The Nature and Origin of Justice

Introduction
Justice is one of the oldest prevailing conceptions and has been deliberated upon by numerous philosophers. It has been one of the significant issues in the historical account of philosophy. Justice, as a Greek concept, was considered to be the virtue of the soul and action. Essentially, the term just is used to define an individual who usually partakes in what is deemed to be morally right and is inclined to giving everyone what is due for him or her. The main objective of this essay is to discuss extensively the origin and nature of justice from the philosophical perspectives of key philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Hume, and Kant.
In his philosophy, Plato places a great deal of significance to the notion of justice. Plato argued that justice can be deemed as the quality of soul, in virtue of which human beings put to one side the unreasonable yearning to taste every desire and to get self-seeking gratification out of every object and lodged themselves to release of a single function for the general benefit (Scott, 2015). From the perspective of Plato, justice can be deemed to be harmony. Plato makes the argument that a state that is just is attained in a circumstance in which every individual undertakes his or her own job, where every part functions and operates with an aim to the good of the entirety. In a society that is just, the rulers, the military as well as the working individuals, all partake in which they are supposed to (Bhandari, 1998). Furthermore, in a society that is just, the rulers have wisdom, the soldiers have brevity and those producing material goods carry out self-control and are not overcome by their yearnings for gain. Plato specifies that a human being comprises of three key elements including reason, spirit, and appetite. A person is considered to be just when every part of his or her soul undertakes its functions devoid of interrupting with those of other elements. A fitting instance is that the reason ought to rule in the best interests of the whole soul with wisdom and prudence. When all of the three aforementioned elements come to the agreement that the reason alone ought to rule, then it is considered that there is justice within the individual (Bhandari, 1998).
A second renowned philosopher that delves into the origin and nature of justice is Aristotle. Imperatively, Aristotle asserts that justice entails in what is lawful and fair, with fairness encompassing impartial distributions and the rectification of what is inequitable. Fundamentally, Aristotle employs the term “just” in manner that brings about two separate meanings. To begin with, it is predominantly employed to delineate a conduct that is in agreement with the law. Basically, the term is used to delineate a conduct that is in conformity with whatever establishes an authoritative implement of social and moral control. Taking this into consideration, justice alludes to a moral inclination which renders human beings suitable to do just things and which impels them to act justly and to desire for what is just. It denotes primarily to the application or compliance to particular authoritative rules of human behavior and should, as a result be called the virtue of moral justice (Chroust and Osborn, 1942). In a second meaning, Aristotle also delineates justice to represent equality or in a precise manner to be fair. Aristotle claims that an individual whose behavior and actions are unjust, an individual who acts in contradiction to certain moral principles and therefore lacks virtue is not necessarily unjust. Justice in regard to equality encompasses external aspects in the sense that it is neither too minimal nor too great. Therefore just is the ideal measure between two extremes of deficiency and excess (Chroust, And Osborn, 1942).
Hume upholds that justice takes into account the observation of guidelines or agreements which are of human creation, and that, as a result, our acquiring of knowledge of justice is an experimental affair of discovering what these guidelines and agreements are (Harrison, 1980). In accordance to Hume, virtuous actions develop their merit solely from virtuous motives, and are deemed merely as indications of those motives. Hume fails to find a common naturally taking place motivation to act in a just manner. Incapable of elucidating the virtues linked with justice in regard to naturally occurring motivations to act, of which human being naturally support, he comes to the conclusion that we ought to allow that the sense of justice and injustice is not stemmed from nature but rather emanated artificially though necessarily from education and human conventions (Reidy, 1993). Imperatively, Hume considers justice to be an artificial virtue in two different respects. To begin with, human nature on its own does not persuade or encourage humans to act in a just manner. Second of all, the thought of an action that is just, in and of itself does not naturally generate pleasure but rather it is the thought of a just act bearing in mind a particular conventional context that generates pleasure. Solely within a situation of particular artificial human conventions, does human nature direct human beings to act in a just manner and give approval of just actions (Reidy, 1993).
Furthermore, justice, as Hume normally deliberates upon encompasses in respect for rights of property. For instance, he gives an example of an act of justice as being the repayment of a loan. He perceived justice to be no more as well as no less than the implementation of rules and guidelines which express the distinction between property and possession. Rules of justice, as comprehended by Hume, delineate the distinction between rightful ownership and possession (Harris, 2010). Taking this into consideration, an act is deemed to be just to the magnitude that it is not in violation of those rules. Nonetheless, one of the key criticisms of this perspective is that Hume argues less efficaciously for the conventional nature of justice. Notably, he fails to incorporate justice in self-interest, partly for the reason that he fails to point out unequivocally what he means by self-interest, and partly for the reason that he fails to take into consideration conceivable alternative grounds for justice. What is more, Hume fails to elucidate traditional property rights as the consequence of self-interest taking part indirectly through convention. Ultimately, whereas Hume eradicates the likelihood that justice can be enlightened through God or reason, he fails to eradicate the likelihood that it can be elucidated through the supremacy of a few, instead of the self-interest of all, working indirectly through convention (Reidy, 1993).
Immanuel Kant made a distinction between justice and other moral principles by taking note that the rules of justice relate unequivocally to external actions and are not reliant on virtuous motives for their gratification. Kant elucidates three key outcomes based on his theory of justice. To begin with, justice solely encompasses external actions by which one individual can impact other individuals, whether directly or indirectly (Smith, 2016). A second aspect is that justice does not deal with the yearnings, wishes or necessities of other individuals. These aspects allude to the deliberate virtues of generosity and charity, whereas justice deals with whether or not we respect the equal freedom of other persons to live their lives as they deem fit (Smith, 2016). The third aspect pointed out by Kant is that justice is concerned only with the form of social relationships and not with their content. Bearing this in mind, it can be noted that Kant tied to ground justice in the moral autonomy of rational agents. In particular, this approach was able to set Kant apart from the numerous other philosophers that tried to justify the rules of justice by making a call to their social utility. For instance, as aforementioned, Hume considers rules of justice to be vindicated for the reason that they are pivotal to sustaining social order and prosperity. However, on the other hand, Kant does not appeal to neither experience nor social utility in his rationalization of rights and justice. Kant argues that the basic right to freedom for human beings can be rationalized by pure real-world reason devoid of resorting to experiential observations regarding the social utility of this right (Smith, 2016).
Conclusion
This paper seeks to discuss the origin and nature of justice. In regard to Plato, justice is a virtue that institutes sensible order, with every part undertaking its suitable role and not interrupting with the proper operation of other parts. From the philosophical perspective of Aristotle, justice encompasses in what is deemed to be lawful and fair, with farness taking into account equitable distributions and the act of correcting what is inequitable. As for Hume, justice fundamentally serves public utility by safeguarding property. Lastly, in the case of Kant, justice is deemed to be a virtue whereby persons respect the freedom of others, their autonomy as well as dignity by not intruding with their voluntary actions, in the condition that those do not violate the rights of others.




References
Bhandari, D. R. (1998). Plato’s concept of justice: An analysis. Ancient Philosophy.
Chroust, A. H., & Osborn, D. L. (1941). Aristotle's conception of justice. Notre Dame Law., 17, 129.
Harris, J. A. (2010). Hume on the moral obligation to justice. Hume studies, 36(1), 25-50.
Harrison, J. (1980). Hume's theory of justice. Oxford Scholarship Online.
Reidy, D. A. (1993). Does Hume have a theory of justice? Auslegung 19(1): 63 – 74.
Scott, D. (2015). Levels of Argument: A Comparative Study of Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford University Press, USA.
Smith, G. H. (2016). Immanuel Kant’s Theory of Justice. Libertarianism. Retrieved from: https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/immanuel-kants-theory-justice