Identifying Opportunities to Improve Revenues and Ridership Levels at WMATA

Safety Concerns at Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) and Implications for Ridership

The Metro network operated by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) provides mass transportation for the nation's capital region for visitors, residents and especially members of the federal government workforce. Besides 118 miles of rail tracks and 91 stations (making it the nation's second-largest heavy rail transit system), the Metro also operates the fifth largest paratransit service and sixth largest bus network in the country today (Metro facts, 2016). Taken together, the Metro clearly represents a valuable transportation resource, but the WMATA has been plagued by several safety-related issues that have adversely affected ridership levels in recent years as discussed further below.

Metrorail ridership in the second half of 2015 dropped to levels not seen since 2004, overall weekday ridership was down six percent compared to FY2015 and weekend ridership was down twelve percent. The ridership declines have impacted nearly all stations, time periods and trip types and cannot be attributed to poor weather, as the autumn and early winter were relatively mild. While some of the decline can be attributed to the proliferation of innovative alternative transportation providers such as Uber and Lyft, the recent decline in ridership was further exacerbated by a recent high-profile system-wide shutdown of the Metro in response to concerns over safety issues (Giaritelli, 2016). The inspections identified 26 frayed jumper cables among 600 cables in 22 zones which are connected to the third rail and provide the electrical conduits needed for rail operations (Giaritelli, 2016). More troubling still, this system-wide shutdown was unprecedented in Metro's 39-year history of operations (Giaritelli, 2016). These were especially troubling findings in view of the death of a passenger at the L'Enfant Plaza station due to smoke inhalation caused by a faulty cable in 2016 and a more recent cable-related fire at McPherson Square station (Giaritelli, 2016). Given WMATA's strategic importance to the smooth operation of the nation's capital, these safety-related issues and corresponding declines in ridership represent an important problem that requires further investigation to identify opportunities for improvement.

The overarching objective of the proposed study will be to develop a timely and informed answer to the study's research question, "Is the WMATA riding public losing confident in the Metro system and its ability to address safety issues; thus resulting in a decrease in ridership over the past two years?" In support of this objective, the proposed study will achieve the following goals:

• Identify and describe the public perception of WMATA performance, compare and contrast with simpler transit system;

• Identify and describe WMATA failure in meeting performance requirements include but not limited to:

• Factors contributing to not achieving headways,

• Factors contributing to not achieving on time performance,

• System safety requirements,

• System assurance requirements -- system availability, equipment reliability, and equipment maintainability.

• To examine WMATA customer service and public relation process exists at the agency, and to highlight similarities between Metro and other transit systems around the world that experienced similar issues.

• To develop a systematic Emergency Management System (EMS) approach that is unique to the Washington DC Metro Transit with the aim of reducing emergency impact.

• To provide a comprehensive review of literatures and other agencies' practices in relation to constraint analysis and outline a conceptual framework for system public relation management. Specifically, it will help to ensure that the structure will be capable of:

a. Providing a comprehensive review of sources and characteristics of constraints typically found in transit safety;

b. Development of a safety management method for easier hazard identification and emergency management;

c. Reviewing of current agency practices and researches in regards to safety and emergency management;

d. Outline of conceptual framework for total public relation management.

The potential benefits that can result from achieving the above-listed goals include providing WMATA's management with a set of recommendations that can be followed to improve popular perceptions of its commitment to safety, thereby increasing ridership and profitability.

The recent introduction of alternative transportation ride-sharing choices such as Uber, RelayRides and Lyft combined with growing ridership dissatisfaction of public transit systems has created a challenging situation for WMATA (Browning, 2014). What is known at present for certain is that ridership levels have experienced a sustained decline in the wake of the recent unprecedented, high-profile system-wide shutdown of the WMATA over safety concerns and that restoring ridership confidence is therefore essential. In fact, today's situation is in sharp contrast to just a decade or so ago when WMATA was in the vanguard of implementing cutting-edge technological solutions to its operations, including safety management and ridership satisfaction (Hanley, 2009).

Since that time, however, federally subsidized funding for these solutions has dwindled and the WMATA has experienced system-wide safety deficits as a result (Birr, 2016). Previous studies have examined the impact of safety-related concerns on WMATA post-September 11, 2001 and have concluded that there is an inextricable relationship between heightened concerns over safety and declines in ridership and revenue levels (Wilson and Jackson, 2007). Therefore, studies of this type are timely and important for identifying opportunities to restore confidence and satisfaction in WMATA's operations.

In reality, though, the task for WMATA is especially daunting given its far-flung transportation network and scope of operations. Created by an interstate compact concluded in 1967, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority was tasked with planning, developing, financing, constructing and operating the Metro network serving the nation's capital area with a current population of about 4 million (Metro facts, 2016). Following initial rail system construction in 1969, the Metro expanded to include bus service in 1973 (currently there are 1,500 buses in constant operation) and the Metrorail component began operations in 1976 (Metro facts, 2016). The Metrorail system currently serves 91 stations with 118 miles of track (Metro facts, 2016). Nearly half (about 45%) of residents who work in the center core (i.e., Washington, D.C. and some parts of Arlington County, Virginia) use some component of the Metro network (Metro facts, 2016). The single highest ridership day in 2015 was 787,707 (Metro facts, 2016).

In response to the safety-related issues described above as well as others, WMATA's general manager and chief executive officer, Paul Widerfeld, has implemented a systematic overhaul of current risk management and inspection practices in order to restore public confidence (Metro facts, 2016). To its credit, WMATA has been absolutely forthcoming in its findings concerning safety-related problems and what has been and still needs to be done (Back2Good initiatives, 2016). For instance, according to the WMATA Web site, "Metro is working with employees, riders, jurisdictional partners, and the general public to make sure that everyone does their part in creating and sustaining a culture of safety and security in stations, vehicles, support facilities, and access points" (Metro facts, 2016 p. 2).

Some of the initiatives that have already been taken to promote safety throughout the Metro network include the following:

• Digital signs in the stations show next train arrival times, system status and time of day;

• Digital signs outside some stations show system status and time of day;

• Digital LCD monitors at station manager kiosks show real-time advisories and alerts;

• Two-way radios between train operator and operations control center;

• Hotlines from operations control center to police and fire departments;

• Automated electronic fire protection system in stations and tunnels;

• Call boxes spaced 800 feet along tracks;

• Fire extinguishers on platforms and inside railcars;

• Video monitoring of stations, elevators and some station parking lots;

• Public address systems on trains and platforms;

• Passenger-to-station manager intercoms on platforms, in elevators and landings

• Passenger-to-operator intercoms inside railcars -- one at each end; and,

• Chemical detection systems in underground stations (Metro facts, 2016).

These initiatives followed another series of security steps taken in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that were funded by a $49 million federal grant in 2002. These earlier security steps included the installation of intrusion detection equipment, chemical sensors, bomb-containment trash receptacles, digital closed-circuit television systems on all buses and supplemental equipment for the Metro command center and K-9 teams (Anderson, 2005). Although these initiatives served to initial restore rider confidence, federal funding dried up in the years following, and despite identifying an additional $150 million in essential security needs, the Metro system received only $15 million in federal funding through 2004 (Anderson, 2005). In 2009, the Metro also introduced a policy of random bag searches using specially trained security forces but rescinded this initiative after just 1 month following recommendations from Metro Riders Advisory Council (Riggs, 2009).

Despite these initiatives, or perhaps even because of them because they highlight recent safety-related deficiencies, Metro ridership and revenues have still been declining. For instance, according to a recent report by Birr (2016), "Ridership is declining despite an increase in the District's population. Ridership in 2015 was just 86% of 2005 levels" (2016, p. 2). By contrast, the mass transportation systems operated by other major cities such as Los Angeles and New York have succeeded in generating consistently higher ridership levels since 2005 by charging less money for fares (e.g., New York riders are charged .0.28 cents per mile versus 0.39 cents per mile for the Metro) compared to the Metro network (Birr, 2016). Moreover, despite the sustained increases in fares, the Metro has experienced declining revenues due to the precipitous drop in ridership levels (Birr, 2016). Part of the problem is attributed to the higher costs incurred by the Metro for human resources (McElhatton, 2010) which average nearly double what other major cities are expending for the same services (Birr, 2016).

The chairman of the Metro board, Washington, D. C. council member Jack Evans, has requested almost one-third of a billion dollars from the federal government to offset the Metro system losses and another $1 billion from local governments to implement the additional safety measures needed to bring the Metro up to standards (Birr, 2016). Critics, though, charge that the management of the Metro has mismanaged its existing funds to the point where a crisis situation has resulted (Birr, 2016). For instance, Birr emphasizes that, "Federal Transit Authority officials have conducted more than 200 inspections of the system, finding more than 1,100 track defects, some on recently repaired sections of track. Many of those defects have yet to be addressed by WMATA officials" (2016, p. 4). Likewise, the National Transportation Safety Board has threatened WMATA with massive funding cuts unless and until safety-related issues are addressed (Bowman, 2015). The general manager of WMATA, Paul Wiederfeld, concedes that the Metro has experienced setbacks in recent years, most especially with respect to safety concerns. "We want our riders to know that we feel your frustration and that we are fully focused on the hard issues facing our system" (2016, p. 2).

In reality, however, the Metro network is in fact faced with a number of "hard issues" that are being addressed in part through a series of safety initiatives launched by the organization pursuant to its Back2Good initiatives as set forth in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Current safety initiatives at WMATA

Safety Initiative

Description

Safety -- Prevent near misses

• Red Signal overruns -- new software onboard trains will prevent an inattentive train operator from passing a red signal by requiring the operator to perform multiple sequential actions before they can move their train. In addition, stations that have the highest frequency of red signal overruns are having their signals upgraded to LED bulbs to improve their visibility to operators and prevent overruns, which will be completed in early 2017.

• Enhance technology for roadway worker protections in hazardous areas.

• Complete work on schedule for installing the public radio system and activating cellular service in the tunnels as work is completed, with certain Blue/Orange and Red Line segments coming online in 2017.

Service -- Reduce delays and offloads from track defects and railcar failures

• Complete the nearly year-long SafeTrack initiative for preventive maintenance. Metro's proposed preventive maintenance plan is the first of its kind for the agency and provides industry grade standards. Preventive maintenance is the "anti-SafeTrack" that prevents emergency conditions and will begin to cut infrastructure related delays to trains in half.

• Execute a "Get Well" plan for railcars. Accelerate the retirement of the oldest and most unreliable cars, commission a total of 50 new trains, implement targeted repair campaigns of defective components on the legacy fleet, and rebalance the rail yards to avoid missing terminal dispatches.

• By the end of 2017, all 8-car trains will be 7000 Series consists

All 1000 Series cars will be retired before December 2017

• Accelerate retirement of least reliable (4000 Series) cars -- all 100 removed from service by end of 2017, subject to NTSB agreement; released from the burden of bellying and operating with the least reliable cars, rebalance rail yards to have the right number of trains per line for the start of service every morning as well as the afternoon peak.

• Begin operating same series consists to improve train line performance

• Complete component fixes on legacy fleet -- 2000, 3000, 5000 and 6000 Series cars, including HVAC, propulsion systems, and pneumatic brakes to reduce train offloads

• Finish replacing carpet with resilient flooring on 6000 Series cars

• The Railcar Get Well Plan will reduce passenger offloads and cut delays due to train car issues by 25% in 2017.

Make stations cleaner and brighter, and improve station management, to better serve customers

• Instead of every four years, all 91 stations will be power washed, scrubbed, and polished annually -- improving the surfaces commuters touch and walk on.

• Each station will be assigned a "champion" among senior managers to work with station personnel to ensure internal coordination of timely repairs to equipment and systems.

Stations undergoing major renovations next year will also receive lighting upgrades that increases brightness and visibility on mezzanines and platforms.

• Adopt peer review recommendations to improve rail operations, including Rail Operations Control Center structural changes to streamline responsibilities, clarify duties, strengthen incident response, better manage station operations, and improve passenger information.

• Leverage Geographic Information System (GIS) technology to integrate real-time traffic data for bus operations.

Begin testing a zero emission, battery powered bus that could become the bus fleet vehicle of the future.

Financial Management -- Balance the budget and secure regional governance and funding solution

• Further reduce expenses by eliminating a total of 1,000 positions

• Outsource functions including certain quality assurance programs

• Decrease reliance on federal funds for maintenance

• Board approval of Reality Check Fiscal Year 2018 budget to fully fund annual requirements

• Secure regional support for PRIAA reauthorization to continue funding safety and reliability critical capital projects

• Deliver 90% of the capital program

• Institute the AbilitiesRide pilot program for Maryland paratransit customers to demonstrate whether customers select private transportation services for their subsidized trips, or continue to use MetroAccess. If successful, all trips subsidized by the program will cost Metro 66% less than comparable MetroAccess trips.

• Metro will also actively engage with stakeholders who have started conversations around governance and funding solutions.

Source: https://www.wmata.com/about/back2good/initiatives.cfm

The question remains, though, whether these steps will be sufficient to reverse the current declines in ridership, revenues and rider confidence levels. Therefore, a viable methodology must be used to measure the effectiveness of current and future safety-related initiatives implemented by the Metro and these issues are discussed further below.

In order to achieve the Metro's proposed objectives outlined in Table 1 above, it will be necessary to conduct a time-series analysis by first establishing ridership benchmarks in order to measure the impact of each initiative. According to Neuman (2009), time-series analysis is "any research that takes place over time in which different people or cases may be looked at in each time point" (p. 546). This step can be accomplished by using the same techniques that are currently being employed by the Maryland Department of Transportation as shown in Table 2 and depicted graphically in Figure 1 below.

Table 2. WMATA ridership levels -- Maryland: Fiscal years 2011 through 2016

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

123,177,000

126,797,000

123,277,000

121,243,000

122,800,000

114,252,000

Fig. 1. WMATA ridership levels -- Maryland: Fiscal years 2011 through 2016

Source: http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/Pubs/BudgetFiscal/2016fy-budget-docs-operating-J00A0104-MDOT-WMATA- -- Operating-Budget.pdf

Following this step, the impact of achieving the study's overarching objective and each of the goals listed above can be measured quantitatively by comparing future ridership levels with benchmarks to evaluate their effectiveness in achieving the desired outcomes. In addition, achieving the foregoing goals will also require a systematic review of the relevant literature to identify best industry practices used by other major metropolitan transportation networks. These strategies will follow the project schedule set forth at Appendix A.

Although there are no specific ethical issues involved in the data collection process, it will be essential to obtain the cooperation of the Metro management in order to obtain the requisite ridership data needed for the evaluation of the effectiveness of each safety-related initiative. It is expected that the validity of the collected data will be sound but the findings that emerge from the proposed study may not be replicable given the unique focus of the research. This unique focus will also limit the generalizability of the findings that result from this methodology.

References

Anderson, T (2005, December). 'Transit Security.' Security Management, Vol. 49, No. 12, pp. 110-113.

'Back2Good initiatives.' (2016). Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. [online] available: https://www.wmata.com/about/back2good/initiatives.cfm

Birr, S (2016, July 23). 'Good Enough For Government Work: Pay Continues To Rise For DC Metro.' The Daily Caller. [online] available: http://dailycaller.com/2016/07/23/good-enough-for-government-work-pay-continues-to-rise-for-dc-metro/#ixzz4UjYdSuh0.

Bownman, B (2015, June 9). 'WMATA, Facing $50M Cut, Urged to Address Safety Issues.' Roll Call, p. 2.

Browning, JG (2014, January). 'Emerging Technology and Its Impact on Automotive Litigation.' Defense Counsel Journal, Vol. 81, No. 1, pp. 83-86.

Giaritelli, A (2016, March 16). 'D.C. Metro Will Reopen Thursday Following Safety Checks.' Examiner (Washington, D.C.), p. 3.

Hanley, RE (2009). Moving People, Goods, and Information: The Cutting-Edge Infrastructures of Networked Cities. London: Routledge.

McElhatton, J (2010, December 21). 'Metro Pays during 13-Year Leave; Driver Gets Cash to Clean His Uniform.' The Washington Times, p. A01.

'Metro facts' (2016). Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. [online] available: https://www.wmata.com/about/upload/Metro-Facts-2016.pdf.

Neuman, WL (2009). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Aapproaches. New York: Allyn & Bacon.

Riggs, M (2009, May). 'Bag Check: Metro Search and Seizure.' Reason, Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 13.

Wiederfeld, P. (2017). Message to customers: Back2Good. WMATA. [online] available: https://www.wmata.com/about/back2good/message.cfm

Wilson, JM and Jackson, BA (2007). Securing America's Passenger-Rail Systems. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.

'WMATA history.' (2017). Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. [online] available: https://www.wmata.com/about/history.cfm.

Appendix A

Project schedule

Goal

• Identify and describe the public perception of WMATA performance, compare and contrast with simpler transit system;

• Identify and describe WMATA failure in meeting performance requirements include but not limited to:

o Factors contributing to not achieving headways,

o Factors contributing to not achieving on time performance,

o System safety requirements,

o System assurance requirements -- system availability, equipment reliability, and equipment maintainability.

• Examine WMATA customer service and public relation process exists at the agency, and to highlight similarities between Metro and other transit systems around the world that experienced similar issues.

•Develop a systematic Emergency Management System (EMS) approach that is unique to the Washington DC Metro Transit with the aim of reducing emergency impact.

• Provide a comprehensive review of literatures and other agencies' practices in relation to constraint analysis and outline a conceptual framework for system public relation management.