Irregular Warfare and United States

Introduction
Irregular warfare refers to the violent process through which various non-state and state actors fight for influence and legitimacy over populations. While the full might of military power may be employed, irregular warfare generally uses asymmetric and indirect approaches to reduce the power, will, and influence of the adversary. Because of the irregular approaches, such a process is usually very “messy” and the actions during such a war cannot be distilled into a clear definite and repeatable process. The process is usually characterized by terrorism, counterterrorism, insurgency, and counterinsurgency (Department of Defense Washington DC, 2017).
Just like in any organization, the execution of war takes place at various levels from the tactical level to the top strategic level. One can understand irregular warfare by breaking it down into various levels. At the top strategic level, influence and control over the target population determine irregular warfare. At the operational level, there is a focus on carrying out war campaigns and operations. On the ground at the tactical level, the personnel focus on the application of the indirect and asymmetric warfare tactics and procedures. The goal as would be in any other kind of warfare is to achieve the strategic goals and win. When a war is won, the winner gets to exert dominance and control over the conquered territory, military force, and population (Department of Defense Washington DC, 2017).
Organizational Stressors during Irregular Warfare
To erode and undermine the will, influence, and power of the adversary, irregular warfare usually utilizes attrition, exhaustion, subversion, and coercion. The result is that they get to exercise political authority and dominance over the conquered population and their military force. The term “irregular’ is used because the aggressor has the strategic goal of gaining and maintaining influence and control over the conquered population by using economic, psychological, and political methods. In the long-term, most populations generally gravitate towards legitimate governments that they have chosen to represent them. Where people are being led by a dictatorship, the dissatisfaction can be taken advantage of by an irregular force to overthrow the government or take control over various administrative regions from the central government (Department of Defense Washington DC, 2017).
There are different mindsets and modes of operations that apply to irregular warfare whose focus is to control a population rather than defeat an enemy as is the case in regular warfare. The general dynamics of warfare haven’t changed much over the centuries. Since the beginning of time, wars have been clashes between organized groups fighting over various interests. In the 21st century, the organized groups extend beyond organized groups represented by states and governmental borders. There are regular and irregular armed forces with competing interests today and some of them do not operate under internationally accepted standards and conventions of war (Department of Defense Washington DC, 2017).
Insurgency and counterinsurgency represent a big portion of irregular warfare activity today. The goal of insurgency is to overthrow and take the place of an established political structure and government. Usually, insurgency and counterinsurgency may involve terrorist and counterterrorist activities. Nonetheless, terrorist activities can be standalone irregular warfare activities with their own ends. The goal of such terrorist activities is to intimidate governments and populations without the need to overthrow the established political structure. Also, such activities may be carried out to exert revenge for real or imagined wrongs (Department of Defense Washington DC, 2017).
While insurgency is an irregular warfare phenomenon, certain aspects of its execution mirror those of conventional warfare military activities. For instance, part of the operations includes stabilization, transition, security, and reconstruction processes. These processes are crucial for the insurgents to gain legitimacy and be deemed successful. Further, collaborations with other actors can also see the exercise attract humanitarian help in the form of disaster relief. Nonetheless, it is notable that the various aspects of irregular warfare such as psychological operations, information and intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and civil-military activities impact irregular warfare in unique ways that may not mirror how they impact regular combat campaigns (Department of Defense Washington DC, 2017).
Army History Involving Irregular Warfare
Irregular warfare occurs in microclimates which are very specific and unique environments. Policymakers, military commanders, and intelligence personnel have sought to understand the dynamics that control such unique settings over the years. The unusual settings present two unique challenges and problems. First, the fundamental elements such as politics, religion, history, ecology, and geography are complicated (Davis, 2010). Second, these elements cannot be taken at face value as they are nuanced and ever-evolving. For instance, in the case of geography, an understanding of the Arab history does not guarantee that one understands the current dynamics between prominent families and clans. Intelligence personnel face several challenges in collecting and analyzing information and data at such a level. This is true for all intelligence personnel in legitimate governments and those among the ranks of illegal warfare operations (White, 1996).
Taking Baghdad as an example, the coordination and synchronization of the battle was not to emerge victorious in war, but to cement peace. High-level strategy went beyond synchronizing battleground operations, but also into building local infrastructure, improving education facilities, creating jobs, training local security personnel, and establishing a local intelligence framework that would support these local operations. Millions of Iraqi citizens rose against the terrorist and insurgency activities that were threatening the state in a manner that had never before been seen in the Middle East. Their resolve to try democracy in their own unique way ushered in a new era that promised a better and more stable future for the people. Systems such as sewage systems, wired electricity, and piped water that had been destroyed by unending irregular war were slowly restored and improved the livelihood of the people. Sadr City residents made tremendous progress towards restoring the basic infrastructure of their city. Task Force Baghdad soldiers and leaders showed extraordinary leadership in synchronizing the various elements necessary in the implementation of the “first mile” project (Lunberg, 2006).
One of the things that were integral to these infrastructure improvement projects was the promotion of the capacity and legitimacy of the local Iraqi Government as an institution capable of governing the local population. The ability of the government to provide security, safety, and a friendlier environment for commerce disarmed insurgents and other agents waging irregular war of their psychological power over the people. It was not easy to change the mindset of the population, though. The religious, clan, and tribal influences in Baghdad have histories spanning thousands of years with various levels of conflict for the previous three decades. Further, corruption had been ingrained in the culture and this presented a unique challenge in ensuring that the government officials acted in good faith and stuck to the democratic ideals the people wanted (Lundberg, 2006).
Armies can always draw from their histories to inspire irregular war strategy. While modularity is great, implementing radical changes to mission strategies and requirements may be suboptimal when the adversary is employing irregular war strategies. A traditional approach allows a cavalry to quickly adapt to the elements characteristic of irregular war environments. Where there is a lot of uncertainty, having fewer variables is better. The process of executing a multi-operational campaign should be grounded on doctrinal, cultural, contemporary, and historical analysis. A military force will quickly realize that it is necessary to simultaneously work with all operational lines in an interconnected and balanced manner (Lundberg, 2006).
Ways of Achieving Organizational Readiness
The outcome of a combat campaign is determined by the level of preparation of the units involved in the war, their ability to adapt as circumstances change on the ground, and the leadership ability of the generals. Field grade officers play a crucial role in providing resources needed by the leaders of the small units. These resources include money, intelligence, and training. The collective effort can win a combat against an adversary in both regular and irregular warfare (Davis, 2010).
Today, organizational readiness must include adoption and proficiency in modern military technology. However, it is notable that irregular warfare has not been disrupted by technology. In irregular warfare, factors such as history, psychology, and sociology play a much bigger role in designing the dynamics of the conflict including the intensity and persistence (White, 1996). A counterinsurgency campaign must, therefore, rebuild the trust and confidence of the people in their legitimate government and promote a sense of patriotic nation building among the people. It is hard for an insurgency movement to arise among populations that are well fed, secured, properly housed, clothed, and productively employed. In the same vein, it is fruitless running a counterinsurgency operation without putting an effort into improving the livelihood of the people (Davis, 2010).
Organizational readiness should also involve welcoming various third parties such as NGOs to provide support and aid to local governments and communities. Such NGOs can identify areas that can be potentially exploited to work towards winning a combat or building good will with the population to win them over. The organizations can also help in promoting commerce by building business centers, warehousing units, and developing a town’s general capacity for business (Lundberg, 2006).
References
Davis, R. G. (Ed.). (2010). US Army and Irregular Warfare 1775-2007: Selected Papers From the 2007 Conference of Army Historians: Selected Papers From the 2007 Conference of Army Historians. Government Printing Office.
Department of Defense Washington DC, (2017). Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC). Washington: 2007. 100 p. Cit, 03-02
Lundberg, K. (2006). The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq. Kennedy School of Government, Case Program.
White, J. B. (1996). A different kind of threat: Some thoughts on irregular warfare.