Case study examination and analysis

Question 1
A military end state refers to a number of vivid signs that signify all military goals have been accomplished. These signs are part of the standards used to indicate the end of a given military operation. They actually point out that the military is no longer the main device in the government’s hand in accomplishing further goals. As such, it is important for the military end state to be definite and straightforward. A number of easily determinable signs should be provided. The military should also be able to come to these signs in the course of its operations. With a distinct military end state, the key stakeholders are able to set major goals which can be mutually worked on. The stakeholders are also in a better position to plan similar operations in the future (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017).
In this case study, the military end state was signified by the total surrender of the Iraqi forces, wherein they called back all their soldiers from Kuwait. Having done this, the government was in a good position to strategize the next course of action. Additionally, the US government added some simple goals which had to be accomplished before the military end state was officially declared. Such included the reestablishment of local security and granting locals unpaid-for access to energy reserves. There was however some bone of contention between the military end state and the officials of Desert Storm. This surprisingly made the achievement of the laid out goals much easier and acted as a reference point for post-war goals. The logical goal of giving back Kuwait its independence and political stability resulted into a distinct military end state when Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait and the Republican Guard was destroyed. After these events, new national goals were set to facilitate the changeover from a militaristic state to a diplomatic state (Hardy, McIntyre III & Knight, 2009).
Question 2
An array of difficulties made it hard for the Schwarzkopf and Coalition forces to defeat the Iraqi army. To single out such difficulties, it is important to take into account important instructions, the status of the prevailing operating environment and the status of a perceived ideal environment. The differences between these factors point out the difficulties that must be faced. Not many people were happy with the manner in which Schwarzkopf brought the war to an end. Some blame him for not being mindful of the Republican Guard divisions. They claim it would have been better to bring the war to an end before the Guard divisions were marooned and unable to fight (Hardy, McIntyre III & Knight, 2009).
There is a possibility that the marines moved to the right at such a high speed that Schwarzkopf could not manage them. This led to the total destruction of the Republican Guard. This destruction was also facilitated by the fact that the Republican Guard offered little very resistance. Schwarzkopf did not really know how to bring the war to an end. The US leaders had simply set their goals, but it was still unclear how Schwarzkopf was expected to handle it. This is the reason why some ended up branding him as too pessimistic. In general, he was in quite a difficult place to make the right decision (Hardy, McIntyre III & Knight, 2009).
In a bid to redeem time and space before enough soldiers were brought to the battlefield, the government decided to send a few soldiers with anti-tank weapons to try and combat the Iraqi forces. The few soldiers were requested to safeguard the important ports and smartly attack the Iraqis until they received more reinforcement (Hardy, McIntyre III & Knight, 2009).
Question 3
The Republican Guard Force Command (RGFC) was wrongly labeled as the Centre of Gravit (COG) for Iraq. The RGFC was made up of the most devoted and best-armed soldiers. However, its combat power was an equivalent of only 20%. They had been subjected to the best training and handed the best armor. Initially, the RGFC was designed to safeguard the government. The government, however, turned it to an elite offensive force following the onset of the war. Soldiers and other staff employed by RGFC were honored with cash rewards, new vehicles, and hefty house allowances. By the time the war with Iran was coming to an end, the RGFC had grown to 8 divisions. When you add this number to the autonomous infantry and the artillery brigades, they made up 20% of the entire Iraqi ground forces (Hardy, McIntyre III & Knight, 2009).
The ordinary army had over 50 divisions by mid-1990, as well as extra Special Forces, and specially designed forces meant for movements and weaponry management. A majority of the divisions were infantry, but there was still a good number of armored and mechanized troops. A section of the armored troops possessed the latest Western and Soviet equipment. The rest were given Soviet and Chinese machinery dating back to the 1960s (Hardy, McIntyre III & Knight, 2009).
b) The assessment of the Republican Guard cannot be complete with a look into the Iraqi military dogma. The RGFC was adequately able to attack and capture Kuwait, and take control of its resources. They were also in a position to attack Saudi Arabia and stop Coalition forces from gaining access to the country. This was possible since they had the following in their possession: RGFC w/8 divisions of T-72 tanks, SCUD missiles, APCs, Iraqi Air Force warfighter-bombers, howitzers, Iraqi Air Defense, the Iraqi army, and good roads for transport. Some of the challenges they faced include poor communication lines, C2 nodes, poor logistics systems and IADS capacity (Hardy, McIntyre III & Knight, 2009).
Question 4
The coalition forces were greatly disadvantaged by poor combat capacity. They had no ready soldiers to deploy when urgently needed. They also had inadequate equipment for quickly lifting the soldiers and their machinery from the ships. Worse still, they seriously lacked sustainment infrastructure. As the war progressed, there was a continuous problem of transportation. The soldiers could not access the places they needed to in a good time. When the soldiers spread to some considerable distance from their base, coordination became quite a big problem (Hardy, McIntyre III & Knight, 2009).
The above problems were made even worse by limited seaports. The soldiers could not enter the country secretly. The Iraqi forces would always get to know the number and strength of the forces which had freshly arrived. They could therefore never ambush the Iraqi forces unknowingly. The Iraqi were also in a position to gain control of the ports and stop the coalition forces from sending in more soldiers (Hardy, McIntyre III & Knight, 2009).
Question 5
The campaign kicked off by what came to be dubbed as Operation DESERT SHIELD. As earlier mentioned, the Coalition forces had limited resources to facilitate the delivery of war machinery to various battlefields. Due to this, they focused on the space element of war, instead of the time element. In other words, they took complete control of the important ports and aircraft runways to ensure all soldiers get into Saudi Arabia. The 2nd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division was their favorite machinery for this task. They used the tanks to form an impenetrable perimeter barrier around Dharan airfield and Al Jubay seaport. Meanwhile, the battlefield was being prepared for subsequent operations (Hardy, McIntyre & Knight, 2009).
The initial phase of Operation Desert Storm was characterized by a massive show of airpower. Airborne weapons would attack from the land as wells as the sea. The soldiers on land also invaded the Iraqi air defense forces and destroyed their radars. This was meant to give the coalition forces complete control of the Iraqi air and make it impossible for the Iraqi forces to carry out their operations (Hardy, McIntyre III & Knight, 2009).
As the Coalition air forces were striking the Iraqi forces from all corners, the land soldiers were employing guerilla tactics to secretly ambush the Iraqis. For instance, two divisions positioned themselves to attack the weak western arm of the Iraqi forces. Meanwhile, the coalition forces made a threat to invade from the eastern side. The Iraqis, therefore, moved in big numbers to the east, unaware of the impending attack on the west (Hardy, McIntyre III & Knight, 2009).
Question 6
Desert Storm operation was largely successful because of the elaborate planning by the coalition forces. In addition to the aforementioned tactics, they also made good use of effects and a concealed approach plan. These can be seen in the fake threats to attack from the sea while the actual attack was on land. Effects in this context refer to the requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to accomplish certain goals. Saddam took the threats of sea attack quite seriously. The Iraqi forces ended up greatly scattered to such extent that it was easy to overpower them (Hardy, McIntyre III & Knight, 2009).
The indirect approach strategy is very handy to a force that is not overly superior to the enemy. As such, the aim is to invade the weak sections of the forces after they are scattered. Once the coalition forces threatened to attack from the sea, the commanders of the Iraqi forces faced hard decisions to make. They decided to send a considerable number of soldiers to safeguard the sea. This made the remaining forces weak and the coalition forces took full advantage of this vulnerability (Hardy, Mcintyre III & Knight, 2009)References
Andrews, W. F. (1998). Airpower against an Army: Challenge and Response in CENTAF\\'s Duel with the Republican Guard. DIANE Publishing.
Bame, D. J. (2001). The Exit Strategy Myth and the End State Reality. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Quantico VA.
Builder, C. H., Bankes, S. C., & Nordin, R. (1999). Command concepts: A theory derived from the practice of command and control. RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST SANTA MONICA CA.
Currie Jr, J. G. (1995). Operational Logistics, War and Operations Other Than War: What Applies?. Army Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth Ks. School of Advanced Military Studies.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2017). Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning. Washigton, DC, Aug.
Matsunaga, H. (2019). The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003: Learning from Its Successes and Failures.