Panama and Haiti Interventions

The public opinion differences in support for the Haiti and Panama interventions were that the latter was viewed by the people (prompted by the media) simplistically, as a mission of good guys (the U.S.) fighting bad guys (Noriega); on Haiti, the public (again prompted by the mainstream media) was the reverse—intervention was unnecessary and was just a case of Clinton trying to get the spotlight off his own back. This paper will compare and contrast the way the government handled the two interventions and discuss the media’s role in the interventions and how a “rally ‘round the flag effect” occurred for the Panama intervention—but not for the Haiti intervention.
In the Panama intervention under Bush, the media depicted the soldiers as effectively bringing Christmas and Santa Claus to the Panamanians (Milburn Panama Video 1, n.d.). The propaganda campaign made it appear as though Noriega was a ruthless dictator who was keeping presents and joy from the children. The Panamanians were shown celebrating the birth of Christ and singing Panamanian Christmas songs in the streets. The “rally ‘round the flag effect” was clearly being implemented by the media in conjunction with the U.S. government throughout the Panama intervention. The government of Noriega was overthrown, the Panama Canal re-opened, and the people liberated. The conditions of the “rally ‘round the flag effect” were all in play for the Panama invasion: there was increased support for the president (the halo effect), a methodological approach to the promulgation of news; the government was in control of the media’s propagation efforts; there was a clear crisis situation portrayed on the news; and the situation was remote from the public’s everyday experience. These conditions were met in the Panama intervention—but not in the Haiti intervention. The limits, of course, are that it is time limited and has to take place outside the scope of everyday life for Americans. That is why the Panama intervention had to be quickly conducted and end with a happy “just-in-time-for-Christmas” ending.
The Haiti intervention was different, from the media standpoint alone. For example, the tone of Tom Brokaw on NBC during the U.S. intervention in Haiti under Clinton was completely different: skeptical, sly, and mocking with a smirk spread across his face as he reported that Americans were wondering why Clinton felt he needed to send the army into Haiti and that Haitians, for their part, showed no signs of being frightened—all of this indicated that Brokaw along with the rest of the mainstream media was not going to support the intervention. As Edelman (“Rally ‘round the Flag Effect,” n.d.) notes, the “President must have control over information with which to arouse” the public if he wishes to win the public’s support for foreign intervention (slide 9). In the case of the Haitian intervention, Clinton did not have control of the message as the media was not facilitating the narrative that the White House wished to deliver. Instead, other members of the government were intent on solving the crisis in their preferred manner: former President Carter, Sen. Sam Nunn, Colin Powell all joined in a diplomatic effort to urge the Haitian leaders to accept the elected officials. Eventually, the diplomatic efforts coupled with the threat of imminent invasion worked and Aristide was able to take his seat as the nation’s democratically elected president. The military intervention then became a peace keeping mission instead of a combat mission.
The media did not put the mission in a positive light, however: they played up the voices of critics who claimed that the intervention was just a diversionary tactic to “get the spotlight off all [Clinton’] scandals” (Milburn Haiti Video 1, n.d.). Clinton tried to generate cognitions of upholding Democratic Freedom with the Haitian intervention and appeal to American love for democracy, but many skeptics did not like Aristide or his politics so this effort failed. Bush, on the other hand, succeeded in painting Noriega as a dictator who had to be stopped: he appealed to Americans’ hatred of tyranny. Bush, in other words, went low; Clinton went high—and missed the mark.
The media facilitated the cognition-generation process by promoting the Panama intervention in a positive light while downplaying the Haitian intervention in a negative light. The content on the Panama intervention showed soldiers making streets safer by getting weapons off the streets in Panama. It showed Panamanian Christians rejoicing that they could now celebrate Christmas. It noted the successes of the mission—the opening of the Canal, the overthrow of Noriega (whom the media portrayed as a slob), and the tone of the media was serious throughout, making it seem like the intervention was completely rational, logic and above board. This was a far cry from the manner in which the media depicted the Haitian intervention. Nothing positive was said about it. The complaints of critics were broadcasted again and again. The tone of the newscasters was dismissive and insulting. The mission was not taken seriously. The aim of the media seemed to want to make Clinton seem foolish.
In conclusion, the government’s handling of the U.S. interventions into Panama and Haiti were different and the media played a role in each case. When the media was working with the White House to drum up support for the Panama intervention, there was a rally round the flag effect. This did not occur with the Haitian intervention because the media was not working with the White House. Instead, it was deliberately trying to make Clinton’s policies look foolish and unnecessary.
References
Milburn Haiti Video 1. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://psych.umb.edu/Milburn/335/Milburn-PSYCH335-Haiti1.m4v
Millburn Panama Video 1. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://psych.umb.edu/Milburn/335/Milburn-PSYCH335-Panama1.m4v
Rally ‘round the Flag Effect. (n.d.). PowerPoint Presentation.