Justice ethics and political philosophy rawls

.....ethics cannot avoid claims to universal truths, political philosophy cannot avoid the efficacy of universalism. Relativism is too convenient a response to resolving conflicts of interest and divergent views of governance. However, an alternative to the universalism versus relativism debate lies in Rawl's concept of justice as being the fundamental tenet of a constitutional democracy. Rawls also bases his concept of justice and political philosophy on the underlying importance of consensus (Baier, 1989). Interestingly, consensus implies a utilitarian ethical framework, which Rawls (1985) claims to move away from: "as a practical political matter no general moral conception can provide a publicly recognized basis for a conception of justice in a modern democratic state," (p. 225). Rawls means that consensus enables universal justice and fairness, but not a justice rooted in religious or moral precepts. A political philosophy like Rawls's that is focused on justice cannot distance itself from universalism, especially given that justice is presented as an ethical goal.

Religion and other sources of rigid moral codes have been common bases for law and order in non-democratic, non-secular societies. In constitutional democracies, individual differences are acknowledged and avowed but those differences do not preclude universal consideration based on humanitarian aims. Identity is connected more with personhood than with ethnicity, religion, or personal beliefs. To further clarify the essential nature and identity of people, Rawls distinguishes between private and public selves. The public self, the individual in the eye of the society, has access to and is deserving of fairness, justice, and equitable treatment under the law. This is regardless of how the private self might deviate from the normative culture. For Rawls, the non-public identity is linked to one's moral identity and one's religious affiliations. Citizens in a constitutional democracy are "free," as Rawls (1985) puts it, and also freely engaged in "a system of cooperation," which characterizes the society (p. 243).

Rawls's aims for political philosophy include consensus, cooperation, justice, and mutual responsibility and respect. These are not only valid goals of political philosophy; they are defining objectives. Baier (1989) adds that "stable social unity" is actually more important than "consensus" on its own (p. 790). Consensus, cooperation, and mutual responsibility necessarily create stable social unity in what can even be considered to be a Confucian philosophical framework. Yet unlike a Confucian ideal, the Rawls concept of consensus and cooperation simultaneously allows for and even celebrates individualism. The concept of justice allows Rawls to reconcile the otherwise competing forces of social responsibility and individual goals. Unfortunately, as Miller (2013) points out, justice is not fairly distributed even in constitutional democracies and Rawls may be therefore overly idealistic in assuming fairness can be legally equated with justice.

Philosophy is above all a pursuit of knowledge and truth, not necessarily intended to reach a moral or ethical outcome. It just so happens that ethics and politics are branches of philosophical thought and are subsequently informed by philosophical theories and traditions. Rawls endeavors to distinguish between justice and morality mainly because morality has been tainted overly much by religion. Democracy purposely distances itself from religion to create an ethical framework based on social justice and the ideal of impartiality or equality. Fundamental human rights are the prime example of the discourse of universal justice as the core moral objective of any political philosophy. Impartiality in the law is, however, unattainable because it seeks to "reduce plurality to unity," a difficult goal indeed (Young, 2011, p. 101). In an ideal world, democracy does ensure liberty and justice for all citizens but in a heterogeneous world, genuine parity and justice remain unattainable.

References

Baier, K. (1989). Justice and the aims of political philosophy. Ethics 99(4): 771-790.

Miller, D. (2013). Justice for Earthlings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rawls, J. (1985). Justice as fairness. Philosophy & Public Affairs 14(3), 1985, pp. 223-251.

Young, I.M. (2011). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.