How racial stereotypes distort eyewitness memory and identification

¶ … Racial Bias/Stereotypes on Eyewitness Memory

In our quest for a democratic, tolerant, and racist-free society, we affirm and believe that although earlier centuries may have prejudice-prone and biased, we of the 21st century have largely overcome that disposition. Yet, as Fiske (2002), for instance, shows 10% of Americans persist in conspicuously voicing their bias, but a full 80% practice subtle bias which manifest itself by cool treatment towards the outsider, or by rejecting outsider altogether. This sort of prejudice may become what is known as 'symbolic racism' where the possessor turns to convention to boost his views (for instance, "well, everyone knows that they are violent.")

People may affirm that becoming aware of the existence and irrationality of their prejudice will influence them to reverse it, but countless cases show that prejudice is so invasive and insidious that it is, what Brekke and Wilson (1994) termed, a mental contaminant, and what Bargh (e.g. 2002) over and again informed is instinctive, implicit, and extremely resilient to change. Today's primarily cognitive approach to stereotypes perceives stereotypes as initiating from cultural conditioning, therefore inherent in us from the earliest of years and, consequently, internalized to an uncontrollable degree. The evolutionary perspective posits that stereotypes function as mental schema, and as such are heuristics that instinctively compel us to visualize objects and people in certain manner.

Not all stereotypes are negative. They may act for our benefit by liberating some of the 'mental clutter' and freeing our resources for more important matters. In an evolutionary manner, stereotypes are supposed to instinctively prod us to the realization what one category is positive for us, whereas another is negative. Unfortunately, however, stereotypes -- negative stereotypes in this context -- may be harmful, too, since, aside from resulting in erroneous thinking, they may also cause harm to another. There is the self-reinforced prophecy which states that perception of another may prompt the target to reciprocate in kind (namely, to actualize the perception), whilst, lastly, there is the unfortunate happenstance that even though we may sincerely desire to do what is right, instinctive stereotyping (our tendency to view the other in a categorical rather than in a particular manner) may cause one to interpret incidents in an incorrect manner thus effecting eyewitness memory and account.

The following essay addresses this point by presenting the three main posited causes of stereotyping, elaborating on their power and resistance to human knowledge, indicating how they can affect eyewitness memory, and, concluding, by presenting some of the prime prejudice-reducing interventions that have been formulated to reverse bias and by evaluating their result. The conclusion sums up the effect of prejudice on eyewitness memory, and what we can do to restrain it.

Chapter 1.

The three main positive causes of stereotype, posited by contemporary accounts include the following:

Cognitive Orientation

This is, allegedly, the most popular contemporary theory: Stereotypes are mental schema that originates from social and cultural conditioning; evolutionary psychology assumes that they are evolutionarily determined and, as such, function for our survival. They are innate, instinctive, and resilient to control. Prominent models include Macrae and Bodenhausen's (2000) whole-or-none association where evidence suggests that activating a portion of the schema tends to activate the unit as a whole in an all-or-none fashion that is seemingly resilient to control. More so, through repetition, mental schemas become ever more intense causing their representative semantic or lexical node, when primed, to become instinctively and speedily activated and then spreading to evaluative nodes (Klauer & Musch, 2003). In this way, strength of activation is increased though object-evaluation and instinctive categorical and holistic, rather than particularistic percepts of the target are formed. And these percepts may not always be accurate. Most, if not all of the prejudice intervention models, incorporate this orientation. Reflective of the 'computer age' and the current paradigm of thinking, the cognitive approach believes, as Stangor (2009) in his Introduction to the "Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination" proclaims, that "stereotypes and prejudices .. are, of course, developed as all cognitive representations are developed, and we have a good idea of the cognitive process involved in this regard." (pp.17). "The dominant image of prejudice," as Duckitt (1989) in his review of the history of prejudice concludes, "came to be that it was an inevitable outcome of cognitive categorization" (1189). Critics, however, feel that the cognitive approach is lacking for the following reasons: it fails to explain the difference in prejudice evidenced by people; whilst some evidence slight prejudice, others indicate extreme and ineradicable bias towards outsiders. Secondly, interventions, although modeled on the cognitive theory, are not always successful in eradicating bias, and thirdly, affect is a substance of prejudice and is, oftentimes, stronger than cognition. For that reason, social scientists have presented alternative determinants of prejudice

Motivational

The motivational stream posits prejudice to be a factor of social threat. Some outgroups -- Asians, Jews, career women, Black processionals, rich people - are resented and disliked since they seem to threaten the in-group, whilst others -- elderly, disabled, housewives -- are pitied and disrespected for their perceived incompetence, and outliers, such as the homeless, drug addicts, and the very poor are condemned as being disreputable and manipulative (Fiske, 2002). Social or personal motives, on the other hand, such as attempts to curry favor with a prospective employer may compel one to individuate rather than to categorize.

Affective Orientation

Using MRI-based studies as their primary contention, supporters of this approach point to the fact that prejudice is an attitude and as such constitutes affect (i.e. emotion) too. More so, fMRI images demonstrate that the amygdala, a neural region intricately involved with emotion becomes activated in the prejudice-producing situation (e.g., Amodio et al., 2003). People think in terms of 'I feel' rather than an 'I think' manner (Schwarz & Clore, 1983); they tend to evaluatively sum up the other in an emotional rather than in an analytical manner. Emotion, in fact, precedes cognition, overwhelms it, and usually binds it to its decree. In short, emotional penetrability causes cognitive impenetrability (Dalgleish & Power, 1999).

The truth is that prejudice (namely negative stereotypes) are probably a combination of both cognition and emotion depending on the strength of the person's attitude, on his or her inclination to prefer a cognitive or emotional approach (which is dependent upon the individual's character), and on the intensity of the situation.

The fact that prejudice most likely consists of both components can best be seem from the experiment conducted by Wittenbrink and colleagues (2001) where they demonstrated that differences may be attributed to the fact that two different primes - conceptual and evaluative -- are used and that these tapped into two different memory contents: the conceptual task results in the phenomenon of the participants responding to stereotypes typical of the primed group, whilst the evaluative task results in "a more generalized form of automatic prejudice" (251).

Regardless of its determinant, prejudice is harmful, specifically so since it may influence eyewitness memory as the following section shows.

Interventions Posited to Reduce / Ameliorate Unintended Eyewitness Bias

McCleland and Chappel (1998) have proposed a model of recognition memory that attempts to correctly internalize the face of an individual belonging to another race by focusing on and differentiating the facial features of the target. They propose that individuals store features of a given stimulus in memory and that each time that they again perceive these features in reality, they reinforce their mental structure resulting in an increase in the psychological sense of familiarity. This, consequently, causes a declension in perceiving the examplar of another race as novel, Thus, as

McClelland and Chappell conclude, "familiarity breeds differentiation" (p. 726). Several other models, such as that by Shifrin and Styevers have studied and come to similar conclusions and proposed associated interventions.

Safeguards have been implemented to ascertain that, as far as possible, bias is excluded in conclusions that are based on eyewitness evidence. There is cross-examination by defense counsel, expert testimony regarding eyewitness testimony, and cautionary instructions to juror. Nonetheless, Meissner & Brigham (2001) assert that these preventives are insufficient and that more is needed. These preventives may particularly be insufficient since as Giner-Sorrolla, Chaiken, and Lutz (2002) demonstrated jurors' prior ideological beliefs about the plaintiffs may influence their decision making process, having a more pervasive effect on their judgment than coolly processing the case would have had. Innocent people have been, and still are, convicted on the basis of prejudice.

Meissner & Brigham (2001) do suggest various palliative and preventative strategies including suggesting that the judge could point out that an expressed certainty for a perpetrator's identification may not indicate accuracy.

'the United States vs. Telfaire" (1972) instructions state that:

The juror should evaluate whether the witness "had the capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the defendant," and whether the witness's identification "was the product of his [sic] own recollection." Jurors are told that they may also take into account "the strength of the identification [certainty]," whether the identification "may have been influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to him [sic] for identification," and the "length of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity of the witness to see the defendant" (Meissner & Brigham, 2001, 23).

Critics still however fail to perceive how the Trefail instructions address all the elements that may evoke faulty bias.

Cognitive Interventions to Impede Prejudice

When bias plays a role, it is advocated that reversing the bias by techniques such as perspective-taking (Dovidio et al., 2004), awareness of one's moral hypocrisy, and training in complex thinking and in statistical logic (e.g., Nisbett, 1993; Sternberg, 2003) may reverse or alter prejudice. However, such findings claim only "modest success," particularly since they have been perpetrated mainly as laboratory studies on middle-class, liberal minded, university students rather than in a real life context; they, and others, therefore indicate, as Paluck and Green's (2009) thorough review on prejudice intervention shows, mixed results. Exposure to examplars have shown some measure of success (Devine et al., 2009). Considerable research, however, has demonstrated that people tend to perceive these individuals as atypical of their group. Bias remains and unduly effects eyewitness percept.

Individuation

Closely identical to McCleland and Chappel's (1998) model of recognition memory that differentiating the facial features of the target may consequent in more correctly identifying features, Bower (1998) and Fiske & Neuberg (1990) suggest that individuating rather than categorizing the other can make his face not only more familiar but also more palatable. This is done by focusing on and reducing the other to elements other than his or her externals. Unfortunately, most social interactions are too brief to enable one to aggregate a fuller picture.

Contact Hypothesis

Perhaps the most popular and seemingly most effective idea, Allport's theory of encountering and becoming acquainted with members of other races and cultures has been often used to mixed results. On the one hand, in an intra- in extra- laboratory situation (Paluck & Green, 2009), it seems to provide compelling evidence of reduced prejudice (e.g., Pettigtrew & Trop, 2006). Whilst cases have found reduction in bias to outsiders, other studies have found little if reverse effects. Much may ultimately depend on the strength of the individual's perspective, on his or her readiness to work on prejudice, on his or her acknowledgment of existence of bias towards outsider and on other conditions such as the makeup of the group. More so, disappointing group situations reinforce the threat (Stangor et al. 1996), whilst former subjective experience may skew perception (Bodenhausen, 2009).

Either way, bias towards outsiders or others exists, is very much a part of American society, and affects the eyewitness account.

Conclusion

That eyewitness accounts are influenced by prejudice seems to be an undeniable indication. Children as young as three years old have been found to be influenced by stereotypical erroneous reports of another, to the extent that they report seeing incidents that have not existed. It has also been found that individuals evidence a greater proclivity for remembering faces and features of their own race than that of others. Stereotyping is instinctive, hasty, and almost impossible -- if not totally impossible to control. This is specially so since it has become so internalized and may be evolutionary in origin. The best one can do is to warn jurors and eyewitnesses of the possibility of the inaccuracy of their reports. Interventions try to promote accuracy and staunch bias with different results. Since prejudice (i.e. negative stereotyping) is a result of both cognition and affect, each being involved to varying extent, it seems to be a permanent part of us. The utmost we can achieve is to realize the extent to which prejudice drives our lives, to take more care in affirming certainty in our conclusions of others, and to be wary in accepting reports from others that affirm their certainty about identifications or happenings of events.

Sources

Allport, G. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.

Bargh, J.A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, efficiency, and control in social cognition. In Robert S. Wyer, Jr. (Ed.), Handbook of social cognition (pp 675-694). Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates.

Duckitt, R. (1992). Psychology and prejudice: A historical analysis and integrative framework. American Psychologist, 11, 1183-1193.

Fiske, S.T. (2002). What we know now about bias and intergroup conflict, the problem of the century. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 123-128.

Fiske, S.T., & Neuberg, S.L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation, from category-based to individuating processes: Influences of information and motivation on attention and interpretation, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 1-74.

Giner-Sorolla, R. (2004). Is affective material in attitudes more accessible than cognitive material? The moderating role of attitude basis. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 761 -- 780.

Leichtman, M.D., & Ceci, S.J (1995) the effects of stereotypes and suggestions on preschooler's reports. Developmental Psychology, 31, 568-578

Macrae, C.N., & Bodenhausen, G.V. (2000). Social cognition: Categorical person perception British Journal of Psychology, 92, 239 -- 255.

McClelland, J.L. & Chappell, M. (1998). Familiarity breeds differentiation: A subjective likelihood approach to the effects of experience in recognition memory. Psychological Review, 105, 724-760.

Macleod, M.D., Frowley, J. & Shephard, J.W. (1994). Whole body information: its relevance to eyewitnesses. In David Frank Ross, J. Don Read, & Michael P. Toglia (Ed.) Adult eyewitness testimony: current trends and development. Cambridge [England]; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 83-95.

Meissner, C.A., & Brigham, J. (2001) Thirty years of investigating the own-race bias in memory for faces. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 7, 3-35.

Nisbett, R.E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Paluck, E.L., & Green, D.P. (2009). Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 339-367.

Stangor, C., (2009). The study of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination within social psychology. In Todd D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. New York: Psychology Press.

Trope, Y. & Thompson, E.P. (1997). Looking for truth in all the wrong places? Asymmetric search of individuating information about stereotyped group members. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 229-241.

Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C.M., & Park, B. (2001). Spontaneous prejudice in context: Variability in automatically activated attitudes. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 87, 817-827.

Yarmey, D.A. (1994). Earwitness evidence: memory for a perpetrator's voice. In David Frank Ross, J. Don Read, & Michael P. Toglia (Ed.) Adult eyewitness testimony: current trends and development. Cambridge [England]; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 71-83.