or using an impossible perspective. In other words, the criterion depends on the desired result of the project and the type of literal or figurative knowledge one wishes to convey. Neither system of knowledge is better, merely different, with different criteria or goals.

Elgin's statement of reflective equilibrium acknowledges human beings have many different goals in knowing something is true or right. Sometimes our goal is to make something practical, as when seeking knowledge in a scientific truth. Other times it is to reconcile two different moral ideas from two different systems. Other times it might be to create art. Elgin is not a relativist, a charge that might be leveled at her words by some foundationalists. She states that one needs "initially tenable commitments," in other words, a coherent system of goals, standards, and theories to met and set and accept when a particular inquiry begins. (107)