Popper's Logic of Science

Response to Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery How the Reading Has Affected What I Believe about the Nature of Science and What It Can Tell Us about the World Popper (2005) rejects the notion that inductive reasoning can lead to the identification of universals, and he uses the white swan as an example: “no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white” (p. 4)—no, and nor should it.

However, one could legitimately analyze the swan still further, identify its species and thus conclude that this species of swan is always going to be white. White is one of the characteristics of this type of swan—so why should it not be viewed as a universal characteristic of this specific species? Popper’s approach to the nature of science is rooted in the empirical analysis—in deduction rather than induction.

He thus concludes that “like every other form of inductive logic, the logic of probable inference, or ‘probability logic’, leads either to an infinite regress, or to the doctrine of apriorism” (p. 6).

What would Popper make of today’s world’s use of probability logic? Why, the financial markets are driven by probability logic; the political strategizing of today is driven by probability logic; business is driven by probability logic—what in the world is not driven by it? Popper appears to approach metaphysics in the same manner as Ayer (1990), though Popper’s emphasis on the logic of the statement serving as the basis of all knowledge rather than on sense data ala Ayer is one difference between them.

For me, I believe the inductive reasoning is just as important as deductive and I find Popper’s arguments unpersuasive. A great deal of scientific inquiry, I feel, is driven by inductive reasoning and always has been. I believe that this is Kuhn’ (1972) main point at least: after all, he states that science, ultimately, is “research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice” (p.10).

For science to be meaningful, some induction is required. Questions Regarding the Nature of the Nature of Facts, Theories, and the Scientific Enterprise Popper discusses the knowledge of facts from the standpoint of sensationalism, which is where Ayer (1990) ultimately lays his basis of epistemology. Popper on the other hand rejects this notion and insists that the knowledge is conveyed by way of relation—i.e., by the statement, or the logical communication of relations.

Sense perception is only a piece of a puzzle that remains to be put together and to rely on sensationalism as a means of understanding is to ultimately fail in the scientific enterprise, which is why Popper (2005) states that the sensationalism “doctrine founders in my opinion on the problems of induction and of universals. For we can utter no scientific statement that does not go far beyond what can be known with certainty ‘on the basis of immediate experience’” (p. 76).

This follows on Popper’s use of falsifiability as as “criterion for the empirical character of a system of statements” (p. 66). Falsifiability merely refers to the manner in which a universal may be perfected and made truer in terms of its reflection of reality.

Facts, in other words, must be approached carefully and through a systematized process, which includes the process of falsifiability: if a statement of fact (not a sense perception of fact—but a statement) can withstand the process of falsifiability, its usefulness as a universal must be acknowledged. To say, however, that all ravens are black when there exists a family of white ravens at the New York Zoo (an example Popper uses) would be to illustrated have a universal can be falsified through the application of the falsifiability criterion.

This is an important concept to consider when engaging with Popper, for it sits at the foundation of his approach to facts, theories and the nature of the scientific enterprise. What They Mean for the Way We Can Understand the World Ourselves These questions of what constitutes a fact, moreover, can have profound implications for what we can understand of our ourselves and of the world.

A certain amount of rigor, of precision, of verifiability and emphasis on validity must be applied in the field of science to determine what is real and factual and what is not. And what is real and factual must be determined by statements of fact. A statement is what can be tested—a sense perception is not verifiable evidence unless it is incorporated into a statement of fact.

That is Popper’s main point with regard to understanding the world in which we live and the role that science plays in coming to terms with that world and its meaning. But what does it say of ourselves? Ayer (1990) postulates that “that our intellects are unequal to the task of carrying out very abstract processes of reasoning without the assistance of intuition” (p. 46).

Kuhn (1972) states that paradigms present themselves for our consideration but that we must by no means feel bound to them or constricted by them, for they are the shoulders upon which we stand as we seek to understand still more deeply. Popper seems to reject Ayer’s postulation while arguing that Kuhn’s concept is acceptable only in so far as the inquiry is pursued with rigor and systematic precision.

Popper would argue that we can only know ourselves in so far as we are able to articulate a statement of fact about ourselves and then test its logic and validity through an examination of the proposition. How the Different Philosophical Positions Strike Me The different philosophical positions strike me as interesting as each seems to focus on a unique aspect of perception. Popper focuses on the empirical aspect of perception, the need to verify everything or believe nothing.

Ayer focuses on the need to admit that without intuition we are directionless, rudderless and incapable of comprehending a mere approach to the abstract ideals that we so often establish as the governing concepts of life. Kuhn focuses on how ideas change hands over time and in that exchange new paradigms are created, which are erected on new philosophical foundations.

The Age of Faith gives way to the Age of Science which gives way to the Age of Reason which yields to the Age of Romanticism which yields to Modernity and then Post-Modernity and now—here—we sit in the Information Age, wherein we are inundated with so much information that one nearly seeks only to escape and find solace in the simpler speculations of philosophy.

But science is an expression of philosophy, ultimately—at least the pursuit of science is an expression of how one perceives the study of wisdom.

Popper poses the question of whether philosophy has a right to exist at all—but leaves it unanswered in favor of a digression on how philosophy only addresses pseudo-problems in the eyes of positivists: “Time and again an entirely new philosophical movement arises which finally unmasks the old philosophical problems as pseudo-problems, and which confronts the wicked nonsense of philosophy with the good sense of meaningful, positive, empirical, science” (Popper, 2005, p. 30).

I do not view philosophy as a meaningless waste of time in which it tackles only pseudo-problems; neither do I view empirical science as the measure by which all wisdom can be judged. Popper is the empiricist—but that in itself has a philosophy at root. What I Conclude What I conclude is that science, as conceived by Popper or by Ayer or by Kuhn is not so distinct from philosophical moorings as some may like to think. Perspective is shaped by belief.

Popper’s perspective is that only facts which can be tested in the form of a statement have any chance of possessing validity. For that reason, he opposes the concept of induction, which Ayer on the other hand recognizes as a requirement in abstract thinking. Kuhn analyzes the major paradigm shifts in how scientific fact and theory is generated—but in each case there is a philosophy that underlies the approach to the meaning of the scientific endeavor.

I am more open in my approach to science and do not feel it necessary to conclude anything. Medical science is rarely conclusive, but that does not prevent us from acting. Hunches have driven discoveries for ages, and so induction should not prevent us from acting either.

Would Popper have discovered the source of the cholera outbreak in London in the same manner as Snow did in the 19th century? How should we proceed to understanding the world and ourselves without a little license, a little liberty, and a little creative imagination and energy? Granted, Snow verified his inquiry by examining the facts and looking at the water from the well at what turned out to be ground zero for the cholera outbreak in the city.

Thus it is important to consider that imagination and intuition are only helpful tools; microscopes and lenses are more helpful tools; and hard data is still more helpful. But all these things go together and I see no need to define a scientific approach in such rigorous terms or with such exact and precise parameters that merely point to the philosophical underpinning.