The NATUNA SEA sinking incident occurred on October 3, 2000 on the rock-strewn outcrop of Batu Berhanti in Indonesia when it was headed to Jinzhou, China. The grounding of the NATUNA SEA took place approximately 6NM from the tanker’s manager’s office (Ferguson, 2002). This incident had devastating effects because of the oil spill into the sea, which was nearly 3 years after the EVOIKOS oil spill. Since the occurrence of this incident, the shipping industries in Singapore and Indonesia have embarked on several initiatives to prevent future accidents and their subsequent oil spills. These industries have also been keen in ensuring oil pollution from such incidents are avoided or mitigated. However, there is need for more initiatives to be undertaken by the shipping industry in order to prevent and deal with such incidents in an effective manner.
According to the Centre of Documentation, Research and Experimentation on Accidental Water Pollution (2001), this tanker was grounded when the ship hit a reef that was three meters below the surface of the sea. As a result, a tear in the tanker’s hull caused an oil spill that is estimated to be not less than 10% of the 70,000 tonnes it was carrying.
The occurrence of the NATUNA SEA incident had considerable impacts on the sea, especially in relation to oil spill, which generated numerous concerns in the shipping industry. One of the immediate effects of the NATUNA SEA incident was rupture of several cargo tanks that in turn contributed to the oil spill. When the Panamanian tanker hit the reef before the sea surface, several cargo tanks that were carrying the crude oil were ruptured including 1C, 2C, 3C, 1S, and 3S (Ferguson, 2002). However, none of the 32 crew in the ship was injured while the tanker was relatively stable. Additionally, when this incident occurred, the traffic flow in Strait of Singapore Traffic Separation Scheme was not affected.
The second and most devastating impact of the NATUNA SEA incident was an oil spill that spread very fast due to the strong tidal streams in the Strait (Heah, 2001). While there was an immediate response from different stakeholders in the shipping industry including the ship’s Managing Director and Manager’s staff, an oil spill of approximately 7,000 tonnes occurred. The oil spread rapidly while breaking up in several slicks as it was carried by strong tide and wind in the Strait. These various slicks from the oil spread ended up affecting Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean waters in different degrees. The responding authorities attempted to address the oil spill using booms and 37 boats in the recovery operations. However, these efforts were seemingly futile given the rapid spread of the oil and its decomposition into several slicks. Some of the areas that were affected by the rapid spread of the oil and its slicks included Singapore’s tourist beach, Sentosa and Indonesian coastal portions in Batam Island. The futility of the recovery operations in preventing the rapid spread of the oil was fueled by difficulties in identifying the most suitable equipment for handling the high viscosity oil at sea. Additionally, the recovery operations were complicated by the nature of the oil itself, which in turn contributed to its rapid spread and effect on surrounding waters.