U.S. National Strategy What Three United States

U.S. National Strategy

What three United States national interests do you think will be at great risk over the next five years? Describe those interests and identify which instruments of national power can be leveraged to protect or advance those national interests and how those instruments can be used.

As President Obama stated in his addresses to Congress in February 2009, the most important problem that the country faced was the economy, which was in the worst recession since the 1930s. This affected both domestic and foreign policy, since the country would probably have to reduce military spending and its commitments overseas as it did during the Great Depression, so for the Obama administration economic recovery was the primary goal. He did promise that "the weight of this crisis will not determine the destiny of this nation" (Obama Address, 2009, p. 1). He promised that the government would deal with unemployment, lack of affordable housing and health care, a failing education system, energy self-sufficiency, revival of the auto industry, an unfair tax system, and weak regulation of the financial system, so that the recession would not be endless. In bringing about economy recovery, the U.S. would not act unilaterally but in cooperation with the G-20 and other international organizations, and with developing nations to ensure that they do not face further catastrophic declines in living standards. For the last three years, in fact, economic revival of the global economy has been at the heart of the strategy and planning of the Obama administration, to prevent the world from sliding into a 1930s-style Depression.

In foreign policy, Obama promised to be more transparent about the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to wind down the nation building operation in Iraq in his first term, which was done. There would also be a new strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan to defeat Al Qaeda, and the president promised that he would not "allow terrorists to plot against the American people from safe havens half a world away" (Obama Address, p. 6). Over the past three years, the use of aerial drones to attack Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders has increased, along with unconventional warfare against terrorist groups, such as the SEAL team that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011. President Obama also promised a "new era of engagement" with the world, including new efforts to secure peace between Israel and the Palestinians, which has not occurred yet. In general, the U.S. would strengthen alliances and "use all elements of our national power" to deal with 21st Century problems such as terrorism, epidemics, nuclear proliferation and global poverty. He pledged to work closely with the G-20 on international economic problems and to avoid a return to protectionism, which would also be a regression into a 1930s-type Depression on the global level. In all these policies, the administration would work with coalitions and allies as much as possible to defeat terrorist groups, to deny safe havens to Al Qaida and affiliated organizations, prevent the spread of WMDs and deal with other urgent social, economic and environmental problems.

2. What are three possible ends you would expect to see in President Obama's National Security Strategy based upon the policy objectives contained in the C202 readings?

Among the most important goals of President Obama's National Security Strategy (NSS 2010) is to defeat Al Qaida and its affiliated global terrorist networks, protect the homeland against attack, prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMDs, and secure cyberspace from attack by state and non-state actors. The war against Al Qaida requires a strong alliance with Muslim countries, denying safe havens to terrorists, and an "integrated campaign that judiciously applies every tool of American power -- both military and civilian -- as well as the concerted efforts of like-minded states and multilateral institutions" (NSS, p. 19). This is not a global war against Islam but a specific terror network that uses certain tactics to attack the United States and its allies. To prevent attacks on the homeland, the federal government will continue to work with state and local police forces to share intelligence about suspicious activities, entrap possible terrorists, and improve information sharing and communications. It will improve screening technologies and enforce stricter travel bans, collaborating bilaterally, regionally and internationally to identify terrorists. By 2013, the government also planned to have secured all vulnerable nuclear materials to prevent them from falling into the hands of Al Qaida.

Most of Al Qaida's leadership was still in Pakistan, so the military and CIA would intensify surveillance, drone attacks and special operations against these targets, such as the SEAL team that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011. Since this area in the "epicenter" of violent Islamic extremism, another important goal will be to deny the Taliban and Al Qaida control of territorial bases from which they can attack the U.S. And its allies (NSS, p. 20). They must be blocked from establishing similar bases and safe havens in any region if the world, but first and foremost the policy has been to strengthen the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and to improve the training and equipment of Afghan security forces. Linked with this effort, the U.S. And its allies will attempt to improve governance at all levels in Afghanistan, root out corruption, support human rights and economic development and create "a strong, stable, and prosperous Afghanistan" (NSS, p. 21). The U.S. government would also work with Pakistan to strengthen democracy and economic development there, as well as providing security assistance to combat the Taliban and Al Qaida there. In addition, if Al Qaida attempts to set up safe havens in North Africa, Yemen, the Sahel or Somalia, the U.S. will exert all necessary pressure to prevent it, although obviously the recent revolutions in the Middle East have complicated these efforts and the outcome is uncertain. Use of torture against terror suspects will not be allowed, though, and if possible all terror suspects will be arrested and tried according to due process of law. In addition, the Obama administration signaled its attention to close down the detention facility at Guantanamo, although this has not happened yet.

The greatest threat to the American people was an attack by terrorists possessing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Cold War stockpiles in these weapons and materials still exist, as do black markets trading in them, while many countries have been disregarding nonproliferation agreements. All of this makes a nuclear attack more likely, which is why U.S. policy favors a global reduction in the development of WMDs and assigns "top priority" to preventing their proliferation (NSS, p. 22). Towards this end, the administration signed and ratified a new START agreement with Russia and also reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its own national security planning, while calling for a new Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The U.S. will also continue its efforts to de-nuclearize the Korean peninsula and prevent Iran from acquiring WMDs, and will continue to isolate both countries diplomatically and economically if they refuse to negotiate on this issue.

3. Describe the process whereby a Geographic Combatant Commander translates strategic level guidance into theater shaping activities, and should those shaping activities fail the process by which he arrives at an executable operation plan.

The United States fights wars with all instruments of national power, including military, diplomatic, economic and mass communications, and the President uses the military to achieve national strategic objectives. National strategic direction is transmitted from the President and National Security Council to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and then to theater and subordinate commanders (JP 3-0 Chapter I). As Harry Yarger points out, strategy is not planning, but rather planning is the bridge between planning and execution. Setting goals and objectives is the most important aspect of strategic planning, and is these are not right then the strategy is doomed to failure from the outset (Yarger, p. 1). Planning, coordination and guidance then takes place among the Joint Staff and Combat Commanders (CCDRs). In addition, the U.S. Government also uses Strategic Communications to advance its "interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power" JP 3-0 I-1). CCDRs then translate overall strategic direction from the President, Secretary of Defense and JCS into courses of action (COAs) to match the local situation. Sometimes the effort will be mainly military and in others to support diplomatic, political and humanitarian efforts carried out by other agencies. CCDRs also provide "strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement; establish constraints and restraints; and define policies and concepts of operations to be integrated into operation plans (OPLANs)" (JP 3-0 I-2). Subordinate CCDRs have the duty to ensure that their plans, operations and policies are in accord with those of the CCDR.

Theater Strategy Determination uses strategic concepts and COAs to secure the objectives of national strategy and integrated use of all instruments of national power. CCDRs determine theater strategy "based on analysis of changing events in the operational environment and the development of options to set conditions for success" (JP 3-0 I-3). They are expected to modify old plans or formulate new ones based on changing conditions in the operational environment or new directives from national command authorities. In their theaters, these estimates will also be based on less comprehensive efforts of subordinate commanders, and will be focused on threats and also "consider other circumstances affecting the military situation as they develop and analyze COAs" (JP 3-0 I-4). Commanders use strategic estimates to determine the likely intent of the enemy and consider alternatives in a continuous process. Theater Strategic Concepts describe the types of operations to be conducted, when and where, and the forces to be used. They should always "incorporate a variety of factors including nuclear and conventional deterrence, current or potential alliances or coalitions, forces available, command and control (C2) capabilities, intelligence assets, mobilization, deployment, sustainability, and anticipated stability measures" (JP 3-0 I-5). This will include deployment of both nuclear and conventional forces, special operations units, use of space assets and satellites, logistics, interagency cooperation, combat support, with the overall goal of controlling political and military events in the theater. The estimate will include assigned objectives from national command authorities, the relation between the theater environment and accomplishment of these objectives, assessments of threats and risks, and the availability of resources to accomplish the mission. They will consider and integrate other, non-military instruments of power, including civilian agencies, the media and NGOs, and how the operation will be terminated once the objectives have been met. Of course, only the President, NSC and Secretary of Defense can order an operation to end, though, but termination should always be considered from the time that planning begins.

4. How does the 2008 National Defense Strategy counterbalance the U.S. Department of Defense's natural tendency to focus excessively on winning conventional conflicts rather than irregular wars?

Protection of democratic values is always uppermost, but the threats in the 21st Century will not come only from hostile states armed with weapons of mass destruction, but the environment, conflicts over natural resources, natural disasters, pandemics like AIDS and tuberculosis and threats from cyberspace. To prevail, the U.S. government will have to "harness and integrate all aspects of national power and work closely with a wide range of allies, friends and partners. We cannot prevail if we act alone" (NDS 2008, p. 1). One key to success will be by promoting democracy, good government, social justice and economic development in the poorer nations. From the military viewpoint it will require strengthening alliances around the world to defeat terrorist networks, prevent attacks with WMDs and defuse regional conflicts. In the immediate future, the overriding conflict will be against a "violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state." As well as rogue states like Iran and North Korea and their threats to use WMDs (NDS, p. 2). Al Queda is similar to communism and fascism in the past, if not in its specific ideology but in threatening the international system as whole, opposing democracy, human rights and self-determination, and exploiting crises and conflicts for its own purposes.

Many countries in the 21st century are failed states or lack the ability to police themselves and their own borders against international and regional terrorist groups. These groups are not tied to any states and "frequently exploit local geographical, political, or social conditions to establish safe havens from which they can operate with impunity" (NDS, p. 3). Many countries are often poorly governed or completely ungoverned, and an international effort is necessary to stabilize them and improve social, economic and political conditions. Iran is attempting to destabilize the weak governments of Iraq and Afghanistan and also attempting the proliferation of WMDs into the hands of terrorists groups. North Korea is a chronic threat to the Republic of Korea and is also involved in the proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons, counterfeiting and the sale of narcotics. Both Iran and North Korea are brutally repressive toward their own people as well.

In the future, the U.S. may also face a greater military challenge from more powerful states like China, just as it is involved in economic and trade competition at present. This military threat could take familiar and conventional forms, or it might take place in outer space or cyberspace, through hacking attacks on the U.S. government and civilian economy. In the 21st Century, China "will continue to expand its conventional military capabilities, emphasizing anti-access and area denial assets including developing a full range of long-range strike, space, and information warfare capabilities" (NDS, p. 3). Under Vladmir Putin, Russia has also moved away from democracy and in a more authoritarian direction, away from arms control and force reduction negotiations and threats against countries like Georgia and Ukraine for attempting to join NATO. These actions indicate that Russia is "exploring renewed influence and seeking a greater international role" (NDS, p. 4). Over the next century, non-state actors and their sponsors are also going to rely on unconventional and asymmetric methods to counter U.S. military capabilities, and the DOD will have to develop more effective countermeasures. They will use the new Internet technologies to disrupt American civilian and military communications, and launch cyber-attacks before the U.S. government is even aware of the threat. For this reason, we "must develop better intelligence capabilities to detect, recognize, and analyze new forms of warfare as well as explore joint approaches and strategies to counter them" (NDS, p. 6). New technologies will interact with globalization, and rapid social, cultural and environmental change to create new and unanticipated areas of vulnerability and instability that are unpredictable.

5. Provide three examples from the critical findings of the "MNF-I Strategic Communication Study Paper" (C207 Reading B) where the Ambassador, the Commander or "Key Leadership Engagement" are associated with a critical finding.

The Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) commander was the driving force behind the improvement in strategic communications in Iraq in 2007-08 and insisted on a "a comprehensive and coherent campaign plan and a much more attuned and educated staff to execute the plan" (MNF Report). He ensured that Operation Iraqi Freedom was revised so that strategic communications became integrated into all operations and planning, and that contractors were hired to fill specialized roles where no such experts existed within the command. Only very recently had the Department of Defense (DOD) recognized the importance of information control and strategic communication in counterinsurgency and nation building operations like Iraq. These capabilities did not exist when the war began in 2003, nor were they considered vital, and this "significantly undermined the overall reconstruction progress" (MNF Report). This reform came about after the report of an inspection team made up of the deputy public affairs officers from each Service, which recommended thirty major changes in communications. In February 2008, the MNF Chief of Staff then requested a report on "strategic communication best practices and to consider potential doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities" (MNF Report).

The Iraq MNF was dealing with a very complicated counterinsurgency war involving various tribes, regions, and international actors, along with Al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM), which "actively wages communication warfare using advanced global technologies and considers winning the war of ideas to be a precondition for victory in Jihad" (MNF Report). In a world of instant communications and electronic media, any action or event can be recorded and distributed worldwide almost immediately, and often deliberately distorted and used against the United States. In the Iraq War, most of the Iraqi and Arabic media were hostile, and eager to report all political and military failures.

Senior MNF commanders understood that they had to counter this with their own media and communications strategy. They had to ensure that accurate information reached all the media outlets, Iraqi leaders and the civilian population first, before Al Qaeda and the insurgents were able to broadcast their own version of events. This was an information war that had to be fought every day and "the MNF-I commander took personal interest and responsibility for MNF-I strategic communication" MNF Report). Contractors were hired for polling, political campaigns, interpreting, media monitoring and assessment, and these were responsible for the successes in 2007-08. Important principles of Strategic Communications include the need for perceived truthfulness, understanding of others, respect for the exchange of ideas, awareness that every action sends a mess and unity of effort in reaching the right audience with the right message. Since 2007, the MFN commander "has taken ownership and ultimate responsibility for strategic communications actions and has challenged the entire staff to synchronize messages and activities in order to support the objectives and goals of each and every campaign line of operation" (MNF Report).

Senior leaders demanded that communications take account of all relevant political, social and economic factors in Iraq. Despite major improvements in communications, though, the "ability to capture accurate and timely data on the level of influence the communication efforts have on Iraqi population perceptions and attitudes remains a difficult undertaking" (MNF Report). There are many regional variations in Iraq with widely different goals, and not all have been equally involved in reconstruction and nation building operations. Not all are equally open to the MNF message, nor was it the only influence on Iraqi society, since religious and political figures, trusted friends, neighbors and authority figures outside of the media had alternative messages, and public opinion polling could not track all these influences. MNF was far more skilled in strategic communications than it had been in 2003 but more work was "needed to detail requirements, positions, and desired skills and experience so that qualified people can be identified" (MNF Report). For the U.S. Department of Defense, strategic communications was still a new activity with rapidly changing policies and doctrines. Iraq was a proving ground for these new concepts, and the lessons learned about organization, technology and processes should be further refined and shared with other commands that will offer commanders "realistic and relevant information about the capabilities required for a comprehensive program that effectively integrates strategic communication as a core aspect of overall operations" (MNF Report).

6. What is the mission of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and how does its mission differ from that of the Defense Logistics Agency?

NO INFORMATION ABOUT THIS QUESTION WAS AVAILABLE IN THE SOURCES

7. What are the ends, ways, and means of the attached Comprehensive Regional Strategy on Somalia: A Strategy for U.S. Engagement?

Somalia has been a failed state since the early-1990s and it remains so today, although U.S. policy has been to assist the country in rebuilding some type of central government and institutions, provide for economic and humanitarian needs, promote regional stability and prevent Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups from using it as a base. All of these problems are extremely deep and complex, and they have no military solution but rather involve "a process of inclusive dialogue and reconciliation between the TFIs and key stakeholders in Somalia, including business leaders, clan elders, civil society, women's groups, and moderate Islamists" (Somalia Report 2007). The U.S. government is working with other states in attempting to establish a Transitional Federal Charter and Transitional Federal Institutions, and organizing international assistance to help rebuild social and economic life. To accomplish these goals and prepare for eventual elections, all sectors of Somalia society will have to engage in real political dialogue and power-sharing. In addition, the African Union and Arab League agreed to deploy an international peacekeeping force, including 1,500 Ugandan troops and the creation of a new civilian police force. At present, the Transitional Federal Institutions are extremely fragile and "given the absence of functioning institutions in Somalia for over 15 years, the rebuilding of law enforcement, judicial, health, education, and other services will largely be starting from scratch and will require significant external assistance" (Somalia Report). Foreign assistance from the U.S. And international donors is designed to support the revival of civil society and the economy, improve health care and education, and reaching out to the Somali diaspora community that send remittances of $800 million to $1 billion per year.

Somalia has not had a national government since 1991, which has turned the country into a safe haven for pirates, criminal elements and international terrorists. In this area, the U.S. has been working with the East African states, Yemen and the Arab League to "help build better counterterrorism capabilities that will protect U.S. interests as well as the people of the entire region" (Somalia Report). It is assisting the Transitional Government in Somalia to build health care, educational and social service institutions, train community health workers, and provide safe drinking water. Al Qaeda and affiliated organizations have exploited this vacuum, and have used Somalia as a base for attacks on Kenya, Tanzania and other parts of Africa. For this reason, the U.S. government will "continue working with Somalis, regardless of clan, religious, or secular affiliation to eliminate this common threat" (Somalia Report). It has continued to support the East African Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) to improve coastal security, border security, and training in special operations and civic affairs, and providing counterterrorism assistance to Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Since 1993, the U.S. has also provided over $500 in humanitarian assistance to Somalia, particularly food aid in the southern and central regions and to the 300,000 Somali refugees in neighboring countries (Somalia Report). American public diplomacy and communications strategies are generally being conducted by the State Department and ambassadors in the region, rather than Central Command (CENTCOM), although since U.S. troops are almost never deployed or directly involved in this area it tends to get very little media coverage.